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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Contrary to the image of large modern corporations, majority of firms around the world are 
controlled by families (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999). More than thirty percent of 
US firms and forty percent of German and French firms with yearly revenue of over one billion 
US Dollars are family controlled (The Economist, 2015). Statistics from the European Family 
Businesses (2012) shows that 75 percent of net employment growth in the United States are 
attributable to family firms. Indeed, about 36 percent of firms in the S&P are family firms (Block, 
2009). Some of the oldest leading firms are associated with families in terms of ownership and 
control (The Economist, 2015). Family firms are thought of as largely conservative such that the 
form of ownership and control as well as the preservation of nonfinancial goals or socioemotional 
wealth are some of their defining characteristics (Caprio, Croci & Del Giudice, 2011). 
Socioemotional wealth refers to the non-financial benefits derived from the ownership of a firm 
such as being able to provide employment for family members, perpetuating the family dynasty, 
the ability to exercise control or influence, the prestige associated with ownership and family 
identity (Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel & Monyano-Fuentes, 2007; Miller & Le Breton-
Miller, 2014). 
A consensus has yet to emerge on a generally accepted definition of family firms among 
scholars due to the complex nature of family firms (Westhead, Howorth & Cowling, 2002; Block, 
2009; Klein 2005). Habbershon & Williams, 1999). For instance Mandl, (2008) signals the 
existence of over 90 definitions of family firms. Furthermore, Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester & 
Cannela (2007) also indicate that 28 definitions of family firms are used in the literature. This goes 
to indicate the complex nature of finding an all-encompassing definition of family firms. Villalonga 
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& Amit (2006) consider a family firm as one where the founder of the firm, a blood relative, or an 
in-law acts as a CEO or as a block-holder. Andersson & Reeb (2003a) refer to this as founder 
owned family firm. According to Vikstrom & Westernberg (2010), a firm is a family firm if at least 
one member of the family owns it and at least a member of the family is active in the management 
of the firm. The common thing among these definitions is that they are centered on ownership, 
management, control and the family generation involved (Block, 2009). 
The lack of consensus on a widely accepted definition makes comparison between different 
studies difficult while also making it difficult to generalize findings or test theories given that some 
theories predict differences between family and non-family firms (Block, 2009). Therefore, 
scholars have tended to use several definitions to ensure that results are robust irrespective of the 
definition used. 
As the definition remains the crux of family business research, the operational definition 
adopted in this thesis is as follows. A firm is said to be a family firm if the combined stock 
ownership of the family is above 5% and a member of the family is either CEO or chairman of the 
board of directors. This definition is similar to the definition used by Anderson and Reeb (2003a) 
and BusinessWeek (2003). Based on this definition and the BusinessWeek issue of July 2003 (pp. 
111-114), as well as a manual search, Block (2009:237-242) published a list of all family firms and 
non-family firms in the S&P 500 as at July 20031.  
A question arises about the relevance of characterizing firms as family firms. It is important to 
note that the growth of US industries during the early stages of modern capitalism is largely 
attributed to the professionalization of firms or the use of salaried managers whose sole duty was 
to run these large firms (Chandler, 1990). In comparison to Germany and the US, Chandler (1990) 
                                                          
1 The book by Block is publicly available /at: https://epdf.tips/long-term-orientation-of-family-firms.html.  
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ascribed the plummeting industrial capabilities of Britain prior to world word II to the dominance 
of family firms. He noted that while US firms aimed at long term growth and profit, British family 
firm owners who double as managers aimed at short term financial returns or steady cash flow as 
retained earnings is often too low due to high dividend payments (Chandler, 1990). The underlying 
rationale is that family owners are more susceptible to pressure from family members who may not 
be involved in the day to day running of the firms, to pay higher dividends. On the contrary 
professional managers are better placed to handle the pressure from members of the owning family 
(Block 2009). 
Porter (1998) expresses a divergent view and laments that US firms invest less in 
competitiveness enhancing assets and capabilities such as supplier relations, R&D and employee 
training and development. This dynamic is attributable to the short term nature of the relationship 
between firms and external capital providers such as institutional investors (Porter, 1992). While a 
significant proportion of total equity is controlled by institutional investors, the portfolio of these 
investors are also diversified across firms thereby leaving only small holdings in each firm (Block, 
2009). Furthermore, institutional investors are motivated by short to medium term returns on their 
investments. This does not only limit the capital available to firms, but also exacerbates the 
shuffling of institutional investors between firms (Porter, 1992). This trend undermines the 
competitiveness of the firms in which these investments are made (Porter, 1998) 
Porter (1992) further observed that dedicated owners who hold large stakes in firms and also 
act as principals rather than agents tend to have long term ambitions with regard to their 
investments. The intergenerational transfer of ownership ambition of family firms underlie the 
longer term outlook of these firms (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Chrisman & Patel, 2012) 
which makes them similar to Porter’s idea of dedicated owners (Block, 2009). This historical 
account underscores the importance of family firms. 
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1.1 The Involvement of Family Firms in M&As and Innovation 
Due to increased competition and rapid technological change, firms no longer have ample time 
to develop technological capabilities or enhance existing competencies to cope with the fast 
changing demands of the market (Kotlar, De Massis, Frattini, Bianchini & Fang, 2013; Graebner, 
2004; Cassiman, Colombo, Garrone & Veugelers, 2005). The complex nature of products and the 
technologies and processes involved in production, has placed mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as 
enchanting strategies to make up for the technological as well as capability deficits of firms 
(Cassiman et al, 2005; Ahuja and Katila, 2001). M&As thus is a vehicle for access to technologies 
and other resources, which are critical to a firm’s long term innovation success as well as its 
competitive advantage in an industry (Maksimovic et al, 2011; Hagedoorn and Duyster, 2002). 
M&As also reflect recent interest in collaborative and open innovation in the development of 
technological competences (Kotlar et al, 2013; Dahlander & Gann, 2010). The growing numbers 
of M&As transactions also indicate that M&As are not only a strategy for gaining access to new 
knowledge, technology assets and other capabilities, they are also used as firm growth and 
internationalization strategies (Ahuja and Novelli, 2014; Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; 
Cassiman & Colombo, 2006; Teerikangas, Very & Pisano., 2011). Prior research shows that M&As 
continue to be a popular strategy. For instance in the year 2016, 13000 M&As were recorded in the 
USA alone summing up to a total deal value of 1.700 trillion (Fernandez, 2018; S&P Global Market 
Intelligence, 2017). It is important to note that a significant proportion of these M&As are 
technology based (Cassiman and Colombo, 2006; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008) which is a 
manifestation of the growing quest to gain access to target technology related resources (Capron, 
Dussauge & Mitchell, 1998; Cassiman, Colombo, Graebner, 2004) as well as intellectual property 
(Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Graebner, 2004; Grimpe & Hussinger, 2014). 
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The literature on M&A suggests that it was not until about a hundred years ago that the first 
comprehensive literature which covered a wide areas including transaction analysis to post deal 
performance was recognized (Dewing, 1921). This was examined from different angles including 
financial, strategic, behavioral and organizational points of views (Worek, 2017). 
Recent studies have shown that even though M&As remain a popular growth strategy, most 
of these M&As do not succeed as an estimated 50-80 percent of M&As fail (Worek, 2017; 
Cartwright, 2005; Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006). This brings to the fore the vital issue of the 
motives associated with the decision of firms to engage in M&As. While research shows a myriad 
of reasons, chief among them are resource redeployment (Capron, Dussauge, & Mitchell, 1998; 
Uhlenbruck, Hitt, & Semadeni, 2006); cost reductions (Graham, Lemmon, & Wolf, 2002) and 
market power (Hitt, Harrison, & Ireland, 2001), improving innovation performance (Kotlar et al, 
2013) etc. 
As mergers tend to be witnessed in clusters or waves, the M&A literature identifies five waves 
starting from the early 1900s (Martynova & Rennebourg, 2008). The rise of merger waves have 
largely been attributed to several factors including shocks in the business environment, managerial 
herding, and the development of financial markets (Martynova & Rennebourg, 2008). 
The ownership structure of a firm has implications for its M&A behaviour (Patel & King, 
2015) as well as post M&A innovation. It is well known that organizations owned by families 
follow different strategic goals than other organizations especially regarding M&A decisions 
(Kotlar et al, 2013; Connelly, Hoskisson, Tihanyi & Certo, 2010. Prior research suggests that 
family firms are less likely to engage in risky activities such as R&D investments (Chrisman & 
Patel, 2012) and M&As because it may threaten ownership and control (Caprio et al, 2011; Shim 
& Okamuro, 2011). However, the reality is that family firms are quite involved in M&As (Worek, 
2017; Family Capital, 2015; Basu, Dimitrova & Paeglis, 2009). Even though research about the 
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involvement of family firms in M&As has only started to gain momentum in last decade (Worek, 
2017), the first recognized study is three decades old (Astrachan, 1988). 
Recent empirical findings show that the M&A behaviour of family firms tend to differ from 
firms with other forms of ownership (Gomez-Mejia et al, 2018; Feito-Ruiz & Menendez-Requejo, 
2010; Worek, 2017). This is because family firms follow different goals and apply different 
decision-making processes in comparison to non-family firms. Since family firms are expected to 
be less likely to engage in risky activities such as radical innovation or M&As, it would be of great 
interest for academic scholars and practitioners to understand the conditions under which family 
firms engage in risky actions such as M&As and the implications for innovation (Kotlar et al, 
2013). 
To understand the phenomena of family firms’ involvement in M&As, a behavioural 
perspective is especially relevant in exploring the factors that drive strategic decisions of family 
firms. The behavioural agency model (BAM), an offshoot of the prospect theory, provides a 
theoretical framework that allows us to explain why in some circumstances family firms would 
still be prepared to engage in risky activities such as innovation (Chrisman & Patel, 2012) and 
M&A activities (Gomez-Mejia, Patel & Zellweger, 2018). The behavioural model underscores that 
loss aversion, rather than risk aversion, and problem framing are the drivers that shape the 
behavioral preferences of people (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejía, 
1998). Loss aversion implies that individuals are more concerned with avoiding losses than with 
making gains. Problem framing contrives choices from an angle of gains and losses in relation to 
current endowments or socioemotional wealth in the case of family firms (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). Problem framing is influenced by the way a choice is presented. Individuals tend to engage 
in risk seeking behaviors when a choice is negatively framed and the vice versa. (Chrisman and 
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Patel, 2012). In short the likelihood of engaging M&A transactions depends on whether family 
firms are performing above or below aspiration levels (Iyer & Miller, 2008). 
The BAM explains why owners of family firms are loss averse with regard to their 
socioemotional wealth, thus implementing decisions aimed at preserving socioemotional wealth 
that arises as a result of control of the firm (Gomez-Mejia et al, 2007). Conflicts between financial 
and socioemotional wealth goals may occur. It is however, possible for these goals to converge at 
some point in the framing of strategic choices (Zellweger & Nason, 2008; Chrisman and Patel, 
2012). The existence of conflicts between financial and SEW makes the acquisition decisions of 
family firms a mixed gamble. Mixed gambles refers to decisions with possible outcomes of gains 
and losses (Bromiley, 2009). The prevailing logic is that while BAM predicts that family firms will 
always be less inclined to engage in risky activities than non-family firms, the concept of mixed 
gambles allows us to reach opposite predictions for situations where the expected gains outweigh 
the expected losses in SEW. 
While research on innovation in family firms is limited and less understood (De Massis, 
Frattini, & Lichtenthaler, 2013), existing research indicates that family firms generally invest less 
in R&D as compared to non-family firms (Block, 2012; Chrisman & Patel, 2012). The results in 
this regard are largely consistent. Also, prior research shows that innovation activities are carried 
out differently between family and non-family firms (De Massis Di Minin & Frattini., 2015). 
Meanwhile, empirical evidence about innovation outputs of family firms remains largely mixed 
(Massis et al, 2015). External acquisition of technology resources is an important innovation 
strategy for many firms including family firms. The inherent difference between family firms and 
other types of firms position them to be able to utilize acquired resources differently which should 
lead to different innovation outcomes (Kotlar et al, 2013).  
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This thesis contributes to the M&A and family business strategy literature by taking a 
behavioural approach to understand the antecedents of M&As among family firms and non-family 
firms. Furthermore, the thesis brings to the fore the mechanisms that drive post M&A innovation 
in family firms. 
The next section briefly discusses the various chapters. 
1.2 Research Questions 
The effect of ownership on M&A and innovation is an aspect of strategy that is growing in 
importance given the increasing involvement of family firms in M&A transactions. This thesis 
focuses on the behavioural antecedents of M&As involving family firms and the implications of 
M&As for innovation in family firms. In doing so, the thesis empirically examines the following 
questions: 1) Are family firms more likely to engage in M&As than non-family firms? 2) Do family 
firms become more innovative than non-family firms after M&As? 3) How do merger waves 
influence the choice of M&A targets? 
The second chapter takes the view that it is a well-documented fact that strategic decisions of 
family firms are not motivated by only financial considerations, but also to a large extent by non-
financial considerations (Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson & Monyano-Fuentes 
2007; Zellweger, Nason, Nordqvist & Brush 2011, Kellermanns, Eddleston & Zellweger 2012; 
Miller & Le Bretton 2014). The focus on SEW, however, also implies that family firms have a long 
run perspective on their corporate decisions because of their desire to transfer ownership to future 
generations (Zellweger, 2007; Le Bretton-Miller & Miller 2006; Classen, Carre, Van Gils & Peters 
2014). This means that family firms have strong incentives to engage in activities with a long run 
perspective and the potential to increase SEW such as R&D (Westhead 1997, Craig & Dibrel 2006, 
Classen et al. 2011) and firm acquisitions.  
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Family firms’ strategic decision making is often analyzed using BAM (Gomez-Mejia et al. 
2007; Lim, Lubatkin & Wiseman 2010; Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman & Chua 2012; 
Chrisman & Patel 2012). Due to their focus on SEW family firms are believed to be loss averse 
(Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007). However, the BAM and the concept of loss aversion do not account 
for potential SEW gains that the engagement in risky activities can generate. Under BAM family 
firms engagement in firm acquisitions is expected to be lower than that of non-family firms (Shim 
& Okamuro 2011, Caprio et al. 2011). However, the concept of mixed gambles allows us to reach 
opposite predictions under certain circumstances. This chapter draws from the concept of mixed 
gambles (Bromiley 2010; Gomez-Mejia et al. 2013) in order to investigate the involvement of 
family firms in firm acquisitions. Here, an acquisition is viewed as a mixed gamble which can 
potentially lead to gains and losses (Gomez-Mejia, Campbell, Martin, Hoskisson, Makri, & Sirmon 
2013). Potential gains and losses are determined by financial performance as well as by SEW, 
which distinguishes family firms from non-family firms. It is therefore hypothesized that family 
firms are more likely to engage in related acquisitions, a means of related diversification 
(Andersson & Reeb 2003b), than non-family firms and that this effect is stronger for family firms 
in a gain frame, i.e. those that perform above the industry average.  
The third chapter acknowledges the involvement of family firms in M&As and focuses on 
estimating the post M&A innovation in family firms from a resource based view perspective. The 
chapter observes that family firms are endowed with distinct resources such as organizational social 
capital, survivability capital, patient financial capital etc. which all favour long term innovation in 
family firms (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003, Acquaah, 2016) By taking into considering the fact that mergers 
take place in waves, the paper explores the idea that the early phase of a merger wave consist of a 
large pool of potential targets thereby increasing the chances of targets with potential synergies 
(McNamara et al, 2008). This further allows for a comparison between family and non-family firms 
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in terms of how they are able to utilize acquired resources during the different phases of the merger 
wave. It is then observed that by virtue of their distinct resources, family firms are better placed to 
utilize acquired resources in combination with internal resources (Newbert, 2007) more efficiently 
than their non-family counterparts there by becoming more innovative after M&As than family 
firms. 
The fourth chapter focuses on exploring how merger waves influence the choice of M&A 
targets and the circumstances under which firms diversify acquisitions. This is similar to chapter 2 
except that it examines the likelihood of acquisitions in the context S&P 500 firms without making 
any distinction between family and non-family firms. It is argued that technology development has 
traditionally been carried out as an internal process through investment in research and 
development (R&D) (Ahuja & Katila, 2001). However, due to increased competition and the rapid 
changing nature of industries and markets, technology development has evolved to include 
externally sourced knowledge bases (Köhler, Sofka, & Grimpe 2012, Laursen & Salter 2006). 
While there are several other means through which organizations can access external knowledge, 
firm acquisitions are considered an important instrument to gain access to external technological 
capabilities that are valuable in dynamic business environments (Graebner, 2004, Grimpe & 
Hussinger, 2014).  
In spite of the recognition of the importance of acquisitions, the acquisition behaviours of 
organizations remain largely underexplored (Barkema & Schijven, 2008). Recent interest in the 
behavioural motives of firms for engaging in acquisitions have focused mainly on the effect of 
financial performance aspiration gaps (Gomez-Mejia, Patel & Zellweger, 2018; Chen, 2008; Chen 
& Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003). In view of this the chapter focuses on how technology performance 
aspiration gaps influence technology acquisition decisions of firms. This chapter fills this gap by 
arguing from the perspective of the behavioural theory of the firm that a firm’s technology 
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performance above or below aspiration levels is a major antecedent of acquisitions. It also focuses 
on the idea of industry relatedness of externally sourced technology resources (Cefis, Marsili & 
Rigamonti, 2019) and examines how a firm’s position in a merger wave impacts the choice of 
acquisition targets relative to a merger wave. Since M&As occur in waves (McNamara, Haleblian 
& Dykes, 2008), the chapter sheds light on this by employing insights from competitive dynamics 
and bandwagon pressures that are occasioned by merger waves.  
1.3 Thesis Dataset 
Data from different sources were linked to construct the dataset for this dissertation namely 
Thomson One Banker, Compustat, NBER patent and citations data, S&P 500 and the 
BusinessWeek issue of July 2003. 
The S&P 500 is the starting point of the data building the dataset. The BusinessWeek issue 
published a list and ownership information of family firms in the S&P 500 at of 2003. In total there 
were 177 family firms representing 35 percent of all firms in the S&P 500. 
The S&P 500 was merged with the Compustat database leading to a panel of 500 firms. In the 
next step this was combined with the M&A data. Information on M&A transactions were taken 
from Thomson One Banker. This dataset provides deal information for all publicly listed US firms 
between 1976 and 2013 which amounted to 36, 841 observations. M&As involving the same target 
and acquirer, uncompleted deals and deals and deals with more than two firms were discarded. In 
the next step the M&A data was matched with the NBER patent and citation data to retrieve 
information on patents using CUSIP and GYKEY as the common idenfiers. This resulted in a total 
of 7,056 observations for the window of interest (01/1980 – 12/2010). 
Different data samples were obtained from this dataset for each chapter of the dissertation. 
Chapter 2 uses a panel dataset of 4903 observations from 225 firms spanning the period 1980-
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2010. 1676 observations correspond to 86 family firms and 3226 to 139 non-family firms. The 
share of family firms in the sample is 38.2%. Out of the 225 firms, 423 acquisitions were conducted 
by 129 firms during this time window. Among them are 158 acquisitions made by 46 family firms 
and 265 acquisitions made by 83 non-family firms. In terms of industry classification of firms in 
our sample, 189 firms, 68 of which are family firms are in manufacturing. Of the 36 firms in the 
service sector, 18 are family firms. Chapter 3 uses a sample of firms from only manufacturing to 
estimate post M&A innovation which resulted in 324 different deals in the sample with a final data 
sample of 4213 observations. Both chapter 2 and 3 made distinction between family and non-family 
firms. Chapter 4 uses a sample of firms from the manufacturing and services, only this time with 
no distinction between family and non-family firms. This resulted in a sample of a panel dataset 
with 4735 observations from 270 firms and a total of 408 different acquisitions. 323 acquisitions 
were conducted by 122 firms in manufacturing and the remaining 85 by 36 firms in the service 
sector. 
The family firm variable in the thesis is estimated based on BusinessWeek classification of 
2003 which is assumed to be constant for the years before 2003 (1980-2003). They are not 
measured on a yearly basis. However, I am unable to make a show that the family ownership status 
remains same beyond 2003 because ownership of firms could change. For this reason a strong 
assumption is made that, these firms remain family firms throughout the years under consideration. 
That is why the analysis is always presented for the years before 2003 where there is certainty that 
firms classified as family firms are indeed family firms. Results for the full sample including the 
years after 2003 are also presented 
Figure 1 shows the yearly volume of M&As transactions for the sample of firms for the period 
under consideration which also depicts the merger waves. Figure 2 presents the volume of 
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acquisitions for family firms in the sample and that of non-family firms is presented in figure 3. In 
comparison to non-family firms, family firms display less volumes of acquisitions for the years a 
under consideration. 
1.4 Outline 
The dissertation consists of three empirical studies which are presented in chapters 2, 3 and 4 
where each chapter addresses one research question. Furthermore, each chapter presents a review 
of the relevant literature and hypothesis, methodology, empirical results, discussion and conclusion 
where implications of the study are discussed. 
Each of the three chapters is independent of the others and can therefore be read as so .While 
chapters 2 and 3 are about family firms, Chapter 4 makes no distinction between family and non-
family firms. Finally, chapter 5 discusses the main findings, implications for both practitioners and 
scholars and the limitations of the study. Finally, it suggests avenues for future research. It is 
important to note that the terms M&A(s) and acquisition(s) are used interchangeably. 
Figure 1: Volume of M&A transactions for the Manufacturing and Service Industries  
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Figure 2: Volume of acquisitions for the Manufacturing and Service Industries (Family 
firms) 
 
 
Figure 3: Volume of acquisitions for the Manufacturing and Service Industries (Non-family 
firms) 
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Chapter 2 
Firm Acquisitions by Family Firms: A Mixed Gamble 
Approach2 
2.1 Introduction 
It is a well-documented fact that strategic decisions of family firms are not motivated by 
financial considerations only, but to a large extent by non-financial considerations summarized 
under the concept of socioemotional wealth (SEW) (Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, 
Jacobson & Monyano-Fuentes, 2007; Zellweger, Nason, Nordqvist & Brush, 2011, Kellermanns, 
Eddleston & Zellweger, 2012; Miller & Le Bretton, 2014). SEW expresses itself in the form of the 
emotional and non-financial value attached by family members to their firm which fulfils affective 
needs of the family, such as preserving the family dynasty, values and family identity as well as 
the ability to exercise control (Gomez-Mejia et al, 2007; Miller & Le Bretton , 2014; Kellermanns 
et al, 2012). 
Family firms’ strategic decision making is often analyzed using behavioural agency models 
(BAM) (Gomez-Mejia et al, 2007; Lim, Lubatkin & Wiseman, 2010; Zellweger, Kellermanns, 
Chrisman & Chua, 2012; Chrisman & Patel, 2012). BAM predicts that family firms are loss averse 
and aim at protecting their SEW (Gomez-Mejia et al, 2007). Loss aversion is in turn negatively 
associated with risk taking and predicts a choice for less risky actions over risky options to avoid 
SEW losses (Thaler & Johnson, 1990). Therefore, loss aversion is put forward as an explanation 
for family firms’ reluctance to engage in risky activities such as research and development (R&D) 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Muñoz-Bullon & Sanchez-Bueno, 2011; 
                                                          
2 Joint work with Katrin Hussinger, University of Luxembourg 
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Block, 2012), industry cooperatives (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007), polluting activities (Berrone, 
Cruz, Gomez-Mejia & Larraza-Kintana, 2010) and firm acquisitions (Shim & Okamuro, 2011; 
Caprio, Croci & Del Giudice, 2011; Gomez-Mejia, Patel & Zellweger, 2015).  
We argue that previous studies using BAM to predict risky actions by family firms and the 
presumed lack thereof suffer from two weaknesses. The first one is that heterogeneity of acquisition 
deals is often not taken into account. Different types of acquisition deals, however, have different 
implications for expected financial as well as SEW losses and gains. We argue that an acquisition 
type that allows family firms to face larger expected gains than losses are related acquisitions as a 
means of related diversification (Anderson & Reeb, 2003a). Related diversification through firm 
acquisitions promises comparably high financial gains and for family firms additional SEW gains 
due to a close relation to the core business of the acquiring firm. Since SEW gains are only realized 
by family firms, we predict that for the specific type of related acquisition family firms are more 
likely to engage in a takeover than non-family firms.  
The second weakness of the prior literature arises from the assumption of BAM that family 
firms’ actions in a gain frame, which is typically measured by an outstanding financial 
performance, are solely motivated by keeping the status quo, hence avoiding actions that involve 
risk3. We argue that this is an unrealistically strong assumption which seems to not fit corporate 
                                                          
3 Within a BAM framework, the concept of problem framing can explain that, under specific conditions, family firms 
nevertheless engage in activities associated with a high risk (Chrisman & Patel, 2012). Problem framing conceives of 
choices from a standpoint of gains and losses in relation to current endowments (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). BAM 
posits that the attitude towards risk taking in decision making depends on the framing of problems (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). When family firms see their SEW threatened, i.e. they are in a loss 
frame, they are ready to take risk in order to re-establish their aspiration level. When family firms are performing at or 
beyond their aspiration level, i.e. they are in a gain frame, they aim at protecting the status quo and avoid risks.  
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reality. On the contrary, family firms just like other firms in a gain frame have an advantage when 
it comes to risky actions such as innovation4 or firm acquisitions because the risk of failure will 
have fewer implications for the firm’s future profitability and survival. Being in a financially sound 
position further helps family firms to keep control by using internal means to finance the 
acquisition (Patel & King, 2015). 
Taking these considerations into account, we suggest the concept of mixed gambles as an 
alternative theoretical framework. In contrast to BAM, the concept of mixed gambles weighs 
expected gains and losses when analyzing strategic options. Here, we view firm acquisitions as 
mixed gambles (Gomez-Mejia, Campbell, Martin, Hoskisson, Makri, & Sirmon, 2014) and allow 
different acquisition types to be reflected by different types of gambles.  
The flexibility of the theoretical concept of mixed gambles allows us to derive predictions that 
differ from predictions derived from commonly used BAM. First, we hypothesize that for related 
acquisitions as a specific type of acquisition, family firms are expected to be able to derive greater 
value than non-family firms because only family firms realize SEW gains. Second, we derive that 
family firms in a gain frame are more likely to engage in related acquisitions than family firms in 
a loss frame since the ability to finance an acquisition using internal means leads to an increase of 
the expected SEW gains relative to the potential SEW losses and implies a limited risk of losing 
control. Third, we hypothesize that family firms in a gain frame are more likely to engage in related 
acquisitions than non-family firms in a gain frame. This is because family firms have the longer 
time horizon which allows them to attach greater value to acquisition gains that are realized in the 
                                                          
 
4 Under certain conditions, family firms have been found to be more innovative than non-family firms (De Massis, Di 
Minin, & Frattini, 2015; Patel & Chrisman, 2014, Classen et al., 2014, Duran et al., 2016, Kosmidou & Ahuja, 2019). 
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distant future. These hypotheses derived from the concept of mixed gambles stand in sharp contrast 
to BAM which predicts that family firms are less willing to take risk than non-family firms and 
that they are only willing to take risk to restore their aspiration level, i.e. when they are in a loss 
frame (Chrisman & Patel, 2012). 
We find empirical support for our predictions using a tailor-made panel dataset that is based 
on the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 firms followed over a period of 31 years (1980-2010). In a 
final step of our empirical analysis, we show that the acquisition strategies of family firms derived 
from mixed gambles lead to a superior financial post-merger performance and, hence, outperform 
BAM strategies. More specifically, we show that family firms face a superior financial post-merger 
performance than non-family firms, especially when they are in a gain frame. These results are 
particularly clear if we use Tobin’s Q as a forward-looking performance measure that takes future 
expected gains into account. 
We make several contributions to the literature on family firms’ strategic decision making. 
First, our study points out two important limitations of the previous literature based on BAM. The 
first one is that deal heterogeneity is often not taken into account. We show that acquisitions leading 
to related diversification are more likely to be conducted by family firms then by non-family firms 
as they promise high SEW increases. The second shortcoming is related to the BAM assumption 
that family firms in a gain frame are solely interested in preserving the status quo, hence avoiding 
actions that involve risk. As an alternative theoretical concept we rely on mixed gambles, a concept 
that was only recently applied to the context of family firms (Kotlar, Signori, De Massis & 
Vismara, 2018; Martin, Gomez-Mejia, Wiseman, 2013; Gomez-Mejia, Patel, & Zellweger, 2015; 
Gomez-Mejia et al, 2014). The concept of mixed gambles allows a more holistic evaluation of 
family firms’ decision making than BAM since it has the flexibility to define different acquisition 
types as different gambles and since it takes expected SEW gains for firms in a gain frame into 
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consideration. Our study, hence, contributes to the first empirical evaluations of the performance 
of the mixed gambles concept (e.g. Gomez-Mejia et al, 2015).  
Second, in that the predictions derived from the concept of mixed gambles stand in sharp 
contrast to BAM predictions, we illustrate a conflict between the commonly used BAM framework 
to analyze family firms’ strategic decision making (e.g. Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Patel & King, 
2015; Gomez-Mejia, Makri & Larraza-Kintana, 2010) and the recent theoretical alternative of 
mixed gambles (e.g. Gomez-Mejia et al, 2015; Kotlar et al, 2018; Martin et al, 2013). Therewith, 
we highlight the importance of model choice for the empirical researcher which should be based 
on a careful study of competing theories and the fit of theoretical assumptions and corporate reality.  
Third, we analyze financial performance implications of acquisitions. Therewith, we go an 
important step further than prior research (Gomez-Mejia et al, 2018, 2010; Kotlar, De Massis, 
Frattini, Bianchini & Fang, 2013; De Massis, Frattini & Lichtenthaler, 2013). The investigation of 
the success of corporate strategies enables us to better draw conclusions about the more appropriate 
theoretical framework.  
Finally, we contribute to the literature on M&As which has paid little attention to differences 
in acquisition behaviour of family firms and non-family firms. Notable exceptions include Shim & 
Okamuro (2011), Caprio et al (2011), Miller, Le Breton-Miller & Lester (2011), Miller & Le 
Breton-Miller (2014), Chrisman & Patel (2012) and Gomez-Mejia et al (2015). These studies 
indicate differences in the acquisition behaviour of family and non-family firms which we 
investigate further in our study. With our conflicting predictions of BAM and mixed gambles and 
focus on deal heterogeneity, we contribute to a better understanding of the influence of ownership 
types on strategic actions such as firm acquisitions (e.g., Connelly, Hoskisson, Tihanyi & Certo, 
2010; David, O’Brian, Yoshikawa & Delios, 2010; Lane  Canella & Lubatkin, 1998; Ramaswamy, 
Li Veliyath, 2002; Gomez-Mejia et al, 2015). 
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2.2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Development 
The BAM framework has for a long time been the most important theoretical framework for 
analyzing family firms’ strategic decision making (e.g. Gomez-Mejia et al, 2007; Lim et al, 2010; 
Zellweger et al, 2012; Chrisman & Patel, 2012). BAM views family firms as loss averse rather than 
risk averse aiming at avoiding SEW losses.5 This leads to the prediction that family firms are 
reluctant to engage in risky activities such as firm acquisitions (Shim & Okamuro, 2011; Caprio, 
et al, 2011).  
Recent literature has, however, shown that decision making of family firms is more complex 
involving financial as well as SEW goals (Kotlar et al, 2018). This speaks to the acquisition 
literature which emphasizes financial performance gains as the main reason for acquisitions (see. 
Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009; McNamara, Haleblian, & Dykes, 
2008), but also shows various other goals of firms’ engagement in corporate acquisitions such as 
the access to new technologies (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Graebner, 2004), intellectual property rights 
(Grimpe & Hussinger, 2008, 2014), as well as access to R&D related expertise beyond the 
boundaries of the firm (Kotlar, et al, 2013; Calantone & Stanko, 2007), gains from economies of 
                                                          
5 The BAM incorporates elements tapped from the prospect theory in to agency models of incentive alignment 
(Martin et l, 2013). For instance. Prospect theory deals with choices under risks and uncertainty. This stems from the 
expected utility principle which posits that individuals “maximize their expected utility by weighting the utility of each 
possible outcome of a given course of action by the probability of its occurrence, summing over all possible outcomes 
for each strategy, and selecting that strategy with the highest expected utility” (Levy, 2007:88). There is an assumption 
of risk aversion where certainty is certainty is entertained over a gamble of equal value (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
Individuals are more sensitive to changes in assets than to changes in net asset levels; to gains and losses from a 
references point rather than to levels of wealth. This reference dependence is central to the analytic assumption of 
Prospect theory. 
BAM departs from this notion by replacing the assumption of risk aversion with loss aversion (Martin et al, 2013) 
where the decision maker aims to protect losses to SEW in the case of family firms, even at the cost of higher risk or 
uncertainty (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). BAM particularly integrates the concept of endowments to its predictions 
(Martin et al, 2013) which refers to SEW in the case of family firms.  
In sum the BAM refers to the combined insights of the prospect theory and agency models of incentive alignment 
(Chrisman & Patel, 2012, Martin et al, 2013). Recent studies including this thesis have failed to use prospect theory as 
the basis of theorizing, thus only relying on BAM as the foundation of their theories. Scholars are entreated to go 
beyond the BAM and explicitly incorporate notions prospect theory in their theories. 
 
21 
 
scale and scope as well as market power increases (Hitt, Ireland, & Harrison, 2001), market 
discipline (Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, & Viswanathan, 2005) and efficient resource deployment 
(Uhlenbruck, Hitt, & Semadeni, 2006). The well-documented variety of acquisition goals and the 
observation that family firms are, in fact, well engaged in the market for corporate control (Family 
Capital, 2015, Worek, 2017) suggests that the acquisition decision of family firms cannot be solely 
motivated by SEW considerations.  
Prior studies in the field of M&A further suggest that firms engage in acquisitions according 
to rational decision criteria, but that the acquisition likelihood and success is also positively 
influenced by behavioural factors such as acquisition experience and a solid resource endowment 
and the availability of slack (King, Dalton, Daily & Covin, 2004). Firms with acquisition 
experience, for instance, repeat a strategic action and benefit from learning effects independent of 
whether the past experience was successful or not (e.g., Franks, Hariss & Titmans, 1991; Haleblian 
& Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002; Kroll et al, 1997). A better resource endowment and slack, 
for instance, allow firms to commit excess resources to pursue new opportunities supporting 
acquisition success (Levinthal & March, 1981, Iyer & Miller, 2008; Tyler & Caner, 2016). While 
BAM allows for firms’ risk attitude to change with regard to the reference point, i.e. the aspiration 
level, which is typically defined in terms of the financial performance of the firm (Chrisman & 
Patel, 2012), behavioural factors that might well impact the expected success of acquisitions are 
often not considered in the previous literature based on BAM (Kotlar et al, 2013). If considered, a 
rich resource endowment often exists within firms performing above their aspiration level for 
which BAM would predict that they are particularly risk averse being only motivated by preserving 
the status quo (Caprio et al, 2011). 
The M&A literature also indicates that returns to acquisitions are rather uncertain (e.g. Capron 
& Pistre, 2002; King et al, 2004; Masulis, Wang & Xie, 2007). In fact, the available evidence shows 
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that about half of the acquisitions turn out to be failures mirroring the substantial level of risk 
involved (Schoenberg, 2006; Krug & Aguilera, 2005). Many acquisitions result in lower cost 
reduction than anticipated (Graham, Lemmon & Wolf, 2002), inefficient resource deployment 
(Uhlenbruck et al, 2006) and less market power gains than projected (Hitt et al, 2001). This is why 
BAM predicts that family firms stay away from the market for corporate acquisitions. 
While the reasons for the failure of acquisitions are often difficult to determine (Ellis, Reus, & 
Lamont, 2009), there is robust evidence that post-merger performance is moderated by several 
factors such as whether the acquisition was hostile, the pre-merger performance of both acquired 
and acquiring firms, the acquisition premium paid, whether the merger was horizontal or vertical, 
whether the merger was regulated or unregulated, related or unrelated, the acquiring firm’s 
acquisition experience, the method of payment (cash/equity), the relative size of acquirer and target 
firm, complementarities of firm resources, and whether the acquiring firm is a conglomerate (King 
et al, 2004). This suggests that acquisition deals are very heterogeneous, a fact that is also often not 
accounted for in prior studies (De Massis et al, 2013). 
These observations challenge the BAM-based prediction that family firms show a low 
involvement in the market for corporate control due to loss aversion (Shim & Okamuro, 2011, 
Caprio et al, 2011), eagerness to preserve the status quo and to keep control thus protecting their 
SEW (Miller et al, 2011; Chrisman & Patel, 2012). First, while SEW refers to the noneconomic 
benefits that accrue to only family members as a result of their ownership, involvement and control 
of a firm (Miller & Le Breton- Miller, 2014) just like non-family firms, family firms may have 
multiple goals of firm acquisitions including financial performance gains (Worek, De Massis, 
Wright & Veider, 2018, Kotlar et al, 2018). Second, the long-term planning horizon of family firms 
may encourage family firms to undertake actions with potential short-term losses, but with potential 
long term gains (Gomez-Mejia et al, 2018). M&As are such an action that may promise long-term 
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gains. In comparison to other forms of external venturing, acquisitions are attractive for family 
firms because they guarantee ownership (Titus, House, & Coven, 2017), hence safeguarding or 
increasing SEW. Third, heterogeneity of acquisitions can lead to different considerations for 
different deal types so that expected SEW losses do not always dominate financial gains and 
potential long-term SEW gains. Fourth, factors such as a rich resource endowment and slack may 
positively influence M&A considerations as they allow the firm to mitigate potential negative 
acquisition consequences (Iyer & Miller, 2008) and might even help family firms to increase SEW 
gains (Patel and King, 2015). These observations are in line with evidence that shows that family 
firms use acquisitions as a vehicle for external resource acquisitions (Kotlar et al, 2013) and that 
there is a surge in the participation of family firms in acquisition activities (Family Capital, 2015, 
Worek, 2017). They are, however, not in line with BAM. This is why we turn to the concept of 
mixed gambles to better explain the observed phenomena.  
2.2.1 The Notion of Mixed Gambles and M&As 
The concept of mixed gambles, in contrast to BAM, treats strategic decisions as moments with 
likely outcomes of both gains and losses (Bromiley, 2009). It acknowledges that, in practice, there 
is hardly any strategic decision with a pure likelihood of gain and loss outcomes (Bromiley, 2010). 
Many strategic decisions promise financial gains but entail losses of SEW such as international 
diversification (Gomez-Mejia, Makri, & Larraza-Kintana, 2010), investments in R&D (Chrisman 
& Patel, 2012) and IPOs (Kotlar et al, 2018). This means that in practice, decision makers face a 
trade-off and need to weigh potential gains and losses with regard to different value dimensions 
(Kim, Hwang & Burgers, 1993; Martin et al, 2013). In the context of family firms’ involvement in 
the market for corporate control this implies that family firms need to weigh both potential financial 
and SEW gains and losses as a consequence of a firm acquisition when deciding to engage in a 
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firm acquisition. Taking both of these dimensions into account allows to develop a more 
sophisticated understanding of family firms’ engagement in the market for corporate control using 
non-family firms as a benchmark for comparison. Recent literature has started to investigate the 
trade-off between avoiding SEW losses and realizing financial gains in family firms (Chrisman & 
Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone & De Castro, 2011; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2014; 
Zellweger et al, 2012; Kotlar et al, 2018).  
Through a mixed gambles lens, both family firms and non-family firms view risky decisions 
as mixed gambles weighing the potential gains and losses against each other (Kim et al, 1993). The 
difference is that family firms consider next to the financial risks and benefits, which are the same 
for both types of firms, potential losses in SEW as well as potential SEW gains. When focusing on 
the average acquisition deal, we most likely find family firms less inclined to make a positive 
acquisition decision since the expected financial returns are uncertain (e.g. Capron & Pistre, 2002; 
King, Dalton, Daily & Covin, 2004; Masulis et al, 2007) and since there might be SEW losses to 
be expected (Gomez-Mejia et al, 2010). The latter is only taken into account by family firms. 
Acquisition heterogeneity provides a unique opportunity to get a better understanding of the 
different strategic considerations of family and non-family firms in the market for corporate control 
through a mixed gambles’ lens because the type of mixed gamble differs for different acquisition 
types. In the following, we focus on related and unrelated diversification through firm acquisitions 
(Gomez-Mejia et al, 2018; Miller, Le Breton-Miller & Lester, 2010; Cefis, Marsili & Rigamonti, 
2019; Capron, Dussauge & Mitchell, 1998). Prior literature has established that, overall, related 
acquisitions refer to high risk-high return strategies (Amit & Livnat, 1988), while unrelated 
acquisitions are a means to reduce firm specific risk with lower associated financial returns 
(Amihud & Lev, 1981, Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Nevertheless, the financial performance 
outcomes of unrelated acquisitions have been found to be difficult to predict (Gomez- Mejia et al, 
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2018) and there is also evidence for a tendency of performance shortfalls (see King, Slotegraaf & 
Kesner, 2008; Amihud & Lev, 1981). A potential superior financial performance following related 
acquisitions can be caused by a transfer of core capabilities between acquisition target and 
acquiring firm (Rumelt, 1982). 
As family firms are typically characterized by undiversified ownership, reducing business risk 
through unrelated acquisitions looks attractive (Miller et al, 2010; Anderson & Reeb, 2003a). 
However, we note that family firms tend to be less diversified than non-family firms (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003a; Gomez-Mejia, Makri & Larraza-Kintana, 2010; Essen, Carney, Gedajlovic & 
Heugens, 2015). This is because family firms often lack the ability to judge the quality of other, 
especially unrelated ventures (Anderson & Reeb, 2003b). The lack of competence and capabilities 
of family firms is caused by family priorities which dictate to fill board and management positions 
with often less qualified family members. In consequence, we observe conservative decision 
making and fewer available capabilities to act upon new opportunities in family firms (Miller & 
Le Bretton-Miller, 2014). In the aftermath of an unrelated acquisitions, the lack of competence 
leads family firms to face a risk of loss of control with implications for SEW. It follows that the 
potential SEW losses of unrelated acquisitions exceed the potential SEW gains so that family firms 
are typically less likely to be involved in unrelated firm acquisition than non-family firms which 
only consider financial acquisition implications. 
Prior research shows that family firms diversify in related industries (Gomez-Mejia et al, 
2018). Related diversification allows the managers of family firms to stay close to their core 
businesses (Gomez-Mejia et al, 2010; Anderson & Reeb, 2003a) while realizing gains from an 
efficient transfer of core capabilities (Rumelt, 1982). With time, family members may have 
developed affection and emotional attachment for the core technology, products as well as the 
domain knowledge and expertise needed to succeed in the industry. Lacking the competence to 
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venture into new markets, diversifying into related industries allows family firms to apply their 
accumulated experience to the new venture (Anderson & Reeb, 2003a). The well-acknowledged 
age-old established knowledge held in the firm is preserved (Duran, Kammerlander, Van Essen, & 
Zellweger, 2016). There will be no need to recruit new external executives in order to acquire new 
relevant skills and the family firms can stay within their routines and time proven methods 
(Eisenmann, 2002; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). Furthermore, related acquisitions help to 
maintain the familial control or SEW in family firms as no major restructuring will be needed in 
order to integrate the target as it is often the case with unrelated acquisitions (Barkema & Schijven, 
2008). This therefore has a long-term effect of preserving or increasing the value and reputation of 
firms which consequently has the potential to strengthen SEW (Gomez-Mejia et al, 2014). 
In line with the logic of mixed gambles, we derive that given the mix of strategic choices of 
family firms, the expected SEW gains of related acquisitions are not negative while unrelated 
acquisitions are associated with expected SEW losses. Expected SEW gains associated with related 
acquisitions should render them more attractive for family firms than for non-family firms (see 
Figure 1). The prospective SEW gain from acquisitions predominates in this mixed gamble 
decision context (Martin et al, 20013). In essence the mixed gamble approach allows for prospect 
of losses in SEW to be weighted less in comparison to gains which also suggests a SEW net gain 
for family firms. Hence, we hypothesis that family firms are more likely to engage in related firm 
acquisitions than non-family firms. 
Hypothesis 1: Family firms are more likely to engage in related firm acquisitions than 
non-family firms. 
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Figure 1 
Hypothesis 1: Family firms versus non-family firms 
 
 
Acquisitions often require large amounts of capital and other financial and knowledge resources. 
This means that a family firm may have to look within for funds to finance this strategy. Only firms 
that are financially viable will be able to finance such risky and resource demanding strategies with 
internal funds. For those who are constrained due to low profitability, the alternative to internal 
financing is to seek external (either debt or equity) financing that presents its own set of challenges 
such as giving up substantial part of ownership, control and influence in decision making to 
external actors (Gomez-Mejia et al, 2014). External financing makes acquisitions of any kind 
unattractive for family firms since it undermines family control or influence in the strategic 
direction of the firm, which is fundamental to SEW (Zellweger et al, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al, 
2018). Financially healthy family firms can rely on internal sources to execute activities including 
28 
 
acquisitions. This should increase the expected gains to SEW relative to the expected losses and 
render related acquisitions as a means for related diversification more attractive for financially 
healthy family firms than for financially less healthy family firms, a prediction that is contrary to 
the BAM prediction (Gomez-Mejia et al, 2014; Chrisman & Patel, 2012).6 
Hypothesis 2: Family firms with a healthy performance (gain frame), are more likely to engage 
in related firm acquisitions than family firms with performance deficits (loss frame). 
Figure 2 illustrates how family firms would decide differently for a risky action when applying 
a BAM or mixed gambles framework. As argued above, mixed gambles predict that the likelihood 
to engage in a related acquisition is higher for family firms in a gain frame based on the weighing 
of expected gains and benefits. Positive SEW gains are taken into account in a gain frame. In 
contrast, BAM assumes that in a gain frame family firms are solely interested in preserving the 
status quo. 
We noted above that financially well performing family firms face greater expected gains from 
related acquisitions due to higher expected SEW gains. Related diversification enables them to stay 
with activities close to their core business (Anderson & Reeb, 2003a) and to transfer capabilities 
directly and efficiently (Rumelt, 1982) potentially deriving substantial SEW gains. Here, we argue 
that the potential SEW gains that family firms can realize in a gain frame also imply that they are 
more likely to engage in related acquisitions in a gain frame than non-family firms in a gain frame. 
The main reason is that a large share of the benefits of related acquisitions is only realized in the 
                                                          
6 Chrisman & Patel (2012) derive from BAM that family firms only engage in risky activities if they are performing 
way below their financial aspiration level. The argument is that only when the pressure is significant family firms are 
taking risk to reach their aspiration level. 
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long run. The long-term benefits fit well with the long-term horizon of family firms’ planning but 
not necessary with the rather short-term strategic planning of non-family firms (Gomez-Mejia et 
al, 2014).  
Figure 2 
Hypothesis 2: BAM Verses Mixed Gambles 
 
 
 
In the presence of a limited downside risk for both type of firms, the gap between expected gains 
and losses for well performing family firms as compared to well performing non-family firms is, 
hence, expected to be significant (see Figure 3).  
Hypothesis 3: Family firms with a healthy performance (gain frame), are more likely to engage 
in related firm acquisitions than non-family firms with a healthy performance (gain frame). 
In order to be effective, the chosen acquisition strategy – BAM versus mixed gambles - should 
show superior post-merger performance effects. Following our arguments above we suggest that 
decision making following the mixed gamble approach leads to a superior outcome as compared 
to decision making based on BAM. We hypothesize: 
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Figure 3 
Hypothesis 3: Family firms in a gain frame versus non-family firms in a gain frame 
 
 
Hypothesis 4: Family firms in a gain frame realize higher post-merger performance gains from 
related acquisitions than non-family firms in a gain frame or family firms in a loss frame. 
2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 Estimation Strategy – Acquisition Strategy 
In order to test hypotheses 1-3, we estimate probability and count data models to determine the 
acquisition strategy of family firms. We apply random-effect panel logit and poisson regressions. 
Our choice of random-effect models is influenced by the fact that our main independent variable, 
the family firm status, is binary and time-invariant. We note that the coefficients of time invariant 
firm specific effects are not defined in a fixed effect model.  
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2.3.2 Estimation Strategy - Performance Effects 
In order to estimate performance implications of M&A strategies (hypothesis 4), we employ a 
non-parametric nearest neighbour matching approach (see e.g. Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009, for a 
methodological overview). The matching accounts for the fact that the decision to engage in a 
related M&A is not exogenous, but depends on firms characteristics which our panel logit models 
strongly confirm for the present sample. We match acquiring firms involved in related acquisitions 
to two sets of “twin firms” with the same characteristics as the focal firm. The first set of twin 
firms, i.e. the first control group, is chosen from all firms that were not engaged in any acquisition 
in the focal year. The second control group is drawn from firms that were involved in unrelated 
acquisitions in the same year. We match the firms engaged in related acquisitions, i.e. the treatment 
group, to twin control observations based on the probability of engaging in a related M&A arising 
from a probit estimation for the likelihood to conduct a related M&A. This so-called propensity 
score matching has the advantage of summarizing different factors such as firm size, return on 
assets and debt in our score, hence avoiding the problem of multidimensionality that arises if treated 
and control firms are required to be exactly identical with regard to several characteristics (Rubin, 
1977). We then compare the post-merger performance of our treatment group, i.e. the firms 
engaged in related acquisitions, to the performance of both control groups. The performance 
difference is called the average treatment effect on the treated and can be given a causal 
interpretation.  
After having obtained the treatment effect on the treated which informs us about performance 
benefits of related acquisitions for the average treated firm as compared to non-M&A firms and 
firms engaging in unrelated acquisitions, we are interested in finding out whether family firms in 
gain frames realize greater treatment effects, i.e. post-merger financial performance gains, than 
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non-family firms and family firms in a loss frame (hypothesis 4). Therefore, we regress the average 
treatment effect on the treated on a family firm dummy, a gain frame dummy and the interaction 
of both terms. A set of year and industry dummies is included in the regression as well. 
2.3.3 Data Source and Sample 
We use the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 firms as of July 2003 as the basis of constructing the 
data sample.70F The July 2003 issue of the BusinessWeek, published qualitative details of family 
firms among the S&P 500 firms. These include the management and ownership structures of the 
177 family firms among the S&P (Block, 2009). 18 The S&P data is combined with the Compustat 
database to retrieve financial and market information for firms. This results in a panel dataset for 
the 500 firms. M&A data was retrieved from Thomson One Banker. We identified majority 
acquisitions and linked them to the S&P firms.  
We focus on manufacturing and service industries. This leads to the loss of 272 of the S&P 500 
firms. We also dropped three firms and their corresponding observations since they turned out to 
be outliers concerning some of their characteristics2F.9 The final sample is a panel dataset of 4903 
                                                          
7 S&P as well as Fortune 500 firms have been used previously to analyze the R&D performance of family firms and 
non-family firms (Chrisman &Patel, 2012) as well as the performance of family and non-family firms (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003a; Miller et al., 2007). 
8 Block (2009) has previously used the Business Week publication of July 2003 to analyze the performance, R&D 
spending and employment downsizing of family and non-family firms. This study relies on the final list of family and 
non-family firms provided by Block after a manual search and review of the ownership levels of these firms. 
9 Amgen Inc, a top independent biotechnology firm, was dropped for having a low return on sales ratio (-65.01), which 
is not comparable to the rest of the sample (the second lowest ROS stood at -5.12). Angen Inc also had a firm level 
aspiration gap of 62.17, which is about three times the second largest value of 2.63. The outlier in Medimmune was 
found in its R&D/employment ratio of 824.59, which is more than half the value of the second largest value of 406.77. 
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observations from 225 firms spanning the period 1980-2010. 1676 observations correspond to 86 
family firms and 3226 to 139 non-family firms. The share of family firms in our sample is 38.2%. 
Out of the 225 firms we recorded 423 acquisitions conducted by 129 firms during this time window, 
among them 158 acquisitions made by 46 family firms and 265 acquisitions made by 83 non-family 
firms. In terms of industry classification of firms in our sample, 189 firms, 68 of which are family 
firms are in manufacturing. Of the 36 firms in the service sector, 18 are family firms.  
2.3.3.1 Dependent variables  
We employ several dependent variables for our empirical analysis.  
Firm acquisitions: Our first dependent variable is a binary variable, which takes the value of 1 
if a firm has conducted a firm acquisition in year t and 0 otherwise. In addition, we use the number 
of firm acquisitions per firm in order to show robustness of our results for a different definition of 
the dependent variable. 
Related firm acquisitions: We use the two-digit standard industry classification (SIC) codes to 
define acquisitions in related industries. A firm acquisition is declared as related if the core business 
activities of the acquiring and acquired firm are associated to the same two-digit industry class. 
Again, we also use the number of related firm acquisitions per year in order to show robustness of 
our results. 
The two-, three- and four-digit SIC codes have been used by prior research to measure 
relatedness (see Miller et al, 2010). We use the two-digit and four-digit (for robustness tests) SIC 
codes. We choose the two-digit level because for an acquisition to be useful enough for firms to 
                                                          
Danaher made several acquisitions over the years and displayed a huge R&D/patent ratio of 60.43 being an outlier. All 
three firms are in the manufacturing industry. Amgen Inc and Medimmune are both in the drug manufacturing sector 
while Danaher is in Measuring & controlling devises subsectors. 
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benefit from synergies, they must not be too distant as in operating in completely unrelated 
industries, but they should also not be too related. There is therefore the need for some level of 
relatedness for an acquirer to be able to fully benefit from acquisitions (Grimpe & Hussinger, 
2014). The four–digit SIC codes are therefore too fined grained to capture the essence of 
relatedness (Miller et al, 2010). This explains why the conventional four-digit SIC measure of 
relatedness is less used in the literature (See Martin & Sayrak, 2003). 
Financial performance: For the evaluation of the financial success of the strategy we use return 
on assets (ROA) as a dependent variable. ROA is a commonly used performance measure, also in 
the family firms literature (see e.g. Bonilla, Sepulveda & Carvajal, 2010; Kowalewski, Talavera & 
Stetsyuk, 2010; Michiels, Voordeckers, Lybaert & Steijvers, 2013; Graves & Shan, 2014, Holt, 
Pearson, Carr & Barnett, 2017). ROA describes the current ability of the firm to effectively use its 
assets and is often used when firm performance in different time periods is compared. We measure 
ROA as the ratio of net income to total assets in year t + 2. The choice of a two years lead is driven 
by data limitations.10 
As an alternative performance measure we use Tobin’s Q defined as the market value over the 
book value of the firms’ assets. In contrast to ROA that assesses the current performance of the 
firm, Tobin’s Q is a forward-looking performance measure that takes the expectations of the stock 
market about the future performance of the firm into account (Griliches, 1981). This means that 
                                                          
10 We use a lead of two years because of data limitations. If we use a longer lead the sample size becomes smaller than 
100 observations and the econometric matching approach that we use does not lead to a balanced sample of treated 
and non-treated firms. This implies that the matching with a dependent variable based on a 3-years lead is not 
appropriate to produce causal results. Note that the results of the regression based on the treatment effects variable (see 
Table 4) are qualitatively similar when based on the invalid matching results based on a 3-years lead, but not significant 
anymore. 
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while ROA allows us to assess the short-term post-acquisition performance of the firm, Tobin’s Q 
allows a more long-term assessment. As for ROA, we use two years lead of Tobin’s Q. 
Treatment effect on the treated: For the last regression, where we are interested in identifying 
whether family firms in gain frames face greater post-merger performance gains from related 
acquisitions than family firms in a loss frame or non-family firms in a gain frame, we use the 
estimated average treatment effect on the treated as a dependent variable which depicts financial 
performance gains due to the merger. 
2.3.3.1 Independent variable & definition of the aspiration gap 
Family firm: We measure the family firm status as a binary variable which is equal to 1 for 
family firms and 0 otherwise. In order to be classified as a family firm the combined stock 
ownership of the family needs to be not less than 5% and a member of the family needs to be either 
CEO or chairman of the board of directors (Block, 2009). Based on this definition and the 
BusinessWeek publication of July 2003, as well as a manual search, Block (2009:237-242) 
published a list of all family firms and non-family firms in the S&P as at July 2003. This study 
relies on the aforementioned published list as the basis for determining whether a firm is a family 
firm or not. 
For robustness tests, we use founder family firms as an alternative definition. Here firms are 
conceived as family firms if a member of the founding family is present in the firm in any of the 
following capacities: CEO, chairman, chairman emeritus, member of the board and management. 
This information was also available in the BusinessWeek publication of July 2003. 
Aspiration gaps: Organizations depend on performance feedback to adapt their behaviour and 
also to undertake organizational search such as acquisitions (Iyer & Miller, 2008). Therefore, we 
measure the aspiration gap as the difference between a firm’s financial performance in year t–1 
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and the median financial performance of firms in the same four-digit industry in year t–2 following 
Greve (2003); Iyer & Miller (2008) and Chrisman & Patel (2012). Return on sales (ROS) is one of 
the most commonly used measures of firm performance (Greve, 2003). For our empirical analysis, 
we perform sample splits distinguishing between firms in a gain frame and in a loss frame. Hence, 
we use a binary variable that separates firms in gain frame, i.e. those that experience a performance 
increase as compared to the average firm in the industry, from those in a loss frame. We also use 
the gain frame variable in the last models to determine the performance implications of 
acquisitions. The variable is coded 1 if a firm is in gain frame and 0 otherwise. 
2.3.3.2 Control variables  
We introduce several control variables to account for firm level heterogeneity. Larger firms are, 
for instance, more likely to have the capacity to implement a firm acquisition (Ellis et al, 2011). In 
addition, a larger firm size makes it more likely that the acquiring firm retains control after the firm 
acquisition (Shim & Okamura, 2011). Moreover, the fact that large family firms can maintain 
control has important implications on the mixed gamble of family firms as the expected SEW gains 
associated with a related acquisition increase (Patel & King, 2015). We use the natural logarithm 
of total assets as a measure for firm size. The natural logarithm is used to handle the skewed 
distribution of the variable. Debt, measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets (Block, 2009), 
shows whether a firm is highly leveraged and proxies the risk associated with the firm’s operations 
(Shim & Okamuro, 2011). This variable is expected to have a negative relationship with the 
probability of acquisitions as it also reflects the scarcity of cash flow. ROA controls for overall 
firm efficiency is measured as the ratio of net income to total assets (Chrisman & Patel, 2012). It 
is expected to have a positive association with the acquisition probability. The R&D/Assets ratio 
is used in the present context as a proxy for the firm’s readiness to take risk and to engage in long-
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run investments. Hence, the measure is expected to have a positive relationship with the likelihood 
of acquisitions. We also include a variable that controls for the firm’s past acquisition experience 
(e.g., Franks et al, 1991; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002; Kroll et al, 1997). A firm 
that already has some experience with the strategic action of firm acquisitions is likely to repeat it 
(Haleblian, Kim & Rajagopalan, 2006). The variable is binary and takes the value one if the focal 
firm has undertaken an acquisition in the past 5 years. Patent R&D ratio controls for technology 
intensive related activities of firms. It is commonly known that slack resources may influence firms 
to undertake acquisitions (Iyer & Miller, 2008). Therefore, absorbed slack which is measured as 
the ratio of selling, general and administrative (SGA) expenses to sales as well as potential slack 
measured as a firm’s ratio of debt to equity are controlled for. 
Industry dummies are introduced to control for any industry related variance. Year dummies 
control for macroeconomic effects, in particular for the fact that mergers and acquisitions tend to 
occur in waves (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). We lag all independent and control variables to 
limit possible endogeneity. 
2.4 Empirical Results 
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Table 1 shows the mean differences for family 
firms and non-family firms along with t-tests that show whether the means are statistically different 
from each other. The acquisition dummy shows a mean of 0.10 for family firms as compared to 
0.08 for non-family firms. Since the t-test is not significant we cannot conclude that family firms 
undertake, on average, more or less acquisitions than non-family firms. With respect to the number 
of deals, we find that family firms make an average of 0.12 acquisitions per year as compared to a 
0.10 average for non-family firms. Again, the mean difference is not statistically significant. The 
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related acquisition dummy shows a mean of 0.08 for family firms 0.04 for non-family firms. The 
mean difference is statistically significant. Also, with regards to the number of related acquisitions, 
we find that family firms are significantly leading with on average 0.09 acquisitions per year as 
compared to a 0.05 average for non-family firms.  
In terms of firm size, the mean of 7.60 for family firms is significantly smaller than non-family 
firms with a mean of 8.20. Family firms in our sample employ less debt over assets than non-family 
firms. In terms of performance, family firms show significantly higher ROA than non-family firms. 
Interestingly, family firms also display a significantly higher R&D/asset ratio with an average of 
0.07, compared to the 0.05 of non-family firms. Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients among 
the key variables in our analysis.11 
                                                          
11 Note that the high corrections occur among the different dependent variables, namely merger dummy, number of 
acquisitions and related acquisitions so that they are not a problem for the regressions. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics and Univariate Test 
  Non-family firms Family firms   
Variables Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. T-test 
Acquisition dummy .08  .00  .28  .10  .00  .30  -.01 
Number of deals .10  .00  .37  .12  .00  .40  -.02* 
Related acquisition dummy .04  .00  .21  .08  .00  .26  -.03*** 
Related acquisitions .05  .00  .24  .09  .00  .35  -.04*** 
Firm size 8.20 8.25 1.63 7.60 7.81 1.76 .60*** 
Debt/assets .17 .15 .13 .13 .11 .13 .04*** 
ROA .06 .07 .09 .07 .08 .10 -.01*** 
R&D/assets .05 .03 .05 .07 .06 .06 .02*** 
Acquisition experience .28 .00 .45 .29 .00 .45 -.01 
Patent/R&D 1.81 1.30 2.05 1.79 .70 3.54 .02 
Absorbed slack .26 .24 .17 .31 .31 .17 -.05*** 
Potential slack .68 .34 11.24 .30 .19 1.74 .38 
ROAt+2 .06 .07 .09 .07 .08 .09 -.01*** 
Gain frame .47 .00 .50 .49 .00 .50 -.02 
Family*gain frame .00 .00 .00 .49 .00 .50 -.49*** 
This table presents the summary statistics of our main variables and the results of the significance test. The mean differences 
are reported  
*** Statistical significance at 5% level; *Statistical significance at 10% level. 
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Table 2: Correlations 
  Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Acquisition dummy 1                
2 Number of deals 0.90 1               
3 Related acquisition dummy 0.68 0.63 1              
4 Related acquisitions 0.63 0.69 0.92 1             
5 Family firms 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.07 1            
6 Firm size 0.13 0.14 0.08 0.08 -0.17 1           
7 Debt/assets -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.16 0.19 1          
8 ROA 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 -0.06 -0.27 1         
9 R&D/assets 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.18 -0.28 -0.37 -0.03 1        
10 Acquisition experience 0.22 0.22 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.25 0.03 -0.08 0.06 1       
11 Patent/R&D -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 -0.11 0.08 -0.05 -0.20 -0.07 1      
12 Absorbed slack 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.15 -0.29 -0.23 -0.06 0.51 0.12 -0.14 1     
13 Potential slack 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 1    
14 ROAt+2 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.06 -0.10 -0.16 0.36 0.05 -0.09 -0.04 0.06 -0.01 1   
15 Gain frame 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.12 -0.07 0.25 -0.03 0.05 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 0.15 1  
16 Family*gain frame 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.62 -0.02 -0.15 0.17 0.10 0.07 -0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.11 0.47 1 
Note: The high correlations are not an issue because they occur between the different dependent variables (Acquisition dummy, Number of deals, Related acquisition dummy and Related 
acquisitions) 
*** Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
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2.4.2 Empirical Analysis 
Table 3 presents the results of panel logit and poisson random effect regression models predicting 
firm acquisitions. Models 1 and 2 show regressions for the full sample for the likelihood of 
engaging in a firm acquisition. These models act as baseline regressions. The results suggest that 
family firms are not more or less likely to engage in acquisitions than non-family firms. The 
coefficient of the family firm dummy as depicted by model 1 (ß = 0.15) and model 2 (ß = 0.14) 
shows a positive but not statistically significant relationship with acquisitions. 
Models 3 and 4 test hypothesis 1, i.e. whether family firms are more likely to engage in related 
acquisitions than non-family firms.12 Our results show, that the probability and the number of firm 
acquisitions in related industries are significantly higher for family firms than for non-family firms. 
Model 3 (ß = 0.47, p < 0.05) and model 4 (ß = 0.39, p < 0.05), hence, display empirical support for 
hypothesis 1. Looking at the marginal effects,13 we find that in comparison to non-family firms, 
family firms are 47% more likely to engage in related acquisition according to model 3. Model 4 
implies that being a family firm increases the number of related acquisitions by 48%.  
The next set of regressions (models 5-8 of Table 3) distinguishes between underperforming firms 
(loss frame) and well performing firms (gain frame). Regressions are presented for both subsamples 
to test hypothesis 2 and 3. The results show that family firms in a gain frame (model 7, ß = 0.77***, 
p < 0.01; model 8, ß = 0.63***, p < 0.01) are more likely to engage in related acquisitions than 
family firms in a loss frame (model 5, ß = -0.02, p > 0.10; model 6, ß = -0.06, p > 0.10). These 
results support hypotheses 2.  
                                                          
12 Note that the numbers of observations vary for models 3 and 4 as well as models 5 and 6 and 7 and 8 respectively 
since we do not observe variance in the dependent variable to use all observations for the logit models. 
13 The marginal effects in the poisson model are calculated as follows: exp(coefficient) - 1 
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Family firms in a loss frame are not more or less likely to engage in related acquisitions than 
non-family firms (models 5 and 6) while family firms in a gain frame are 77% more likely to 
engage in related acquisitions than non-family firms with 87% higher number of acquisitions as 
the marginal effects corresponding to models 7 and 8 indicate. These findings support hypothesis 
3. 
Table 3: Panel Logit & Poisson Random-Effect Regression Models for Family Firm Acquisitions (Full 
Sample) 
  All acquisitions  
All related 
acquisitions 
Related acquisitions 
- loss frame 
Related acquisitions 
- gain frame 
Variables Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Logit Poisson Logit Poisson Logit Poisson Logit Poisson 
Family firms 0.15 0.14 0.47** 0.39** -0.02 -0.06 0.77*** 0.63*** 
 (0.17) (0.15) (0.20) (0.19) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) 
Firm size 0.44*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.23** 0.23*** 0.45*** 0.43*** 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) 
Debt/assets -1.06* -0.93* -0.43 -0.60 -0.64 -0.43 -0.04 -0.57 
 (0.61) (0.52) (0.73) (0.65) (1.04) (0.97) (0.94) (0.88) 
ROA 3.22*** 2.39*** 2.58** 2.00** 0.93 0.79 4.58*** 3.84*** 
 (0.87) (0.70) (1.01) (0.86) (1.15) (1.07) (1.71) (1.46) 
R&D/assets 1.40 0.97 1.34 -0.09 1.71 1.07 -0.14 -2.24 
 (1.64) (1.42) (1.86) (1.71) (2.28) (2.24) (2.87) (2.62) 
Acquisition experience 0.60*** 0.46*** 0.25 0.09 0.71*** 0.49* 0.30 0.13 
 (0.17) (0.15) (0.20) (0.17) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.23) 
Patent/R&D 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
Absorbed slack 0.95* 0.65 1.52*** 1.17*** 1.24** 1.06** 1.82* 1.41 
 (0.49) (0.44) (0.51) (0.45) (0.52) (0.45) (1.01) (0.94) 
Potential slack -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons -5.93*** -5.52*** -6.68*** -6.20*** -4.60*** -4.79*** -7.67*** -6.80*** 
 (0.72) (0.62) (0.91) (0.81) (1.05) (1.01) (1.24) (1.12) 
Observation 4903.00 4903.00 4789.00 4903.00 2390.00 2569.00 2274.00 2334.00 
Log likelihood -1242.24 -1450.45 -886.50 -1005.60 -402.65 -434.21 -472.96 -557.84 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.    
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01       
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 With regard to our control variables, firm size shows a positive and statistically significant effect 
on the likelihood and number of acquisitions in all our models. ROA shows a positive relationship 
with firm acquisitions for the full sample and the subsample of firms in a gain frame. The debt over 
assets ratio as well as R&D/assets, patent/R&D ratio as well as potential slack do not exhibit a 
significant effect on related acquisitions. Absorbed slack shows a significant positive effect on 
acquisitions except for the subsample of firms in gain frame in model 8 of table 1. Acquisition 
experience matters, in particular, for related acquisitions made by firms in a loss frame. Lastly, the 
overall effects of industry and year dummies are positive. 
Next, we investigate the performance effects of related acquisitions and, in a final step, we relate 
post-merger performance to family firm status and position vis-à-vis the aspiration level. Therefore, 
we first estimate a probit model on the likelihood of conducting a related acquisition. In order to 
retrieve our two control groups we run the probit model twice, once for the full sample (control 
group 1) and once for the sample of M&A observations only (control group 2). Control variables 
are the logarithm of firm assets, debt over assets, ROA, R&D over assets as well as a set of industry 
and time dummies. An important variable here is the pre-merger performance as it has been shown 
that firms with a better pre-merger performance also show a better post-merger performance (King 
et al, 2004). The matching leads to balanced control groups, i.e. treated and control observations 
do not differ systematically at the means of the variables used for the matching.  
The matching results reveals that there are no significantly different post-merger performance 
effects between treatment group, i.e. the firms that engage in related acquisitions, and both control 
groups. The average treatment effects on the treated for ROA are 0.00 for control group 1 and 0.03 
for control group 2 and for Tobin’s Q 0.14 for control group 1 and 0.22 for control group 2. All 
treatment effects are insignificant suggesting that the average firm engaged in a related acquisition 
is financially not better off than a firm that did not engage in any M&A (control group 1) or a firm 
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that engaged in an unrelated acquisition (control group 2). The lack of performance differences is 
most likely caused by a high level of post-merger performance heterogeneity. All results are 
available upon request, but not reported here due to space limitations. 
In the last step, we regress the treatment effects on the treated for ROA and Tobin’s Q on a 
family firm dummy, a gain frame dummy and the interaction of both variables. Table 4 shows the 
results. 
Model 1, 3, 5 and 7 show a basic specification for ROA and Tobin’s Q that includes the family 
firm status and the gain frame status plus industry and time dummies for the two different control 
groups. Models 2, 4, 6 and 8 also include the interaction of the family firm dummy and the gain 
frame variable. We do not find that family firms realize a financial performance advantage from 
related acquisitions as compared to non-family firms as measured by ROA, a contemporaneous 
performance measure (see model 1 and model 3). Focusing on Tobin’s Q as a forward-looking 
measure that takes expected future performance gains into account we, however, find that family 
firms well outperform non-family firms after related acquisitions (see model 5 and model 7).  
Model 1 shows a weak ROA performance advantage for firms in a gain frame suggesting that 
firms in a gain frame that engage in related acquisitions outperform firms that have not engaged in 
any M&A (ß = 0.04*, p < 0.10). The result does not hold for the control group of firms engaging 
in unrelated acquisitions (model 3).  The performance advantage of firms in a gain frame is more 
pronounced for Tobin’s Q which takes the expectations about the firm’s future performance into 
account (see model 5 and model 7). 
Model 1 shows a weak ROA performance advantage for firms in a gain frame suggesting that 
firms in a gain frame that engage in related acquisitions outperform firms that have not engaged in 
any M&A (ß = 0.04*, p < 0.10).  
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Table 4: Regression Results for the Performance Implications of M&As in Family Firms  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Dependent variable  ROA ROA ROA ROA 
Tobin’s 
Q 
Tobin’s 
Q 
Tobin’s 
Q 
Tobin’s 
Q 
 Control group All Firms not involved in M&As 
Firms involved in 
unrelated M&As 
All Firms not involved 
in M&As 
Firms involved in 
unrelated M&As 
Family firms 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.86*** 0.21 0.63* 0.52 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.27) (0.39) (0.33) (0.48) 
Gain frame 0.04* -0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.46* -0.09 0.76** 0.66 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.26) (0.35) (0.32) (0.43) 
Family*gain frame  0.09**  0.13**  1.18**  0.21 
  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.51)  (0.63) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.00 -1.36* -1.68*** -1.36* -1.33* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.71) (0.61) (0.71) (0.71) 
Observation 232 232 198 198 230 230 197 197 
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The result does not hold for the control group of firms engaging in unrelated acquisitions (model 
3). The performance advantage of firms in a gain frame is more pronounced for Tobin’s Q which 
takes the expectations about the firm’s future performance into account (see model 5 and model 
7). 
Model 1 shows a weak ROA performance advantage for firms in a gain frame suggesting that 
firms in a gain frame that engage in related acquisitions outperform firms that have not engaged in 
any M&A (ß = 0.04*, p < 0.10). The result does not hold for the control group of firms engaging 
in unrelated acquisitions (model 3).  The performance advantage of firms in a gain frame is more 
pronounced for Tobin’s Q which takes the expectations about the firm’s future performance into 
account (see model 5 and model 7). 
Model 2 of table 4 shows that family firms who engage in related acquisitions in a gain frame 
actually observe increases in financial performance post M&A as compared to firms not engaged 
in any acquisition (ß = 0.09**, p < 0.05). The effect is even more pronounced if compared to the 
control group of family firms that engaged in an unrelated acquisitions in the same year (ß = 0.13**, 
p < 0.05, see model 4). Also, with regard to Tobin’s Q model 6 suggests a performance advantage 
for family firms in a gain frame. The results show that there is a short-term performance advantage 
for family firms in a gain frame while the long-term advantage is less obvious. This provides 
support for hypothesis 4. 
Robustness tests 
We use different types of robustness checks in this study. First, our analysis is based on the 
classification of S&P 500 firms as family and non-family-firms as of 2003. The previous results 
are relying on the assumption that the family firm status did not change after 2003. Since this is a 
strong assumption, we re-ran our analysis using the subsample of observations for our firms before 
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2003, i.e. for the period of which we can be sure that our family firm classification is accurate. The 
findings are presented in Table 5 and show a very similar pattern as for the full sample analysis. 
 
 
Table 5: Panel Logit & Poisson Random-Effect Regression Models for Family Firm Acquisitions (sub 
Sample) 
  All acquisitions  
All related 
acquisitions 
Related 
acquisitions - loss 
frame 
Related acquisitions - 
gain frame 
Variables Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 Logit Poisson Poisson Logit Poisson Logit Poisson 
Family firms 0.19 0.13 0.40* -0.01 -0.06 0.85*** 0.65** 
 (0.19) (0.18) (0.21) (0.28) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27) 
Firm size 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.20** 0.20** 0.47*** 0.42*** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) 
Debt/assets -0.80 -0.88 -0.48 0.02 0.13 0.15 -0.68 
 (0.74) (0.65) (0.79) (1.17) (1.11) (1.24) (1.14) 
ROA 2.37** 2.02** 1.70* -0.52 -0.64 5.09** 4.38** 
 (1.02) (0.86) (1.02) (1.24) (1.17) (2.02) (1.71) 
R&D/assets 2.44 1.32 0.64 1.82 0.80 0.64 -1.51 
 (1.84) (1.60) (1.87) (2.56) (2.49) (3.33) (2.97) 
Acquisition experience 0.55*** 0.37** 0.03 0.58* 0.39 0.08 -0.02 
 (0.21) (0.17) (0.20) (0.31) (0.30) (0.33) (0.27) 
Patent/R&D 0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.08 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) 
Absorbed slack 1.15** 0.91* 1.25*** 1.34** 0.96* 2.14 1.65 
 (0.58) (0.48) (0.48) (0.66) (0.51) (1.35) (1.24) 
Potential slack -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.08) 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons -5.24*** -5.08*** -5.68*** -3.87*** 
-
4.11*** 
-
8.37*** -7.22*** 
 (0.81) (0.72) (0.88) (1.07) (1.06) (1.55) (1.38) 
Observation 3448.00 3616.00 3616.00 1832.00 1974.00 1553.00 1642.00 
Log likelihood -899.17 -1049.42 -749.53 -306.97 -334.81 -336.01 -399.21 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.   
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01      
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Second, we estimate pooled cross-sectional poisson estimations with robust and clustered 
standard errors (see Table 6). The clustered robust standard errors account for over-dispersion and 
correlation over time for the specific firms (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). The results confirm our 
previous findings. This robustness check is not unimportant since tests for over-dispersion cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of equal mean and variance.  
Table 6: Pooled Cross Sections with Robust Clustered Standard Errors 
Pooled Cross Sections with Robust Clustered Standard Errors 
  Full sample 
  All acquisitions 
Related 
acquisitions 
Related 
acquisition - 
loss frame 
Related 
acquisition - 
gain frame 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Family firms 0.09 0.51*** -0.11 0.84*** 
 (0.12) (0.17) (0.21) (0.23) 
Firm size 0.39*** 0.34*** 0.23*** 0.39*** 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) 
Debt/assets -0.99** -0.36 -0.32 -0.18 
 (0.50) (0.63) (0.85) (0.83) 
ROA 2.34*** 2.49** 0.79 4.09** 
 (0.80) (1.02) (1.16) (1.75) 
R&D/assets 1.40 0.70 0.81 -0.11 
 (1.54) (1.69) (2.38) (2.32) 
Acquisition experience 0.99*** 0.74*** 0.75*** 0.65*** 
 (0.12) (0.16) (0.21) (0.23) 
Patent/R&D 0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) 
Absorbed slack 0.79* 1.37*** 1.07*** 1.73** 
 (0.42) (0.38) (0.31) (0.83) 
Potential slack -0.00* -0.01* -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) 
Industry dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year dummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
_cons -5.46*** -6.00*** -4.68*** -7.06*** 
 (0.48) (0.81) (0.87) (0.89) 
Observation 4903.00 4903.00 2569.00 2334.00 
Log likelihood -1466.95 -1026.34 -435.92 -566.00 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01   
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Also, the 2-digit SIC industry classification has been criticized for being a too broad measure to 
capture relatedness. Table 7 presents results of related acquisitions as a further robustness check 
using the 4-digit SIC classification which is more fine-grained than the 2-digit classification.  
Table 7: Panel Logit Random-Effect Regression Models for 
Family Firm Acquisitions (Sub Sample) (4-digit SIC Codes) 
 Loss frame Gain frame 
Variables Model 2 Model 3 
Family firms -0.16 0.68** 
 (0.34) (0.33) 
Firm size 0.29** 0.37*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) 
Debt/assets 0.11 -0.51 
 (1.46) (1.67) 
ROA -0.49 4.83** 
 (1.46) (2.42) 
R&D/assets 1.93 0.70 
 (3.16) (3.80) 
Acquisition experience 0.84** 0.46 
 (0.34) (0.34) 
Patent/R&D -0.21 -0.55*** 
 (0.13) (0.19) 
Absorbed slack 1.52* 0.83 
 (0.82) (1.66) 
Potential slack -0.03 0.10 
 (0.15) (0.08) 
Industry dummy Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes 
_cons -4.58*** -6.70*** 
 (1.25) (1.55) 
Observation 1638.00 1376.00 
Log likelihood -189.79 -183.83 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
 
Here we find strong support for family firms in a gain frame being more likely to engage in 
related acquisitions than family firms in a loss frame. We do not find a significant effect for family 
firms being more likely to engage in related acquisitions (results not presented). Using the 3-digit 
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SIC classification to define relatedness leads to qualitatively the same results: family firms are 
more likely to engage in related acquisitions, especially when they are in a gain frame. The results 
are available from the authors upon request. 
We present a further robustness test for founder family firms (Miller, Le Breton-Miller.& Lester., 
2011, and Block, 2012), i.e. firms that have a member of the founding family as a CEO, Chairman, 
chairman emeritus, board member or part of management. The results are presented in the Table 
2.8 and show that the results are qualitatively the same as for our simple dummy definition. 
 
Table 8:Panel Logit Regressions for Family Firms in which 
the Founding Family is Present 
  Related acquisitions 
    
Loss 
frame 
Gain 
frame 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Founding family 0.50** -0.01 0.71** 
 (0.24) (0.27) (0.31) 
Firm size 0.41*** 0.24** 0.47*** 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) 
Debt/assets -0.93 -1.61 -0.16 
 (0.84) (1.15) (1.11) 
ROA 2.92*** 1.66 4.55** 
 (1.11) (1.26) (1.85) 
R&D/assets 1.91 1.98 0.86 
 (2.00) (2.35) (3.04) 
Acquisition experience 0.34 1.04*** 0.32 
 (0.22) (0.25) (0.29) 
Patent/R&D -0.08 -0.04 -0.19* 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) 
Absorbed slack 1.67*** 1.41*** 2.41** 
 (0.54) (0.53) (1.10) 
Potential slack -0.00 -0.00 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) 
_cons -6.96*** -4.52*** -8.04*** 
 (1.00) (1.05) (1.37) 
Observation 4671.00 2384.00 2038.00 
Log likelihood -726.38 -321.84 -396.62 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Panel estimators are used 
for all models 
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
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2.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
2.5.1 Discussion 
Our study takes two limitations of the previous literature based on BAM as a point of departure. 
The first one is acquisition deal heterogeneity which is often not taken into account. While it has 
been argued that family firms are reluctant to engage in risky actions such as innovation (e.g. 
Gomez-Mejia et al, 2007), we show that under the specific circumstance of related diversification 
acquisitions are more likely to be conducted by family firms than by non-family firms as they 
promise SEW increases. Therewith, we make a related point to recent studies on family firms and 
innovation (see Röd, 2016, for a recent survey) that show that the involvement of family firms in 
innovation displays some heterogeneity (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; De Massis, Di Minin, & Frattini, 
2015; Classen, Carree, Van Gils & Peters, 2014; Kotlar et al, 2013, Duran et al, 2016, Kosmidou 
& Ahuja, 2019) and that under certain conditions family firms’ innovation efforts are more 
prevalent and successful than the innovation activities of non-family firms (De Massis et al, 2015; 
Patel & Chrisman, 2014, Classen et al, 2014, Duran et al, 2016, Kosmidou & Ahuja, 2019).  
The second shortcoming of the previous literature on which this study elaborates is related to the 
BAM assumption that family firms in a gain frame, i.e. those that perform above their aspiration 
level, are solely interested in preserving the status quo, hence avoiding actions that involve risk. 
While BAM was for a long time the most important theoretical framework for analyzing family 
firms’ strategic decision making (Gomez-Mejia et al, 2007; Lim et al, 2010; Zellweger et al, 2012; 
Chrisman & Patel, 2012), recent studies started questioning some of the BAM assumptions and 
proposed the mixed gamble approach (Bromiley, 2009, 2010) as an attractive alternative (Berrone 
et al, 2010; Martin et al, 2013; Gomez-Mejia et al, 2014). In some cases, mixed gambles allow to 
reach the same predictions as BAM. For instance, BAM explains the lesser involvement of family 
firms in risky endeavours with loss aversion. The concept of mixed gambles can reach the same 
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prediction for specific cases by weighing expected gains and losses from risky actions, a calculus 
that involves SEW gains and losses for family firms, but not for non-family firms.  
In other cases, BAM and mixed gambles reach opposite predictions. We showcase that BAM 
and mixed gambles lead to different predictions about family firms’ involvement in the market for 
corporate control when focusing on related acquisitions. We derive from mixed gambles that family 
firms are more likely to engage in related acquisitions than non-family firms. Related acquisitions 
are an example of an acquisition type for which the expected SEW gains that only count for family 
firms can be expected to be substantial. Mixed gambles allow to account for the fact that decision 
makers need to take into account potential gains and losses with regard to different value 
dimensions (Kim et al, 1993). In the context of family firms’ involvement in the market for 
corporate control family firms need to weigh both potential financial and SEW gains and losses as 
a consequence of a firm acquisition when deciding to engage in a firm acquisition (Kotlar et al, 
2018). Our paper, therewith, speaks to the recent literature which has started to investigate the 
trade-off between avoiding SEW losses and realizing financial gains in family firms (Chrisman & 
Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al, 2011; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2014; Zellweger et al, 2012; 
Kotlar et al, 2019).  
Mixed gambles and BAM further disagree regarding the impact of a firm’s position relative to 
its aspiration level. While BAM predicts that only when far away from the aspiration level family 
firms are ready to take risks (Chrisman & Patel, 2012), mixed gambles can predict that for a well 
performing firm expected short-term SEW losses can be easy to digest if the expected long term 
financial and SEW gains weigh more. This prediction speaks to a recent analysis of IPOs that shows 
family firms make decisions based on both financial and SEW considerations (Kotlar et al, 2018). 
Our study is related to this previous analysis shedding light on ambiguities of BAM and mixed 
gambles. 
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Having derived hypotheses from the concept of mixed gambles and having shown that in some 
cases those predictions conflict with BAM predictions, our empirical results for S&P 500 firms 
speak in both cases clearly for the mixed gambles predictions, rejecting the commonly used BAM 
framework. We find that family firms are more inclined to engage in related acquisitions than non-
family firms (hypothesis 1). Further, family firms in a gain frame are more likely to engage in a 
risky action than family firms in a loss frame (hypothesis 2) and, than non-family firms in a gain 
frame (hypothesis 3). These results call highlight the importance of choosing the theoretical 
framework for empirical studies with care, paying attention to the underlying assumptions of 
competing model frameworks, and also highlight the importance of deal type heterogeneity 
influencing family firms’ actions. 
The fact that family firms are more involved in related acquisitions and especially so when they 
are well performing does not allow to draw conclusions about the success of this strategy. While 
firms appear to follow mixed gambles strategies according to our empirical analysis, a BAM 
strategy where family firms acquire mainly when they are in a loss frame might turn out to be more 
successful. This is why in the final step of the analysis, we show that financial post-merger 
performance of related acquisitions is superior for family firms in a gain frame. Family firms 
outperform non-family firms after a related acquisition when expected long-term gains are 
considered (as captured by Tobin’s Q). There is no effect found when focusing on the current 
performance only (as measured by ROA). This finding is in line with the concept of mixed gambles 
as it suggests that family firms include potential short-term SEW losses and expected long-term 
SEW gains in their strategic calculations, weighting one against the other (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Thaler, 1980).  This result does not suggest that family firms demand a financial premium 
for a risky endeavour (Astrachan & Jaskiewicz, 2008; Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008). In case of 
IPOs, this premium has been found to be substantial ranging from 22% to 75% (e.g., Zellweger et 
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al, 2012). We find that in case of firm acquisitions family firms are rather compensated by expected 
long-term gains which we estimate as a Tobin’s Q that lies 63%-86% above that of non-family 
firms.  
We further find that the short-term and expected long-term post-merger performance of family 
firms in a gain frame exceeds that of family firms in a loss frame and non-family firms providing 
additional evidence for the success of mixed gambles acquisition strategies. 
These empirical findings lead us to the conclusion that mixed gambles predictions are more in 
line with the actual acquisition strategies of family firms than acquisition strategies of mixed 
gambles. Furthermore, acquisitions in line with mixed gambles promise a superior performance for 
family firms. The implications for future research is that the concept of mixed gambles as a more 
flexible theoretical concept that can overcome several shortcomings of prior BAM studies is more 
appropriate. 
The implication for practitioners is that financial and SEW gains in the short and in the long run 
need to be weighted carefully against each other. Our results show that short-term losses can be 
well compensated by expected long-term gains. For family firms with their long-term planning 
horizon this calculus encourages risky actions such as M&As, especially if the firm is in a solid 
financial situation. Furthermore, this is not a call for non-family firm to mimic family firms. It is 
nearly impossible for non-family firms to mimic family firms. The long-term outlook of family 
firms creates dedicated owners who in turn provide patient capital without the need for short-term 
returns (Block, 2009; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003, Acquaah, 2016). These factors enable family firms to 
execute acquisitions that non-family firms will not be able to do. This is because of the short-term 
nature of non-family firms’ relationships with institutional investors and other capital providers 
who aim at short term returns. Institutional investors also diversify and move their portfolio around 
different firms thereby undermining the competitiveness of non-family firms. That said, non-family 
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firm competitors of family firms should observe the activities of family firms in the market for 
corporate control in order to be able to fashion out robust strategic responses for their activities and 
remain competitive. 
Limitations and future research 
Our study is not free of limitations. One limitation that our study shares with many others is that 
we do not have access to all information that we would like to have. For instance, we are limited 
to a binary measure of family ownership which we obtain from the Business Week Magazine. The 
difficulty in obtaining continuous measure of family ownership has made the practice of using a 
binary variable common in family firm studies (Gomez-Mejia et al, 2014; Gomez-Mejia et al, 
2010). While our focus has been on showing the differences of the type of firm ownership (family 
firms versus non-family firms), future studies may investigate the levels of ownership and how that 
influence the acquisition behaviour of family firms.  
Furthermore, it would be very interesting to have more detailed information about decision 
processes within the firms. Such information is, however, difficult to collect, especially for large 
sample studies. Hence, we accept that our study has to be seen as complementary to qualitative 
studies that may have a deeper look into the processes of strategic decision making in family firms 
(e.g. Kumeto, 2015). In a similar vein, we cannot observe the objective of firm acquisitions and 
follow prior literature by assuming that related acquisitions are to some extent motivated by the 
aim of related diversification (e.g. Anderson & Reeb, 2003a). We acknowledge that this is not a 
perfect measure, but believe that this is the most suitable measure available. 
Another potential limitation is that we focus on the S&P 500 firms. These firms are large and 
well performing and, hence, have access to resources necessary for engaging in firm acquisitions. 
This implies that the results may not be generalizable to small and medium-sized firms. Our results 
may challenge prior findings that suggest that firms in a loss frame are less likely to engage in 
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acquisitions as such. These results may be explained by a lack of resources for acquisitions for 
samples of small and medium-sized firms rather than by the position of the firms vis-à-vis their 
aspiration level.  
Another avenue for future research would be to investigate the importance of irrational 
determinants for the decision to acquire another firm. Since Cyert & March (1963) it is known that 
many firm decisions are irrational and an investigation into what extent this applies to family firms 
and non-family firms in the market for corporate control would be of great interest. We believe that 
an investigation of irrational motives would be an interesting topic for a case study. 
In recent times and extended BAM framework has been proposed which can be applied to risky 
decisions that involve mixed gambles such as related acquisitions (Martin et al, 2013). Since this 
study did not exclusively apply this extended framework, its potential to analyze broader decision 
mixed gambles is duly recognized and future studies should consider applying and testing its 
efficacy. 
2.5.2 Conclusion 
Our study tests predictions derived from the notion of mixed gambles for strategic decision 
making of family firms. Empirical results for firm acquisition decisions of a sample based on the 
S&P 500 firms confirm the mixed gambles predictions – namely that family firms are more likely 
to engage in related acquisitions than non-family firms and that they are even more so when 
performing above their financial aspiration levels - and therewith stand in contrast to the predictions 
of the often-used BAM. These results emphasize the significance of potential gains of risky actions 
for family firms and recommend mixed gambles as a superior approach for understanding family 
firms’ decision making.  
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Chapter 3 
Post-Acquisition Innovation and Merger Waves: The 
Influence of Family Ownership 
3.1 Introduction 
Prior research on firm level innovation have examined firm level drivers of innovation in detail 
while paying inadequate attention to the influence of family ownership and influence on the 
relationship between innovation activities and innovation outputs (De Massis, Frattini, & 
Lichtenthaler, 2013). Research also shows that family firms are endowed with distinct resources 
which can produce enormous benefits in the innovation process (Konig, Kammerlander, & Enders, 
2013) and cause family firms to outperform other organizational forms (Classen, Carree, Van Gils, 
& Peters, 2013). Yet very little is known about the sources of the advantages that allow family 
firms to gain superior performance over their non-family counterparts in the pursuit of innovation 
(Bammens, Noelaers, & Van Gils, 2015). 
Family involvement has barely been unravelled in innovation research (De Massis et al., 2013), 
and holds significant prospects for the field of management in terms of pushing forward the 
frontiers of knowledge (De Massis Di Minin & Frattini., 2015). So far research has brought to the 
fore the constraints faced by family firms in the use of internal sources of innovation such as R&D 
expenditures (Block, 2012; Chrisman & Patel, 2012) and the use of external sources of innovation 
such as technology acquisitions (Classen et al, 2012; Kotlar, De Massis, Frattini, Bianchi, & Fang, 
2013). 
Prior research shows that there are several motives for which firms including family firms 
engage in acquisitions (see Worek, De Massis, Wright, & Veider, 2018). These include financial 
performance and creating barriers of entry, market discipline (Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, & 
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Viswanathan, 2005), gaining market power (Hitt, Harrison, & Ireland, 2001), cost reductions 
(Graham, Lemmon, & Wolf, 2002), resource redeployment (Capron, Dussauge, & Mitchell, 1998) 
etc. Given that prior studies have shown that family ownership of firms is mostly associated with 
low R&D investments (Block, 2012; Chrisman & Patel, 2012), and yet these firms must remain 
innovative in order to be competitive, it is plausible to suggest that acquisitions undertaken by 
family firms could among other things be geared toward improving future innovations (Ahuja & 
Katila, 2001). Available knowledge on how family ownership and control influence the ability of 
family firms to use external sources of innovation such as acquisitions to improve innovation 
performance is limited and requires further investigation (Kotlar et al., 2013). 
The resource based view of the firm is a useful lens through which the acquisition of external 
resource assets can be analyzed (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998; Peteraf, 1993). The resource 
base view conceives of resources as rare, valuable and difficult to imitate that are needed to 
establish a sustained competitive advantage (Barney 1991, Saxton & Dollinger, 2004). To be able 
to gain the full potential of acquired resources, firms must leverage and redesign or recombine 
these resources (Newbert, 2007) through their internal processes in order to fully exploit their 
potential benefits (Saxton & Dollinger, 2004). However, the resource base view alone offers a 
limited view about the dynamics of acquisitions on innovation. Lieberman & Montgomery (1998) 
as well as Carow et al. (2004) envisaged a combined insight of the resource base view and the 
theory of first mover advantage, which promises to be useful in shedding more light on the timing 
of entry into merger waves and how that may influence the acquisition and superior appropriation 
of resources and capabilities as well as synergies from acquisitions (Lieberman & Montgomery, 
1998). This line of enquiry remains largely unexplored. 
The timing of acquisitions has been widely studied particularly due to the fact that the position 
of a firm in a merger wave influences the potential benefits or returns on acquisitions (McNamara, 
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Haleblian, & Dykes, 2008). Carow, Heron, & Saxton, (2004) and Lieberman & Montgomery 
(1998) investigate the performance implications of acquisitions in merger waves thereby placing 
the timing of entry into merger waves at the heart of the strategic management literature. As 
acquisitions occur in waves, prior studies have examined the financial performance implications 
of acquisitions relative to the movement of the wave or mergers (See McNamara et al, 2008) as 
well as the characteristics of firms that participate in the various phases of a merger wave (See 
Haleblian, McNamara, Kolev, & Dykes, 2012). The peculiar attribute of the timing of acquisitions 
is the early mover advantages or disadvantages that are associated with the acquisition of target 
resource assets (Carow et al, 2004; Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998). For instance prior research 
shows the presence of significant early mover advantages as these acquisitions tend to be associated 
with increases in performance (McNamara et al, 2008). 
However, it is also commonly known that information asymmetry and dynamic nature of the 
market for corporate control may obscure the true potentials of early acquisitions which may turn 
out be less valuable as the merger wave evolves (McNamara et al, 2008). This underscores the 
importance of the timing of acquisitions. Family firms are distinctive organizations that invest less 
in internal R&D and use acquisitions as a resource picking strategy for innovation. In respect of 
the timing of acquisitions, very little is known about how family firms are able to participate and 
fully benefit from acquisitions in order to accomplish their innovation targets. Nor how the unique 
resources of family firms make the utilization of acquired resources different from non-family 
firms depending on the position of the family firm in a merger wave. This paper addresses this 
important gap by drawing upon perspectives of the resource base view of family firms and the 
theory of early mover advantages and focuses on how family firms are better able to appropriate 
acquired resource assets to improve upon innovation performance considering the timing of the 
acquisitions. 
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Using a panel dataset of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 firms followed over a period of thirty-
one years (1980-2010), the study finds empirical support for the predictions that family firms are 
more able to appropriate acquired resources better than non-family firms. Furthermore, targets 
acquired during the upswing of a merger wave are more valuable to family firms and associated 
with innovation than for non-family firms. 
This paper makes three important contributions to the literature on strategy and innovation in 
family firms. First, by drawing on the resource based view of the firm, the paper shows that family 
firms invest less in internal development of innovation (Block, 2012; Chrisman & Patel, 2012), 
and regard acquisitions as a pathway to innovation in order to remain competitive. Acquisitions 
foster transparent and efficient transfer of the valuable knowledge resources of the targets which 
are then reconfigured using the internal unique resources of family firms such as employee 
commitment (Wayne, Shore & Liden, 1997), patient capital and survivability capital both of which 
support long term innovation (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). This contributes to a better understanding of 
the influence of family ownership on the relationship between innovation activities such as 
acquisitions on innovation outputs (De Massis, Frattini, & Lichtenthaler, 2013). The second 
contribution is of empirical value explicating the view that that family firms absorb external 
resources markedly different and more efficient than non-family firms (See Sirmon & Hitt, 2003; 
Kang, 2003). Third, the predictions of the timing of entry into a merger wave and its association 
with innovation is particularly made clear by exploring the combined notions of the resource based 
view, first mover advantages as well as family involvement. In light of this the paper establishes 
that external resource assets acquired during the upswing of a merger wave are more valuable to 
family firms in terms of resource synergies for future innovation performance. This adds a 
theoretical contribution to the question of innovation performance of family firms by deviating 
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from prior studies that have only considered merger waves in the context of organizational decision 
making and financial performance thereof. 
3.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
3.2.1 Involvement of Family Firms in Acquisitions 
Acquisitions are risky and anticipated returns are also uncertain. Despite this observation, 
acquisitions have proven to be one of the instruments with which firms access new or external 
resources to complement existing ones (Kotlar et al, 2013; Worek, 2017). While acquisitions can 
be a growth strategy for firms, there is also a likelihood that acquisitions can lead to the dilution of 
ownership and control (Basu et al, 2009). This aspect of ownership and control is particularly 
important for family firms and has led to predictions of the reluctance of family firms to engage in 
acquisitions, especially deals that threaten ownership and control (Caprio et al, 2011; Shim & 
Okamuro, 2011). In spite of this, recent developments indicate that family firms are participating 
in acquisition deals in increasing numbers (See Family Capital, 2015). In deed prior studies have 
examined the involvement of family firms in acquisitions (Andre et al, 2014). Prior findings thus 
far show the differing acquisition behaviours of family firms from non-family firms where these 
differences emanate from the differences in governance structures, ownership structures, family 
related economic goals as well as preferences for non-economic priorities (Gomez-Mejia et al, 
2007, Miller et al, 2010). M&A theories should therefore be applied to family firms conditional on 
the aforementioned differences (Worek, 2017). A consideration of these two dimensions of 
financial and non-financial goals in acquisition decisions is viewed as a mixed gamble (Gomez-
Mejia et al, 2018). 
Recent empirical evidence indicates that the desire of family firms to pursue both financial and 
non-financial goals remains discordant and exacerbates the reluctance to engage in acquisitions 
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(Gomez-Mejia et al, 2018). In line with this, vulnerability is used as a signal by family firms to 
engage in acquisitions where increased vulnerability leads to more acquisitions (Gomez-Mejia et 
al, 2015). Furthermore, as family wealth tend to be concentrated, the quest to reduce the risk 
associated with the wealth portfolio leads family firms to diversify their businesses through 
acquisitions (Miller et al, 2010).  
3.2.2 Acquisition and Innovation in Family Firms 
Industries associated with high R&D and technology dynamism are faced with uncertainties 
about resources and capabilities that are needed to keep up with changes in the technological 
landscape (Peteraf, 1993). Innovation has in the past been viewed as an internal development 
process through investment in R&D (Kohler, Wolfgang & Grimpe, 2012). However, prior research 
is clear that because of the high level of control and wealth concentration as well as the aversion 
to loss of non-financial benefits, family firms invest less in innovation related activities such as 
R&D (Block, 2012; Chrisman & Patel, 2012), even though they tend to have a higher rate when it 
comes to the conversion of innovation inputs into outputs making them more innovative than non-
family firms (Duran et al., 2016). Therefore, a firm risks losing its competitive edge if it fails to 
adhere to and respond to changes and invest its resources accordingly (Titus, House, & Covin, 
2017). However, due to the time and cost associated with generating innovation internally, firms 
are strategically turning to external sources of knowledge and capabilities in other to remain 
competitive (West & Bogers, 2014). Internal R&D may take considerably longer period of time to 
mature or even fail to yield desired results. Therefore, for family firms who are known to invest 
less in R&D, speedy access to proven and tested technologies from sources outside the firm remain 
an important avenue for continuous renewal. Relying on external resources makes it possible for 
firms to gain access to resources that are not available to them locally. Thereby addressing a critical 
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need of sustaining favourable outcomes in product and process innovations (Kotlar et al., 2013). 
Even though risks, uncertainties and information asymmetries associated with sourcing 
technologies and other resources outside the boundaries of the firm may persist, sourcing 
technology outside the boundaries of the firms grants speedy access to new resources to improve 
innovation performance (Lichtenthaler, 2011) as well as securing new technology spaces such as 
patents (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998). In view of this, access to technological resources 
beyond the boundaries of the firm can be achieved through different strategic activities including 
alliances, joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions (De Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, & Duysters, 2009). 
Acquisitions have increasingly become one of the strategies used by firms to overcome local 
search barriers and gain access to external technology assets (De Vrande et al., 2009), as well as 
some of the hard to replicate capabilities and resources (Grimpe & Hussinger, 2014). Acquisitions 
are means through which firms can obtain new resources to reconfigure existing resource stocks 
(Karim & Mitchell, 2000; Kotlar et al., 2013). While acquisitions may lead to the dilution of 
ownership and control (Basu et al., 2009), recent studies point to the fact that acquisitions bestow 
control of the targets on the acquirer and enables commitment and openness in the transfer of 
knowledge resources from the target to the acquirer (Titus et al., 2017). Although this may apply 
to all kinds of firms, it is particularly greater for family firms for whom control is regarded as an 
asset and integral part of their resource stocks. Acquisitions grant control over the target, which 
not only enhances the socioemotional wealth of family firms (Berrone et al., 2010), but also give 
them the wherewithal to efficiently appropriate the acquired resources and capabilities to boost 
their innovation performance (Rumelt, 1982). 
3.2.3 Resource Based View of Family Firms 
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Competitive advantage can be gained from resources and capabilities at the disposal of 
organizations (Barney, 1991). An organization should therefore be able to leverage these valuable, 
rare and hard to imitate resources and capabilities in order to exploit and maintain its competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1997). Furthermore, for an organization to gain a sustained competitive 
advantage from its resources, it should be able to reshape these resources to yield their full potential 
(Newbert, 2007). 
Family firms are endowed with distinct resources and capabilities that can be leveraged to 
develop competitive advantages over non-family firms (Acquaah, 2016; Rau, 2014). Some of these 
resources include but not limited to human capital, tangible resources, intangible resources, 
organizational culture, organizational capabilities, knowledge and information (Barney, 1991; 
Habbershon & Williams, 1999). Patient financial capital, survivability capital and social capital are 
other distinct resources of family firms that can be leveraged upon to improve firm performance 
(Sirmon & Hitt, 2003) 
Any capital that is invested for a considerably longer period of time and poses no threat of 
liquidation can be termed as patient financial capital. This is different from other forms of capital 
investments due to the planned time (Teece, 1992). Patient capital is a valuable asset for family 
firms which enables them to undertake innovative activities (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003; Kang, 2000; 
Teece, 1992). Survivability capital takes the form of pooled resources such as additional equity 
investments, free labour, dedication, commitment and sacrifices that family members are ready to 
contribute to a family firm due to their relationship with it .This is particularly useful during periods 
of difficulties such as decline in profitability, entry into new markets and post-acquisition 
integration (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). 
In terms of strategic organization of activities, family firms can take advantage of their 
organizational social capital. In this regard social capital refers to the trust and obligations that are 
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immersed in the family firm and its relationship with employees and external stakeholders (Sirmon 
& Hitt, 2003). This can be a source of resource exchange such as valuable information and access 
to new markets (Hitt, Ireland, Camp, & Sexton, 2002). Also through routines that foster a long 
term approach to giving befitting treatment to externally hired employees (Konig, Kammerlander, 
& Enders, 2013; Miller & Le Bretton-Miller, 2005), family firms are able to retain organizational 
memory that facilitates the transfer of skills and knowledge (including tacit knowledge) between 
firms and across generations (De Visscher, Aronoff & Ward, 2005). 
The assumption is that family firms can reconfigure their unique resources and capabilities 
(Newbert, 2007) in combination with externally acquired resources to create a sustainable 
competitive advantage in the form of innovations (Acquaah, 2012; Miller, Lee, Chang, & Le 
Breton-Miller, 2009) . This implies that external resources obtained from the market can be 
integrated to create valuable, rare and hard to imitate bundle of new resources (Sirmon & Hitt, 
2003). This also applies to family driven intangible resources, which can generate more valuable 
bundles of resources when combined with acquired complementary resources (Carpenter, Sanders, 
& Gregersen, 2001). 
Employees remain an important source of creativity and innovation for many organizations 
(Baer, 2012; Grant & Berry, 2011). Employees strive in work environments that support innovation 
either directly or indirectly (Amabile, et al., 1996; Bammens et al., 2010). Suffice it to mention that 
family firms have distinguished themselves for having a stronger work climate that motivate the 
innovation activities of employees (Bammens et al., 2015). Furthermore, family firms are reputed 
for their preparedness to make special efforts in treating employees well (Konig et al., 2013; Miller, 
Le Breton-Miller, & Scholnick, 2008). Besides family firms are said to be better employers in term 
of job security in comparison to non-family firms (Block, 2010; Stavrou, Kassinis & Filotheou, 
2007) as well as through benevolent care centred contracts for non-family employees (Cruz, 
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Gomez-Mejia & Becerra, 2010). This display of concern and care for the wellbeing of employees 
creates a perception of organizational support for employees (Eisenberger, Armeli, Rexwinkel, 
Lynch & Rhoades, 2001). This then evolves into a sense of obligation on employees to reciprocate 
the employer’s commitment by acting in ways that support organizational goals (Wayne, Shore & 
Liden, 1997). This leads to a dedicated work force who take creative initiatives in the best interest 
of the firm (Bammens et al., 2010; Miller et al, 2009) especially during difficult times (Cennamo, 
Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012) such as reconfiguring acquired resources with internal 
resources. The process of recombining acquired resources through the internal processes of a firm 
can be labourious, heighten uncertainty about the value of the new resource as well as the value of 
the acquiring firm and lead to the exit of key employees. Part of the uncertainty is that recombining 
an acquired firm’s resources can lead to destruction of the acquiring firm’s existing knowledge 
bases (Ranft and Lord, 2002). This is where the distinctive characteristic of family firms that make 
them stand out as better employers play a role by invoking employee commitment, obligation and 
support for organizational goals. 
Furthermore, owners of other non-family firms tend to be detached from the running of the 
firm and lack the information needed to ensure effective monitoring (Duran, Kammerlander, Van 
Essen & Zellweger, 2016). On the contrary, the high level of control and concentration of 
resources, coupled with the overlapping owner manager role exhibited by family firms ensures that 
firm owners or owner managers have high amount of information and the wherewithal needed for 
efficient monitoring (Duran et al., 2016; Poza, 2007; Uhlaner, 2013) of decisions regarding 
reshaping acquired resources in order to realize their potential synergies for future innovation 
(Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Graebner, 2004).  
Furthermore, family firms are usually held in the family for a considerably long period of time. 
The domain knowledge, experience and skills accumulated over the period of time through the 
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family’s association with the firm make the absorption and assimilation of knew knowledge 
resources from acquisitions more efficient (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). The effectiveness with 
which family firms absorb externally acquired new resources is markedly different and more 
efficient than non-family firms (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). In light of this, Kang, (2000) observes that 
the transfer and absorption of new resources is supported by patient and survivability capital in 
family firms both of which also support long term creative strategies such as innovation. Taken 
together, it is expected that the association of acquisitions with innovation will be stronger for 
family firms than non-family firms as family will be able to recombine the acquired resources 
through internal process aided by distinct resources which support innovation. 
Hypothesis 1: Family firms are more associated with post-acquisition innovation than non-
family firms.  
 
3.2.4 Merger Waves and Innovation in Family Firms 
Acquisitions take place in waves due to several reasons including market shocks, development 
of capital markets, self-interested managerial decisions etc. (Harford, 2005; Martynova & 
Renneboog, 2008). Prior research shows that the last century has witnessed about five major merger 
waves (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). Acquisition waves are times of increased acquisition 
activities and a start of a wave is often identified by an upsurge in or intensified acquisition 
activities as compared to the preceding period (Haleblian et al., 2012; McNamara et al., 2008). This 
trend continues until merger activities get to the peak and then start to fall until activities return to 
levels similar to the period prior to the start of the merger wave (Carow et al., 2004).  
The theory of early mover advantages underscores the advantages associated with the timing 
of entry into a merger wave (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998; McNamara et al., 2008). This 
becomes even more useful when it is applied within the wider context of the resource based view 
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(Carow et al., 2004; Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998) to explain the external resource acquisition 
activities of firms. Market pre-emption is advanced as one of the profound advantages associated 
with acting early. First, market pre-emption refers to the ability of firms to get ahead of competition 
by acquiring critical resource assets (including capabilities and competencies) they can capitalize 
on to improve performance. Second, it also refers to the ability of firms to foresee opportunities in 
a particular technology space and act before competitors (Carow et al., 2004; Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988). 
However, it is widely argued that early movers may also face disadvantages resulting from 
market dynamics and cost disadvantages (Cho, Kim &Rhee, 1998). As merger wave evolves, early 
movers may acquire assets that would turn out to be inappropriate or of limited value due to 
technological, and market uncertainties (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998). This has the tendency 
to put early acquirers at a disadvantage in terms of cost and undermine the value of resource bases 
relative to late movers (McNamara et al, 2008). 
In spite of the disadvantages of early participation in merger waves, McNamara et al. (2008) 
offer more insights and argue that acting early in a merger wave is more likely to lead to increases 
in performance, where as acting late is associated with negative performance outcomes. Early 
movers take advantage of asymmetric information over competitors (Peteraf, 1993). The supply of 
targets is also substantial during the early phase of a merger wave. This implies that information 
asymmetries provide early movers the opportunity to choose targets with superior potential assets 
or critical resource assets that reflect the resource needs of the acquiring firm from a large pool of 
potential targets (Finkelstein, 1997; Saxton & Dollinger, 2004). Acting early thus gives early access 
to strategically valuable resources often at lower costs, before competitors would even identify 
their potentials and true value and bid up the cost (Wernerfelt & Karnani, 1987). Being able to pre-
empt, acquire and integrate valuable resources give firms performance advantages over 
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competitors (Sarkar, Cavusgil, & Aulakh, 1999). Furthermore, the advantage of having to choose 
from a large pool of targets increases a firm’s likelihood of acquiring targets that will foster co-
specialized assets due to the market power, economies of scale or new knowledge that originates 
from the combination of assets of the target and the acquirer (Mahoney & Mahoney, 1993). 
Building on hypothesis 1, it is suggested that there can also be substantial first mover 
advantages for family firms because decision makers of family firms tend to possess extensive 
knowledge of their core industry and activities due to many years of association with the firm as 
well as the presence of emotional attachment to the firm’s core business activities (Chrisman & 
Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2013). Establishing stable and lasting networks or relationships 
with stakeholders including suppliers underlie the essence of family organizational social capital 
which to a large extent defines the identity of family firms (Konig et al, 2013; Miller & Le Breton-
Miller, 2005; Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel & Gutierrez, 2001). These ties are important sources of 
privileged information about market opportunities such as new deals as well as general market and 
industry dynamics. The knowledge of the industry equips managers of family firms with more 
knowledge and foresight to pre-empt changes and needs specific to that industry (Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988). Family firm managers can then leverage their foreknowledge or 
organizational social capital for early information about deals, to quickly appraise and acquire 
superior and valuable targets at relatively lower costs before the true values and synergies are 
known to all industry participants (McNamara, et al, 2008). 
The information asymmetry advantage driven from family owners’ foreknowledge and 
organizational social capital benefit family firms such that it allows them to make full use of 
opportunities provided by the early phase of a merger wave. The early phase of a merger wave is 
dominated by a large pool of superior targets from which early acquirers can choose (McNamara 
et al., 2008). The foreknowledge and information advantage granted by organizational social 
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capital aids firms in gaining a head start in order to control critical strategic resources (Saxton & 
Dollinger, 2004) for future innovation activities .  
Also the chances of benefitting from co-specialized assets increase during the upswing of a 
merger wave where the pool of targets are many. The notion of co-specialized assets is that 
individual firms each have a set of resources which when combined with other firms’ resources 
becomes more valuable (McNamara et al, 2008). These co-specialized assets are vital in increasing 
innovation prospects (Mahoney & Mahoney, 1993).  
Hypothesis 2: Acquisitions in the upswing of a merger wave are positively associated with 
more innovations in family firms than in non-family firms. 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Data Sources and Sample 
The data sample is constructed using the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 firms as of 2003 as the 
starting point14. This is because the July 2003 issue of the BusinessWeek, published qualitative 
details of 177 family firms among the S&P 500 firms (Block, 2009).15 
                                                          
14 S&P as well as Fortune 500 firms have been used previously to analyze the R&D performance of family firms and 
non-family firms (Chrisman and Patel, 2012) as well as the performance of family and non-family firms (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003; Miller et al., 2007). 
15 Block (2009) has previously used the Business Week punblication of July 2003 to analyze the perofrmance, R&D 
spending and employment downsizing of family and non-family firms.. This study relies on the final list of family and 
non-family firms provided by Block after a manual search and review of the ownership levels of these firms. See pages 
237-242 for the list of family and non-family firms as published by Block (2009). The book can be accessed here: 
https://epdf.tips/long-term-orientation-of-family-firms.html. 
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To gain access to the financial and market information of firms, the S&P dataset is merged 
with the Compustat database leading to a panel data of 500 firms. This is further combined with 
the acquisition data which is obtained from Thomson One Banker. Furthermore, using the GVKEY 
and CUSIP as common identifiers, the patent data obtained from the NBER U.S patent and citation 
records is merged with the Compustat database. 
The study focuses on the manufacturing sector due to the overwhelming presence of knowledge 
intensive and innovative firms in that sector (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002; Zaheer, Hernandez & 
Banerjee, 2010). This led to a final panel dataset of 4213 observations from 203 firms spanning the 
period of analysis, 1980-2010. A total of 297 of the S&P 500 firms were dropped owing to the 
focus on only manufacturing sector firms as described above. Finally, a total of 118 of the S&P 
500 firms in the sample carried out 324 different acquisitions during the period of analysis.  
3.3.1.1 Dependent variable 
Patent count 
Granted patents indicate the knowledge that a firm is recognized as having generated (Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg and Henderson, 1993). Patents are results of successful R&D that partially shows the 
relevance of the knowledge generated (Block et al, 2013). Patents are also indicative of the 
technological, inventive as well as innovative performance of a firm (Hagedoorn & Cloodt, 2003). 
However, Griliches (1990) acknowledges the presence of a noteworthy ‘noise’ in granted patents, 
as this may not be representative of the knowledge base of a firm. In spite of this shortcoming, 
patents are largely accepted in the innovation literature as a measure to compare the innovative 
performance of firms (Hagedoorn & Cloodt, 2003). Therefore, patent count is used as a proxy to 
capture innovation at the firm level. The patent count variable measures the number of patents of 
the acquiring firm i in year t. Therefore, in line with Cloodt, Hagedoorn, & Van Kranenburg, 
72 
 
(2006), patent count is estimated as the number of patents of the acquiring firm in the 1-3 years 
after the acquisition. 
Patent citations indicates the technological and economic value of patents (Hall et al, 2005). 
Citation weighted patents is used for robustness test to account for the economic value of patents. 
3.3.1.2 Independent variables 
Family firms 
The BusinessWeek issue of July 2003 provided a list of S&P 500 family firms as at 2003. The 
report indicates that “to start, we asked two scholars whose work provided the impetus for our 
research—Ronald C. Anderson of American University and David M. Reeb of Temple University—
to help us identify family companies. Then, with the help of Spencer Stuart, we examined regulatory 
filings, company Web sites, and corporate histories. The result: We found 177 family companies in 
the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index as of July, 2003.” (See BusinessWeek, November 
2003:111). Based on the BusinessWeek issue and a manual check, Block (2009:237-242) 
reaffirmed and published a list of all family firms and non-family firms in the S&P 500 as of July 
2003.16 This study relies on the aforementioned published lists as the basis for determining whether 
a firm is a family firm or not. 
The family firm status is measured as a binary variable which equals to 1 for family firms and 
0 otherwise. According to Block (2009) in order to be classified as a family firm the combined 
stock ownership of the family needs to not be less than 5% and a member of the family needs to 
                                                          
16 The list of family firms can be found on pages 237-242. And the book can be accessed here: https://epdf.tips/long-
term-orientation-of-family-firms.html. 
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be either CEO or chairman of the board of directors.17 A similar definition of family firms has been 
employed by Anderson & Reeb (2003).  
Acquisition dummy is a binary variable, which takes a value of 1 if a firm has conducted any 
firm acquisition and 0 otherwise. 
3.3.1.3 Merger wave variables 
A merger wave is broadly categorized into 3 distinct phases namely, the upswing, peak and 
downswing. As indicated earlier, a merger wave starts with a period of intensified merger activity 
relative to the preceding period and continues, usually over a few years. This phase is called the 
upswing. The trend continues to the zenith which normally also lasts a few years and referred to as 
the peak. The last phase called the downswing refers to the period where the intensity of merger 
                                                          
17 It is often explained that the a low family ownership level such as 5%, whether a member of the family is CEO or 
chairman of and the percentage of family members on the board is suited for the US context which unlike in some 
European countries runs a one-tier board structure (Tirole, 2006) and an outsider- controlled system of corporate 
governance (Hackethal et al., 2005). A family can rely on publicly available information and the market for corporate 
control to push its agenda. So the family does not have to be represented on internal institutions such as the supervisory 
board which is important in a two-tier system of corporate governance (see Block, 2009: 18). Also the ownership 
structure of the firm matters when one considers the percentage of share ownership and influence. A 5% ownership in 
a widely dispersed ownership structure is better than 5% ownership in a concentrated ownership structure. 
Furthermore, a 5% ownership in listed firm gives more power than a similar ownership stake in a non-listed firm 
(Claessens and Tzioumis, 2006; Block, 2009). A firm which is listed on a stock market tend to follow some rules and 
regulations which strengthens the rights and interests of investors. Therefore for listed firms to be considered family 
firms the ownership stake required should be lower (Jaskiewicz, 2006). Block (2009) also notes that CEOs in US tend 
to exercise control over the selection of board members which makes the position of CEO powerful. 
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activity descends to levels similar to the period prior to the start of the wave (Carow et al., 2004; 
Haleblian et al., 2012).  
Three dummy variables are created for the different stages of the acquisition wave (See figure 
1 below). The variable upswing takes a value of 1 if the acquisition takes place during the rising 
period of the wave and 0 otherwise. The variable peak takes the value of 1 if acquisition activities 
take place during the zenith of the wave and 0 otherwise. Finally, the downswing variable takes 
the value 1 if acquisitions activities happen during the declining phase of the wave and 0 otherwise. 
 
Figure 1: Volume of M&A transactions in the manufacturing sector. 
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It is important to note that all observations in the sample are in one of the three parts of the merger 
waves.18 
3.3.1.4 Interaction term 
An interaction term of the family firms variable with the acquisition dummy is created to 
supplement the analysis and test the hypothesis. 
3.3.1.5 Control variables  
Firm level and industry characteristics are controlled for in the analysis using control variables. 
It is generally accepted that larger firms are more likely to have the capacity to make acquisitions 
(Ellis, Reus, Lamont & Ranft, 2011). More to the point, the larger the size of an acquirer the more 
it is able to retain or dominate control after acquisition (Shim and Okamura, 2011). The natural log 
of total assets as indicator of firm size is used. The natural log handles the skew distribution of the 
variable. 
The acquisition experience of acquiring firms which is estimated as firms who have undertaken 
an acquisition activity within 5 years prior to the time under consideration has been controlled for. 
Furthermore, debt /asset ratio estimates the percentage of a firm’s assets that is financed by debt 
(Block, 2009). Highly leveraged firms display high debt/asset ratio and indicates the associated 
risk involved in the activities of firms (Shim & Okamuro, 2011). It is anticipated that this will have 
a negative association with innovation. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets and it controls 
for overall firm efficiency (Chrisman & Patel, 2012). Its effect on innovation is anticipated to be 
                                                          
18 The upswing covers the following year: 1980-1985, 1993-1998 and 2005-2006. The peak covers the following years: 
1986, 1999-2000 and 2007. The downswing covers the following years: 1988-1990, 2001-2004 and 2008- 2010. 
 
76 
 
positive. R&D/Assets ratio is used as a proxy for risk and preparedness of firms to engage in long 
term investments. It is expected to have a positive effect on innovation. Meanwhile, it is estimated 
as the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets.  
The analysis also controls for slack since it gives insights about the vulnerability of firms. 
Slack refers to unused resources available to a firm and it serves as a buffer against risks and 
economic shocks (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2015; Iyer & Miller, 2008). Potential slack which measured 
as ratio of debt to equity (Iyer & Miller, 2008) and absorbed slack which is measured as is measured 
as the ratio of selling, general and administrative (SGA) expenses to sales. Finally, industry and firm 
level variance are controlled for using industry and year dummies. 
3.4 Results and Analysis 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics. The dependent variable, patent count shows a mean 
of 72.94 for non-fami firms and 75.58 for family firms. This indicates that family firms are more 
involved in technology activities on average than non-family firms in the sample. The firm size 
variable indicates a mean of 7.94 for non-family firms and 7.25 for family firms, an indication that 
the non-family firms in the sample are larger relative to the family firms. The acquisition dummy 
shows a mean 0.26 for non-family firms and 0.23 for family and non-family firms. This indicates 
that non-family firms are slightly more involved in acquisitions than family firms. Meanwhile, the 
upswing of the wave shows a mean of 0.70 indicating that on average there are more non-family 
firms making acquisitions in the upswing than family firms which has a mean of 0.69.  
Table 2 presents the correlations of the variables in our sample. The high correlation of -0.80 
is between interaction of upswing variable and the acquisition dummy. These variables are not used 
in the same model. So there is no problem of multicollinearity 
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TABLE 1 
Summary statistics & univariate tests 
  Non-family firms Family firms   
Variables Mean Median SD. Mean Median SD. T-test 
Patent count 72.94 20.00 154.33 75.58 8.00 202.67 -0.47 
Acquisition experience 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.23 0.00 0.42 2.61** 
Firm Size 7.94 8.02 1.48 7.25 7.42 1.64 13.92*** 
R&D/assets 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.07 -6.72*** 
ROA 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.10 -0.54 
Debt/assets 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.12 5.56*** 
Potential slack 0.51 0.33 10.18 0.59 0.23 8.68 -0.23 
Absorbed slack 0.22 0.15 0.82 0.34 0.22 0.56 4.84*** 
Acquisitions dummy 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.08 0.00 0.27 -0.12 
Family firm*Acquisition dummy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.27 -14.79*** 
Upswing 0.70 1.00 0.46 0.69 1.00 0.46 0.62 
Peak 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.22 0.00 0.42 -0.40 
Downswing 0.08 0.00 0.28 0.09 0.00 0.28 -0.43 
Citation weighted patents 218385.80 1959.00 1197611.00 330165.30 238.00 1822492.00 -2.37** 
Patent stock 405.45 132.38 739.38 335.91 38.69 853.09 2.74*** 
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  Correlations 
  Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Patent count 1                
2 Acquisition experience 0.10 1               
3 Firm Size 0.32 0.28 1              
4 R&D/assets 0.21 0.01 -0.23 1             
5 ROA 0.03 -0.07 -0.03 -0.16 1            
6 Debt/assets -0.10 0.10 0.19 -0.31 -0.28 1           
7 Potential slack 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.07 1          
8 Absorbed slack -0.03 -0.03 -0.24 0.19 -0.18 -0.12 -0.01 1         
9 Family firm 0.01 -0.04 -0.21 0.10 0.01 -0.09 0.00 0.08 1        
10 Acquisition dummy 0.11 0.50 0.15 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 1       
11 Family firm*acquisition dummy 0.09 0.30 0.05 0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.22 0.59 1      
12 Upswing 0.04 -0.18 -0.17 0.00 0.03 -0.08 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.09 -0.07 1     
13 Peak 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.11 0.08 -0.80 1    
14 Downswing -0.06 0.08 0.08 -0.01 -0.08 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.46 -0.16 1   
15 Citation weighted patents 0.75 0.02 0.15 0.12 0.03 -0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.05 -0.05 -0.02 1  
16 Patent stock 0.65 0.19 0.47 0.16 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.13 0.10 -0.07 0.05 0.04 0.35 1 
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3.4.2 Empirical Analysis 
The dependent variable, patent count is a count variable. Because of this I estimate a count 
data model using negative binomial regression (Verbeek, 2004). Negative binomial regressions are 
applicable when the sample variance of the dependent variable is greater than its sample mean thus 
indicating an “overdispersion”. The standard deviation/mean =2.35 of the dependent variable 
points to ‘overdispersion’ in the variable’s distribution. Further checks were carried out to ensure 
that the zeros in the dependent variable were not as a result of missing variables but are a result of 
firms who did not successfully apply for patents in the respective years.  
A fixed effects model is estimated as the Hausman test rejected the null hypothesis that the 
unique errors are correlated with the regressors (Verbeek, 2004). This indicates that there is a 
systematic difference between the coefficients of the random effects model and the fixed effect 
model. The preferred model for the analysis favours a fixed effect model. The fixed effect models 
also account for unobserved firm specific fixed effects. 
It is commonly known that acquisitions are driven by strategic decisions of managers. This 
particularly makes it difficult to account for endogeneity. To reduce any possibility of endogeneity, 
all independent variables are time lagged by 3 years. The consideration is that post-acquisition 
integration could take a few years to achieve before firms can actually recombine or reconfigure 
their new resources to produce new innovations in the form of new patent applications. Patent 
applications also go through a standard waiting period before they are granted. That is why the 
independent variables are lagged by 3 years. Also note that, the merger wave variables are industry 
level variables and the study is about firm level innovation. It is therefore certain that the 
composition of the main variables reduces any possibility of endogeneity that may affect the results 
of the study. 
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3.4.3 Results 
Table 3 presents results of panel negative binomial regression models predicting the innovation 
implications of acquisitions in family firms. Model 2 of table 3 shows the influence of acquisitions 
undertaken by family firms on innovation as compared to non-family firms. Hypothesis 1 predicts 
that the association of acquisitions with innovation is stronger for family firms than non-family 
firms. Hypothesis 1 is supported given the coefficient of the interaction of family firms and 
acquisition dummy in model 1 of table 3 (ß = 0.17, p < .05). The results show a positive and 
significant association of family firm acquisitions with innovation. Thus acquisitions by family 
firms are 16.67 % positively associated with post M&As innovation. 
Furthermore, hypothesis 2 predicts that the association of acquisitions with innovation is 
stronger for family firms than for non-family firms if the acquisition is conducted during the 
upswing of a merger wave. Model 2 (ß = 0.20, p < .05) of table 3 provides empirical support for 
this hypothesis. The marginal effect indicates that acquisitions by family firms during the upswing 
are 19.92 % associated with innovation. This also shows the positive effect of acquisitions in the 
upswing as in the ability of family firms to appropriate acquired assets efficiently than non-family 
firms. 
3.4.4 Robustness Tests 
Further to the results obtained in table 3 for manufacturing sector firms, robustness tests are 
conducted for high technology intensive manufacturing firms. The results are consistent with the 
earlier results. However, the split samples for the downswing and peak failed to converge. The 
results for the technology intensive manufacturing regressions are presented in table 4. 
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TABLE 3 
Fixed-Effect Negative Binomial Models for Post-Acquisition Innovation in 
Family Firms 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  All acquisitions 
Upswing 
acquisitions 
Downswing 
acquisitions 
Acquisition experience 0.09*** 0.13*** 0.09 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.18) 
Firm size 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.49*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.09) 
R&D/assets 0.86** 0.71 5.42* 
 (0.41) (0.49) (3.08) 
ROA 0.17 0.28 -3.18*** 
 (0.18) (0.23) (1.21) 
Debt/assets -0.37*** -0.19 -1.37* 
 (0.14) (0.17) (0.71) 
Potential slack 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) 
Absorbed slack 0.04** 0.02 0.48* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.25) 
Family firms -0.18*** -0.26*** -0.53 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.42) 
Acquisition dummy -0.06 -0.02 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.34) 
Family firm* acquisition dummy 0.17** 0.20** -0.61 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.52) 
_cons -2.50*** -2.42*** 13.62 
 (0.21) (0.25) (11531.50) 
Observations 4130.00 2863.00 282.00 
Log likelihood -14000.29 -9492.77 -349.64 
Note: standard errors are reported in parentheses  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01   
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TABLE 4 
Fixed-Effect Negative Binomial Models for Post-Acquisition Innovation in 
Family Firms (Technology Intensive Manufacturing- Sub Sample) 
  Model 1 Model 2 
  
All 
acquisitio
ns  
Upswing 
acquisitio
ns 
Acquisition experience 0.09*** 0.13*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) 
Firm size 0.37*** 0.36*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
R&D/assets 0.32 0.04 
 (0.43) (0.52) 
ROA 0.21 0.37 
 (0.19) (0.24) 
Debt/assets -0.27* -0.10 
 (0.14) (0.17) 
Potential slack 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Absorbed slack 0.03 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Family firms -0.12* -0.24*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) 
Acquisition dummy -0.05 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.05) 
Family firm* acquisition dummy 0.15** 0.16* 
 (0.07) (0.09) 
_cons -2.22*** -2.16*** 
 (0.22) (0.25) 
Observations 3831.00 2606.00 
Log likelihood -13542.15 -9141.73 
Note: standard errors are reported in parentheses 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  
 
The analysis is limited to the time window of 1980-2003 because the family firm ownership 
information of sample is not known beyond 2003. A further robustness test is conducted for the 
full sample of all technology intensive manufacturing sector firms (1980-2010). Here an 
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assumption is made that the ownership status of the family firms remains the same. The results as 
presented in table 3.5 are consistent with the results of the subsample. 
TABLE 5 
Fixed-Effect Negative Binomial Models for Post-Acquisition Innovation in Family 
Firms (Technology Intensive Manufacturing -Full Sample) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  
All 
acquisitions  
Upswing 
acquisitions 
Downswing 
acquisitions 
Peak 
acquisitions 
Acquisition experience 0.06* 0.11*** 0.08 0.12 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.19) (0.09) 
Firm size 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.52*** 0.43*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.04) 
R&D/assets 1.08** 0.80 5.66* 2.53** 
 (0.42) (0.50) (2.98) (1.01) 
ROA 0.15 0.11 -2.16* 0.11 
 (0.19) (0.25) (1.28) (0.41) 
Debt/assets -0.51*** -0.34* -1.42* -1.53*** 
 (0.16) (0.20) (0.84) (0.41) 
Potential slack 0.00 -0.00 -0.03 0.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) 
Absorbed slack 0.04** 0.02 0.38 0.68*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.26) (0.11) 
Family firms -0.15** -0.20** -0.38 -0.28 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.42) (0.19) 
Acquisition dummy -0.08* -0.05 0.08 -0.18* 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.35) (0.10) 
Family firm* acquisition dummy 0.20*** 0.21** -0.75 0.17 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.55) (0.15) 
_cons -2.07*** -1.99*** -2.54*** -2.05*** 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.79) (0.38) 
Observations 3105.00 1941.00 310.00 807.00 
Log likelihood -10611.80 -7163.63 -294.25 -1884.75 
Note: standard errors are reported in parentheses   
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01    
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For further robustness check, citation weighted patents which controls for the value of patents 
is used and the results as presented in table 6 are consistent with the prior results. Note that the 
Hausman test for the models favours random-effects (Verbeek, 2004). This shows a 31.69 % 
association with increases in citation weighted patents for acquisitions during the upswing. This 
shows a difference of 11.77 % increase in innovation in comparison to the number of patents. 
TABLE 6 
Random-Effect Negative Binomial Models for Post-Acquisition 
Innovation in Family Firms (Citation Weighted Patents) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  
All 
acquisitions  
Upswing 
acquisitions 
Downswing 
acquisitions 
Acquisition experience 0.18*** 0.24*** -0.15 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.18) 
Firm size 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.61*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) 
R&D/assets 0.40 0.77 3.39** 
 (0.45) (0.53) (1.57) 
ROA -0.13 -0.21 -0.83 
 (0.25) (0.32) (0.77) 
Debt/assets -0.71*** -0.72*** -0.81 
 (0.20) (0.25) (0.66) 
Potential slack 0.00 -0.00 0.02 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
Absorbed slack 0.05** 0.04* -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.11) 
Family firms -0.21*** -0.25*** -0.02 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.18) 
Acquisition dummy -0.18** -0.17 -0.18 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.44) 
Family firm* acquisition dummy 0.27** 0.32* -0.14 
 (0.13) (0.17) (0.59) 
_cons -2.59*** -2.67*** -4.98*** 
 (0.14) (0.17) (0.52) 
Observations 2663.00 1837.00 231.00 
Log likelihood -25886.71 -18983.10 -1742.57 
Note: standard errors are reported in parentheses  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01    
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The differences in pre-acquisition patent stock of firms are controlled for and the results as 
presented in table 7 is consistent with the prior results. Note that the model for downswing 
acquisition does not converge. 
 
 
Table 7 
Random-Effect Negative Binomial Models for Post-Acquisition 
Innovation in Family Firms (Weighted citations) 
  Model 1 Model 2 
  
All 
 acquisitions  
Upswing 
acquisitions 
Patent stock -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Acquisition experience 0.18*** 0.23*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) 
Firm size 0.34*** 0.32*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
R&D/assets 0.57 0.88* 
 (0.44) (0.52) 
ROA -0.16 -0.19 
 (0.25) (0.31) 
Debt/assets -0.72*** -0.68*** 
 (0.20) (0.25) 
Potential slack 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Absorbed slack 0.05** 0.04 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Family firms -0.17*** -0.21*** 
 (0.06) (0.07) 
Acquisition dummy -0.18** -0.16 
 (0.08) (0.10) 
Family firm* acquisition dummy 0.24* 0.27* 
 (0.13) (0.17) 
_cons -2.65*** -2.65*** 
 (0.15) (0.18) 
Observations 2646.00 1828.00 
Log likelihood -25857.12 -18959.58 
Note: standard errors are reported in parentheses 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  
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In nonlinear models, the interaction effect cannot be evaluated by examining the sign magnitude 
and statistical significance of the coefficient of the interaction term. It is required that a cross 
derivative or cross difference is estimated. The interaction effect thus depends on all covariates in 
the model. When done properly will prevent wrong inferences in the sample (Ai & Norton, 2002). 
The chances of non-family firms who did not engage in any acquisitions increasing innovation is 
0.803. The chances of non-family firms increasing innovation through acquisitions is 0.997. 
Following Buis (2010), using the cross difference will imply that the marginal effect of acquisitions 
for non-family firms is 0.19. The chances of family firms increasing innovation after acquisitions 
is 0.541 and the chances of family firms increasing innovation after acquisitions is 0.978. The 
marginal effect of acquisitions for family firms on innovation is 0.44, which is the difference 
between the marginal effect of family firms who did not engage in M&A in the upswing and family 
firms who engaged in M&As in the upswing. Table 2 presence the interaction effects.  
 
Table 8: Interaction effects on Citation weighted patents 
  Delta-method    
  Margin Std. Err. z P> | z | [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
Family firm#acquisitions       
0 0 .803423 .0328343 24.47 0.000 .7390689 .867777 
0 1 .9976429 .1001153 9.96 0.000 .8014206 1.193865 
1 0 .5414578 .0313128 17.29 0.000 .4800859 .6028297 
1 1 .9781657 .1382621 7.07 0.000 .7071769 1.249154 
 
Figure 3 presents the margin plots of the interaction effects showing the marginal effects. 
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Figure 2: Interaction effects on Citation weighted patents 
 
 
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
3.5.1 Discussion 
Family firms just like other forms of organizations may engage in acquisitions for a variety of 
motives (Worek et al, 2018; Iyer & Miller, 2008). Given the poor investment in R&D (Block et al, 
2012; Chrisman & Patel, 2012), it is plausible that family firms engage in acquisitions for 
innovation resources (Ahuja & Katila, 2001). 
Family firms are able to appropriate target resources and capabilities with the aid of their 
endowed distinct resources in order to improve innovations better than non-family firms (Newbert, 
2007). The long term nature of patient financial capital makes them valuable in the innovation 
efforts of family firms (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Regarding post-deal integration, patient capital 
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serves as a source of capital that can be relied up on to carry out activities without any threat of 
liquidation (Teece, 1992). This would then cause firms to act with confidence and thus enable them 
to fully appropriate the full potentials of acquisitions. Furthermore, when a family firm undertakes 
to capture the synergies of an acquisition with a pool of family resources, the dedication and 
commitment to see it through the difficult times could be reassuring. This survivability capital in 
the form of additional equities and labour of family members that have been invested creates a 
sense of motivation and drive to maximize the full potentials of acquisitions (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). 
According to Kang (2000), survivability capital aids the efficient absorption of acquired resources 
as well as long term long term innovation activities (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). 
Family firms create an atmosphere of organizational support for employees which is reflected 
in job security or generous remunerations (Eisenberger, et al, 2001; Konig et al, 2013). By so doing, 
family firms are not only able to keep organizational memory and aid the transfer of skills (De 
Visscher et al, 2005), they also create a sense of obligation for which employees are keen on 
reciprocating by adopting behaviours that support organizational goals in challenging times such 
as post-acquisition integration (Cennamo et al, 2012; Wayne et al, 1997). More so, a perception of 
organizational support unleashes the creative initiatives of dedicated employees in the strategic 
interest of the firm (Bammens et al, 2010, Miller 2009). Taking together a perception of 
organizational support which is peculiar to family firms makes it possible for them to appropriate 
resources and synergies from targets better than other forms of firms. 
Family firms are also better able to utilize target assets more than non-family firms because of 
the organizational social capital that family firms are endowed with (Acquaah, 2016). Long 
standing relationships with customers and external stakeholders of family firms can serve as a 
window of information exchange about opportunities and access to resources and give early access 
89 
 
to valuable resources which would ultimately be reconfigured in combination with the other 
distinct resources (Newbert, 2007; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). 
The literature has it that the early phase of a merger wave though riddled with information 
asymmetries, tend to be filled with a lot of targets with superior resources that can be acquired at 
low cost before prices are bid up by competition. Furthermore, the knowledge of the changes in an 
industry associated with the affective emotions and years of association with the industry by family 
owners or managers (Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & De Castro, 2011) as well as the 
organizational social capital in the form of ties and stable relationships with stakeholders also 
account for the ability of family firms to pre-empt and act accordingly based on their 
foreknowledge of the changing needs of the industry and access to privileged information . And 
thus able to make better acquisitions that reflect the needs of the market and provide a better fit for 
their innovation needs. The fact that family firms are more efficient at absorbing new external 
resources better than their non-family counterparts proclaims a mechanism that makes the 
association of family firms with post-acquisition innovation stronger than non-family firms 
(Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). 
Contribution 
This paper contributes in three ways to the literature on family firm acquisitions, strategy and 
innovation. First, the paper shows that family firms use acquisitions as a pathway to innovation. 
This enhances a better understanding of the role of acquisitions in the innovation performance of 
family firms (De Massis et al., 2015). Second, the paper makes an empirical contribution that 
family firms absorb external resources markedly different and more efficient than non-family firms 
(See Sirmon & Hitt, 2003; Kang, 2003). Third, prior studies on merger waves have mostly 
investigated the characteristics of firms, the decision and likelihood to engage in acquisitions 
during a certain stage of the merger wave(See Haleblian et al., 2012), as well the financial 
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performance implications of acquisitions in merger waves (See McNamara et al, 2008). This study 
goes a step further and shows that target assets acquired during the upswing of a merger wave are 
more valuable, and provide better resource synergies for family firms which makes them more 
innovative than non-family firms. This contributes to the literature on first mover advantages as 
well as family firm strategy and innovation 
Managerial implications 
The early phase of a merger wave is associated with information asymmetries and high levels 
of uncertainty about the potential synergies and complementarity of resource assets of potential 
targets relative to that of the acquirer (McNamara et al, 2008). The fact that family firms are able 
to increase innovation through acquisitions in the upswing is an indication of the presence of 
opportunities in spite of the uncertainty. This clearly indicates that family firms that have any 
expectations to use acquisitions as a route to innovation must aim and take advantage of the 
upswing of the merger wave. 
Competitors may pay attention to the acquisition activities of family firms in order to inform 
their own acquisition strategies as early movers have the tendency to shape developments in the 
market of a particular technology domain or industry (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998). 
Limitations and future research 
Similar to many studies about family businesses, detailed data on the ownership structure of 
the firms was not available to be able to investigate how different levels of ownership influence a 
firm’s ability to benefit more from externally acquired resources in terms of innovation (Gomez-
Mejia et al, 2013). Future studies may consider gathering more data to be able to decipher how 
changing levels of family ownership affect innovation in a similar context. Data on whether the 
family firms in the sample are multiple generation firms or founder management firms was not also 
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available. Future studies may consider unpacking this to see how these dimensions affect the results 
observed in this study. 
Also, the family firms in this study are acquirers. There was no information on the family 
ownership status of the target firms. Future studies may consider this in order to provide clarity 
about what happens when target family firms are acquired during merger waves and how such 
acquisitions affect innovation in acquirer family firms. 
3.5.2 Conclusion 
By linking the conceptual frameworks of the resource based view of the firm as well as the 
early mover advantages, this study tests predictions about the external acquisitions of resource 
assets by family firms. Results from a sample of S&P 500 manufacturing firms provide support for 
the prediction that acquisitions are positively associated with innovation, where this association is 
stronger family firms than non-family firms. This suggests that family firms are more able to absorb 
and recombine the acquired resource assets better than their non-family peers and thus lead to more 
innovations. The results further confirm the prediction that the relationship is stronger for family 
firms when the acquisition is conducted during upswing of the merger wave which signifies a 
period of intense acquisition activities. This brings to the fore how family influenced organizations 
are able to capitalize on their endowed distinct resources to facilitate innovation (Sirmon & Hitt, 
2003). 
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Chapter 4 
Distance to Technology Aspiration Levels and the Choice of 
Acquisition Targets in Merger Waves19 
4.1 Introduction 
Technology development is a strategically important performance goal because it underpins 
value creation in many industries (Tyler & Caner, 2016). Technology development can be internal, 
but prior research has identified a multitude of external technology acquisition modes including 
mergers and acquisitions (Iyer & Miller, 2008; Zaheer, et al., 2010). The acquisitions literature has 
often shown among other goals that firms use acquisitions as an instrument to redeploy resources 
(Capron, Dussauge, & Mitchell, 1998), overcome entry barriers to certain technology domains 
(Iyer & Miller, 2008), and acquire valuable intellectual property or technology (Katila & Ahuja, 
2002; Graebner, 2004; Grimpe & Hussinger, 2014). Indeed, technological innovation has often 
been cited as the stimulus for firms’ acquisition decisions (Kotlar et al., 2013; Zhao, 2009; 
Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002). This is because merging two firms may establish considerable 
knowledge synergies through the cross fertilization of ideas (Organghi, 2009). Being in contact 
with new, diverse ideas and capabilities of an acquired firm does not only present opportunities for 
organizational learning but can also contribute to a firm’s technology performance if it is able to 
utilize the acquired knowledge well (Cloodt, Hagerdoorn & Kranenburg, 2006 Graebner, 2004). 
For instance Chrion Corporation, a manufacturer of biopharmaceuticals, vaccines and blood testing 
products, acquired pathogenesis Corp. in 2000 for its antibiotic drug called Tobi. It also acquired 
Matrix Pharmaceutical Inc in 2002 for its product Tezacitabine to expand its cancer drug portfolio. 
Another example of technology driven acquisition was the case of Dell Inc acquiring EqualLogic 
                                                          
19 Joint work with Christoph Grimpe, Copenhagen Business School and Katrin Hussinger, University of Luxembourg 
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in 2008 for its internet protocol-based storage networking systems called ISCSI- Internet Small 
Computer Systems Interface. This and many others show that these acquisitions are partly driven 
by technology. 
Ahuja & Katila (2001) make a distinction between technology acquisitions in which target 
firms resource assets involve a technology component and targets whose resources have no 
technology component. Through this line of enquiry prior studies indicate the need for the 
knowledge bases of the acquirer and target to be complementary if an acquisition is to create value 
through innovations (Grimpe & Hussinger, 2014). The established relationship about the 
relatedness between the knowledge bases of the acquirer and target firms on innovation is said to 
be nonlinear (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; Cefis, Marsili & Rigamonti, 2019), thus 
indicating the existence of a trade-off between ‘exploration of new possibilities and the exploitation 
of old certainties’ (March, 1991, p. 71) in acquisition decisions. In light of this, related acquisitions 
involve search for solutions aimed at refining and integrating familiar technologies for efficiency 
gains (Capron &Mitchell, 2004; Ranft & Lord, 2002) while unrelated acquisitions are search for 
solutions that hinge on diversity, novelty, unfamiliarity as well as uncertainty of the target 
knowledge resources (Graebner, Eisenhardt & Roundy, 2010, March, 1991). In other words a 
related acquisition is a form of nonlocal search as it favours incremental changes by limiting 
variability in search decisions (Baum & Dahl, 2007). An unrelated acquisition represents a form of 
nonlocal search given that it promotes radical organizational changes by favouring variability and 
novelty in search decisions (Baum & Dahl, 2007). We note that relatedness of acquisitions remains 
an important subject in the M&A literature (Cefis et al, 2019). This observed corporate 
phenomenon shows that technology or product relatedness continue to drive decisions as well as 
the value of search or acquisitions (Ornaghi, 2009; Lungeanu et al, 2015). 
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According to the behavioural theory of the firm (BTOF), search or acquisitions are triggered 
based on organizational performance relative to aspiration levels (Gomez-Mejia, Patel & 
Zellweger, 2018; Kotlar et al, 2013; Greve, 2003; Ref & Shapiro, 2017). Aspiration level is defined 
as the minimum level of performance a firm should meet in order to consider its performance 
satisfactory (Alexy, Bascavusoglu-Moreau & Salter, 2016). Organizational performance above 
aspiration creates no incentive for major organizational changes. On the contrary performance 
below aspiration levels will motivate firms to engage in problemistic search for solutions (Cyert & 
March, 1963). Problemistic search refers to a type of search that is orchestrated by a problem and 
aimed at obtaining a remedy to the problem (Cyert & March, 1963; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Problemistic search often commences with a focus on local search and then moves to nonlocal search 
(Baum & Dahli, 2007). 
In spite of the recognition of the importance of acquisitions to technological development, the 
acquisition behaviours of organizations remain largely underexplored (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2018; 
Barkema & Schijven, 2008). Recent interest in the behavioural motives of firms for engaging in 
acquisitions have focused mainly on the effect of financial performance aspiration gaps (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2018; Chen, 2008; Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003). While the importance of 
technology-motivated firm acquisitions on technology performance of acquiring firms cannot be 
overemphasized (See Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Cloodt, Hagerdoorn & Kranenburg, 2006; Grimpe & 
Hussinger, 2014), there is a growing interest, although largely unexplored, in how technology 
aspiration levels influence the search behaviour of acquiring firms (Yu, Minniti & Nason, 2018; 
Tyler & Caner, 2016; Lungeanu, Stern & Zajac, 2016). For instance Tyler & Caner (2016) 
investigate how new product introductions below aspiration levels affect the decision to form R&D 
alliances. Yu et al. (2018) examine how the duration of technology underperformance influences 
the type of search. Similarly, Lungeanu and colleagues (2016) focus on how slack influences 
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organizational responses to poor innovation performance as well as search decisions. However, 
little is known about how technology performance aspiration gaps influence technology sourcing 
or acquisition decisions of firms. This study fills this important gap by focusing exclusively on 
technology aspiration levels and argues from the perspective of the behavioural theory that a firm’s 
technology performance above or below aspiration levels is a major antecedent of acquisitions. 
Our focus on technology aspiration levels stems from the recognition of the saliency of goals where 
technology performance goals take precedence over financial performance goals in technology 
intensive firms (Tyler & Caner, 2016). This is because technology is the main driver of value 
creation upon which financial performance is anchored (Tyler & Caner, 2016; Greve, 1998). 
It is widely established that acquisitions take place in waves (McNamara, Haleblian & Dykes, 
2008). Prior studies have given considerable attention to the effect of the timing of acquisitions on 
financial performance (McNamara et al, 2008; Iyer & Miller, 2008). Also, theories of competitive 
dynamics show that the timing of acquisitions in a merger wave can be influenced by factors such 
as social or bandwagon pressures (Rosenkopf & Abrahamson, 1999; McNamara et al., 2008), 
depending on whether a firm is above or below performance aspiration levels (Iyer & Miller, 2008). 
However, relatively little is known about how the position of a firm in a merger wave affects the 
decision on whether to conduct a local or nonlocal search through technology acquisitions.  
Taking insights from BTOF, competitive dynamics and bandwagon pressures we predict that 
increases in the distance of technology above aspiration levels are positively associated with related 
acquisitions especially during the peak of a merger wave. We also predict that increases in the 
distance of technology performance below aspiration levels are positively associated with unrelated 
acquisitions. Furthermore, we predict that increases in the distance of technology performance 
below aspiration levels is positively associated with acquisitions or unrelated acquisitions which 
defines the start of a merger wave. We find empirical support for our predictions using a panel 
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dataset that is comprised of the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 firms followed over a period of thirty 
years (1980-2010).  
Our study contributes to the field of strategy and acquisitions in several ways. First, we identify 
that the need for a differentiated competitive strategy is the motivation for unrelated acquisitions. 
Drawing upon competitive dynamics, we argue that firms below technology aspiration levels seek 
solutions outside their core domains for new and diverse ideas and that this kind of search is 
motivated by the need to take actions aimed at restoring performance to reasonable levels and catch 
up with competitors (Ross & Sharapov, 2015). 
Second, acquisitions made by firms below technology aspiration levels signal the emergence 
of a wave of mergers. Firms below technology aspirations levels engage in differentiated strategic 
activities such as unrelated acquisitions in periods of non-existent or low acquisition activities. This 
could set the stage for subsequent imitating behaviours of competitors and thus define the start of 
a merger wave (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006; Pacheco & Dean, 2015). 
Third, we know from the BTOF that firms above technology aspiration levels would ideally 
engage in related acquisitions because such acquisitions are closely aligned with ongoing activities. 
However, combining this with insights from competitive dynamics, we predict that pursing a local 
search strategy should not be seen as “business as usual” or lack of organizational change. This 
should be conceived as a deliberate effective strategic response to redeploy underutilized resources. 
As firms below technology aspirations comprehensively appraise technology and R&D options 
available before engaging in acquisitions, firms above aspiration levels follow social cues and 
assume that those acquiring may be seizing better opportunities. There is no incentive for firms 
above aspiration levels to pursue any radically different strategy, for which reason they stick to a 
familiar or homogenous strategy in the industry. This bandwagon behaviour which is observed 
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during the period of intense acquisition activities, makes it possible to neutralize the actions of 
other players in order to maintain dominance or competitive advantage. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section two presents the theory and hypotheses 
development. The methodology is presented in section three and the results are captured in section 
four. The discussion and conclusion are presented in section five. 
4.2 Theory Development and Hypotheses 
4.2.1 Technology Performance and Problemistic Search  
The behavioural theory (Cyert & March, 1963) provides a lens through which organizational 
performance evaluation, decision making and search for technologies can be analyzed (Greve, 
2003). In light of this, decision makers in organizations pursue goals sequentially based on the 
prominence of each goal among a multitude of goals where the most salient goal is given attention 
at a time (Greve, 2008). More to the point, organizational actions are bargained based on the 
performance of other goals (Cyert & March, 1963). For instance in technology intensive firms, 
technology goals may take precedence over financial goals. This implies that firms that drive value 
from technology related products and services would give priority to technology goals since that is 
the main driver of value creation on which financial performance is anchored (Tyler & Canner, 
2016). 
The behavioural theory of the firm (BTOF), posits that an organization’s technology 
performance is assessed relative to its aspiration level. We reiterate that an aspiration level is 
defined as the minimum level of performance a firm should meet (Alexy, Bascavusoglu-Moreau 
& Salter, 2016). Therefore a firm is said to be above aspiration level when performance surpasses 
the minimum threshold. A firm is below aspiration level when performance falls short of the 
minimum threshold (Greve, 2003). Firms resort to inaction or focus on their routines when 
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technology is at or above the minimum threshold anticipated (Greve, 2003). However firms below 
aspiration levels have a higher risk tolerance and are thus more likely to make organizational 
changes or depart from their routines for new ideas in order to restore performance back to 
reasonable levels (Ref & Shapira, 2017). In the following, we analyze how both performance above 
aspiration levels and performance below aspirations influence acquisitions.  
Performance of technology resources above aspiration levels produces slack resources in a 
firm’s current market context which also affects the diversification strategy of the firm (Levinthal 
& Wu, 2010). These slack resources trigger slack based-search for “innovations that would not be 
approved in the face of scarcity but have strong subunit support” (Cyert & March, 163:279). Slack 
search basically characterises a search driven by excess resources that need to be redeployed in 
other areas. Slack search particularly underscores the risk taking capacity of a firm (Xu et al, 2019) 
as well as the capacity to experiment with new ideas for future innovations (Iyer & Miller, Ref & 
Shapira, 2016). Technology performance above aspiration levels stimulate local search as the 
search for new innovations focuses in the proximity of organizational practices of the the 
organization or the subunit responsible (Tyler & Caner, 2016, Greve, 2003; Cyert & March, 1963). 
Futhermore, the diversification literature underscores that scale free resources are fungible and 
their value tend to reduce when they are redeployed or leveraged in distant domains (Levinthal & 
Wu, 2010). In light of this, diversifying or redeploying such technology resources through an 
acquisition in related domains represents a low risk endeavour and explains the preference of 
related acquisition by many firms. It also explains why related diversification tends to outperform 
unrelated diversifications (Robins and Wiersema, 1995; Rumelt, 1974; Levinthal & Wu, 2010).  
Viewed differently from the capacity-based logic in the explanation above (Cyert & March, 
1963; Levinthal & March, 1981), it has been suggested that a more consistent motivation-based 
99 
 
logic to explain the effects of both performance above and below aspiration levels and their 
relationship to risk taking be used (Xu et al, 2019). 
The motivation-based logic suggests that technology performance above aspiration levels 
diminishes the pressure on decision makers to restore performance back to acceptable levels. 
Furthermore, they concentrate on forward looking activities in order to maintain their existing 
performance, competitive advantage or market leadership (O’Brien & David, 2014; Souder & 
Bromiley, 2012). This also reassures managers of the effectiveness of their growth strategy (Xu et 
al, 2019). This confidence drives managers to resort to activities that seek to maintain the status 
quo and at the same time ensure growth and market leadership, while maintaining the same or 
similar strategies. (Birhanu et al, 2016). In light of this, firms above technology aspiration levels 
will be spurred to undertake related acquisitions, as they are not under pressure to do something 
radically different in order to restore performance to aspiration levels. Note that related acquisition 
is a form of local search in the core technology domain of the acquiring firm that is aimed at 
maintain its comparative advantage. 
Hypothesis 1: Increases in the distance of technology performance above aspiration 
levels are positively associated with the likelihood of engaging in related 
acquisitions. 
Organizations initiate search actions for technologies when technology is deemed lower than 
the minimum threshold that should be achieved (Alexy et al., 2016; Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 
2003). When a search mechanism is orchestrated by a problem and aimed at obtaining a remedy to 
the problem, it is known as problemistic search (Cyert & March, 1963; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). Firms increase problemistic search to locate solutions to technology problems when 
technology aspirations are not met (Greve, 2003).  
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Thus a firm below technology aspiration level will start a problemistic search for technology 
solutions by engaging in acquisitions as a means to secure valuable technology resources 
externally. These include knowledge sources that were previously unknown to the firm (Alexy et 
al., 2016). With regard to problemistic search, Baum & Dahlin (2007) note that performance 
outcomes below aspiration levels trigger nonlocal search for solutions to improve performance 
(Cyert & March, 1963). This implies that problemistic search begins with attention to local search 
and subsequently moves to nonlocal search depending on the distance to the unmet aspirations 
(Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Tyler & Caner, 2016; Cyert & March, 1963). 
We note that an unrelated acquisition is a form of nonlocal search which involves search in 
industries different from the core industry of the acquiring firm in areas such as technologies, 
products, markets and the way business is generally conducted (Gupta 1984; Park, 2002). This 
form of search makes it possible for a firm to access a new, diverse and unfamiliar R&D projects 
which can create more technology options for the future (McGrath, 1997; Vassolo, Anand, & Folta, 
2004). Thus unrelated acquisitions will become the most preferred strategy for firms below 
technology aspiration levels given the need to gain access to new and diverse R&D projects.  
Hypothesis 2: Increases in the distance of technology performance below aspiration 
levels are positively related to the likelihood of engaging in unrelated acquisitions. 
4.2.2 Bandwagon Pressures and Acquisitions 
The search strategy of firms are influenced by several factors such as competitive dynamics. 
In broad terms, it is commonly known that acquisitions occur in waves due to several reasons 
including business environment shocks (Haleblian, McNamara, Kolev, & Dykes, 2012; Martynova 
& Renneboog, 2008). Similar to the adoption and diffusion of innovation (See Rogers, 1995), the 
market for corporate control is characterized by bandwagon pressures (Fiol & O’Connor, 2003) 
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manifested through merger waves. Two theoretical streams have been put forward to explain the 
phenomena of bandwagons. The rational-efficiency theories (Rosenkopf &Abrahamson, 1999; 
Katz & Shapiro, 1985) and the theories of institutional isomorphism or mimetic isomorphism 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In summary, rational efficiency has it that an organization adopts a 
course of action or technology based on rational assessment of the technical efficiency and the 
expected returns associated (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993). This presupposes a certain 
proinnovation bias as organizations will be deterred from adopting courses of actions or 
technologies that are deemed unprofitable (Rosenkopf & Abrahamson, 1999). Conversely, mimetic 
isomorphism theories assert that instead of relying on rational assessment of technical efficiency 
and returns of an action, an organization adopts a course of action because it has been adopted by 
certain organizations. Organizations simply imitate others when there is uncertainty about possible 
courses of action (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). Bandwagon theories thrive on ambiguity or 
uncertainty of alternative range of actions as well as the likelihood of occurrence of outcomes of 
such actions (Milliken, 1987; Abrahamson & Rosenkopf 1999). Organizational theory puts forward 
two theories that explain the phenomenon of bandwagon pressures, namely institutional 
bandwagon pressures which is a result of the threat of lost legitimacy as well as competitive 
bandwagon pressures which is a result of the threat of lost competitive advantage (Abrahamson & 
Rosenkopf, 1990, 1993).  
From the perspective of competitive dynamism, firms that aspire to perform well relative to 
the competition will pursue one of two strategies. 1) A risky and challenging differentiation 
strategy which can protect them from the actions of rivals and lead to higher gains should it succeed 
(Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). 2) Adopt a course of action that is homogeneous with that of 
competitors (Baum & Haveman, 1997; Deephouse, 1999; Gimeno & Chen, 1998). This later 
strategy enables firms to match the behaviour of competitors (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). It is 
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important to note that performance below aspiration levels generally increases the risk tolerance of 
firms as they strive to navigate out of the quagmire (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). In light of 
this, acquisitions can be conceived as a differentiated strategy in an environment where acquisitions 
are not common place. 
Furthermore, the literature on competitive dynamism perceives imitation as a response to a 
competitor’s actions in order to minimize risks and alleviate the intensity of competition in an 
uncertain environment (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). Firms also use imitative behaviour to match 
competitors and as a mechanism to disrupt or maintain the status quo (Ross & Sharapov, 2015; 
Chen, Smith & Grimm, 1992). While laggards are often thought to imitate market leaders as a 
means of catching up, Market leaders or firms above technology aspiration levels also imitate as a 
strategy to maintain market leadership in highly competitive environments (Pacheco & Dean, 2015; 
Ross & Sharapov, 2015). 
We suggest that on the market for corporate control, firms below or above technology 
aspiration levels differ on the timing of acquisition and are subsequently impacted differently by 
bandwagon pressures (McNamara, et al, 2008; Pacheco & Dean, 2015). Firms above technology 
aspiration levels are likely to be motivated by bandwagon pressures (Fiol & O’Connor, 2003). 
There are institutional bandwagon pressures when firms succumb to peer pressure and choose to 
imitate the action of early adopters in order not to appear markedly different from their peers in 
terms of industry participation and technology portfolio (Pacheco & Dean 2015; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). On the other hand, there are a competitive bandwagon pressures when firms join 
the fray motivated by the fear of missing competitive opportunities that early acquirers may be 
optimising (Lierberman & Asaba, 2006; Fiol & O’Connor, 2003; McNamara, Haleblian, & Dykes, 
2008). 
103 
 
Where technology performance is at or above aspiration level, firms are more likely to react 
to competitor actions on the market for corporate control by focusing on social cues, assume others 
have superior information (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006), and are therefore affected by competitive 
bandwagon pressures because they fear missing out on competitive opportunities that early 
adopters appear to be seizing (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993). Being above technology 
aspiration level often signals the existence of underutilized resources for which these firms seek to 
redeploy fully in other areas such as acquisitions (Ref & Shapira, 2016). Yet satisfactory 
performance or technology above aspiration levels motivate firms to focus on routines and 
customary practices which moderately fine-tune prior experiences (Baum & Dahl, 2007). 
Considering that leading firms often seek to strategically maintain the status quo that reinforces 
their dominance, and the fact that high performance reduces risk tolerance, these firms will not be 
interested in pursuing a differentiated strategy as this is risky and challenging (Ross & Sharapov, 
2015). Instead, firms will adopt a homogenous strategic action by mimicking the prevailing 
strategic actions of competitors such as acquisitions (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). In this sense, 
imitation could be seen as an attempt by firms above technology aspiration levels to neutralize 
earlier actions of competitors in order to maintain their dominance technologically (Ross & 
Sharapov, 2015). This indicates that firms will focus on local search as it is coterminous with 
related acquisitions which is considered less risky in comparison to unrelated acquisitions. 
Furthermore related diversification or acquisition is proclaimed as the most efficient way to 
redeploy fungible scale-free technology resources (Asmussen, 2014; Robins and Wiersema, 1995; 
Rumelt, 1974; Levinthal & Wu, 2010). 
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Hypothesis 3: Increases in the distance of technology performance above aspiration 
levels are positively associated with the likelihood of engaging in related 
acquisitions, and this likelihood increases at the peak of a merger wave. 
Being below technology aspiration levels motivate organizations to make a comprehensive 
analysis of the strategic opportunities and value of alternative courses of action available. As 
problemistic search encourages attention to nonlocal search depending on the distance to 
technology aspiration levels, decision makers highlight nonlocal search and favour big changes 
aimed at restoring performance (Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Tyler & Caner, 2016; Cyert & March, 
1963). Firms below technology aspiration levels aim at picking new resources beyond the 
boundaries of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963, Tyler & Caner, 2016). We reiterate that in 
competitive dynamism, acquisitions in general or an unrelated acquisition is a differentiated 
strategy in an environment where acquisitions are not the routine practices of organizations. 
Therefore, in order to restore performance, firms below technology aspiration levels would most 
likely adopt a differentiated strategy such as acquisitions (Lieberman & Asaba, 2016). Also, given 
that performance below aspiration levels increases the risk appetite of managers (Wiseman & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998), problemistic search will not only lead these firms to consider acquisitions 
but will cause them to consider an unrelated acquisition which gives access to diverse and novel 
R&D resources and have the potential to restore technology performance to levels closer to 
aspirations (Baum & Dahlin, 2007). Since this action or acquisition takes place at a time when 
acquisitions are not customary, it will most likely occur at the beginning of a wave of mergers. 
Hypothesis 4: Increases in the distance of technology performance below aspiration 
levels are positively associated with the likelihood of engaging in unrelated 
acquisitions, and this likelihood increases at the beginning of a merger wave. 
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4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Data Sources and Sample 
To construct our data sample we combined S&P 500 firms dataset with Compustat database 
to retrieve the financial and market information of firms, which resulted in a panel data of 500 
firms. In the next step, the acquisitions data was drawn from Thomson One Banker. Furthermore, 
the patent data was retrieved from the NBER U.S patent and citation records and merged with the 
Compustat database using the GVKEY and CUSIP as common identifiers. 
In an attempt to capture sample innovative firms, prior studies on M&As and alliances have 
focused on the manufacturing and service sectors arguing that a significantly large volume of 
knowledge intensive firms can be found in these industries (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002; Zaheer, 
Hernandez & Banerjee, 2010). In view of this our analysis focuses on the manufacturing and 
service industries which led to the loss of 230 firms from the sample. These are firms that have 
neither been classified as manufacturing nor service sector firms.20 The final sample is a panel 
dataset with 4735 observations from 270 firms for the period ranging from 1980 – 2010. 158 of 
these firms engaged in 408 different acquisitions. 323 acquisitions were conducted by 122 firms in 
manufacturing and the remaining 85 by 36 firms in the services sector. 
4.3.1.1 Dependent variables  
                                                          
20 The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) classifies industries by a four-digit code. By focusing on the 
manufacturing and services industries, all firms in the following indstrial classification were dropped from the sample. 
These include agriculture, forestry and fishing; mining, construction;wholesale trade; retail trade, finance insurance 
and real estate; public adminsitrations and those in the miscellaneous and non-classifiable category. 
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We used nine (9) dependent variables for our analysis. Acquisition dummy is the first 
dependent variable and it is a binary variable, which takes a value of 1 if a firm has conducted any 
acquisition and 0 otherwise. 
Following the Cefis et al., (2019) we measure relatedness based on industry affiliation using 
the standard industry classification (SIC) codes. This is against the background that acquisitions 
involve the transfer of resources from one firm to another. The industry relatedness measure is thus 
suitable in that it captures relatedness in resource profiles of merging firms (Bryce & Winter, 2009; 
Speckbacher, Neumann & Hoffmann., 2015). Prior studies have applied the two and four digit SIC 
codes in the measurement of relatedness (see Miller et al, 2010). So the relatedness index is 
estimated using the four and two-digit (for robustness tests) SIC codes. For the resources of a target 
to be beneficial to the acquirer there is the need for some level of similarity between the two 
resource bases in order to enhance their efficient integration. The four digit measure indicates high 
similarity between resource bases of targets and acquirers. However, the limitation of the four digit 
measure is that it is too fine-grained (Miller et al, 2010; See Martin & Sayrak, 2003).While the 
industry of operation of firms should not be too distant for purposes of maximizing synergies, they 
should also not be too similar so that acquirers will have something new to benefit from for future 
innovations (Grimpe & Hussinger, 2014). In view of this we use the two digit measure for 
robustness tests.  
The unrelated acquisition dummy takes the value 1 if the acquirer and target are in different 
industry classification using the four-digit SIC industry classification. Related acquisition dummy 
takes the value 1 if the acquirer and target are in the same industry classification using the four-
digit SIC industry classification. 
4.3.1.2 Acquisition waves 
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We identify three stages in an acquisition wave using the volume of acquisitions for each year 
for which we create three dummy variables namely upswing, peak and downswing.21 The upswing 
represents a period of increasing acquisition activities in comparison to the period before which 
may last a few years. The peak represents the phase in a wave where acquisition activities get to 
the peak and stabilizes in intensity. This may also last a few years. The downswing refers to a 
period of declining acquisition activities. Acquisition activities decline to levels comparable to 
what it was before the wave began (Carow et al, 2004; Haleblian, McNamara, Kolev & Dykes, 
2012). Figure 1 on page 13 shows the volume of M&A activities depicting the merger waves. The 
upswing variable takes a value of 1 if an acquisition takes place during the rising period of the wave 
and 0 otherwise. The variable peak takes the value of 1 if acquisition activities take place during 
the zenith of the wave and 0 otherwise. Finally, the downswing takes the value 1 if acquisitions 
activities happen during the declining phase of the wave and 0 otherwise. All acquisitions in the 
sample belong to one of the three phases of the merger wave. The wave variables are used to 
construct the other dependent variables as seen below.  
Upswing acquisitions is a dummy variable which measures acquisitions that take place in the 
upswing of the merger wave. In a similar fashion, the Peak acquisitions variable also shows 
acquisitions undertaken during the peak of the wave. 
The others are upswing unrelated acquisitions 4 digit and upswing related acquisitions 4 digit 
which represents related and unrelated acquisitions occurring during the upswing of the merger 
                                                          
21 We follow the movement of the years of intensive and decrease M&A activities to construct the wave variables. The 
upswing covers the following years: 1980-1985, 1993-1998 and 2005-2006. The peak covers the following years: 
1986-1986, 1999-1999 and 2007-2007. The downswing covers the following years: 1987-1992, 2000-2004 and 2008 
- 2010. 
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wave using the 4 digit SIC industry classifications. Furthermore, the peak unrelated acquisitions 4 
digit and peak related acquisitions 4 digit are acquisitions that occur during the peak of the merger 
wave. Those of the downswing are used as the bench mark of comparison. 
As indicated earlier for robustness tests, we also constructed four (4) dependent variables for 
the 2 digit SIC industry classification. They include the upswing unrelated acquisitions 2 digit and 
upswing related acquisitions 2 digit which represents related and unrelated acquisitions occurring 
during the upswing of the merger wave using the 2 digit SIC industry classifications. Also, the 
peak unrelated acquisitions 2 digit and peak unrelated acquisitions 2 digit are acquisitions that 
occur during the peak of the merger wave. 
4.3.1.3 Independent variables  
Technology above and below aspiration levels 
In line with prior research we used granted patents as a proxy for technology performance (See 
Block, Miller, Jaskiewicz & Spiegel, 2013). Patents are generally conceived as the product of 
technological and inventive capabilities of firms (Hagedoorn & Cloodt, 2003). Thus, patents could 
be the outcome of successful R&D (Block et al, 2013). A patent owned by a firm is an indication 
of the recognition the firm has gained for the new knowledge it has produced (Jaffe, Trajtenberg 
and Henderson, 1993). Patents are therefore generally accepted in literature as the measure of the 
innovative or technology performance of firms (Hagedoorn & Cloodt, 2003). Even though patents 
are indicative of the technological potential of the outcome of R&D, patents may not be 
representative of the knowledge base of a firm as not all inventions are patented (Griliches, 1990). 
Therefore, we used the patent count as a proxy to gauge firm level technology performance. 
According to the BTOF, a firm’s behaviour is determined by the evaluation of its performance 
relative to its aspiration level (Cyert & March, 1963, Greve, 2003). This calls for identifying a 
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benchmark of comparison. Establishing the benchmark of comparison raises a fundamental 
question as to which reference group the focal firm should compare its performance to (Iyer & 
Miller, 2008). There are two competing views about the benchmark of comparison. The first view 
compares a firm’s performance to the focal firm’s own historical performance (Cyert & March, 
1963, Levinthal & March, 1981). This is because a firm’s recent past performance is a yardstick 
with which it appraises its present performance. More so, not only is it a measure of how well a 
firm performs but can also become yardstick of how well a firm should perform (Ref & Shapira, 
2017; Greve, 2003). The second view compares a focal firm’s performance to other comparable 
firms and it is called social comparison (Iyer & Miller, 2008; Cyert & March, 1963). This uses the 
past performance of comparable firms as the yardstick with which a firm appraises its performance 
(Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Ref & Shapira, 2017). However, prior research indicates that it is often 
an arduous task to determine which comparable group is suitable (Washburn & Bromiley, 2012). 
Because firms can choose to compare themselves to others based on technology portfolio, size, 
strategy or core industry classifications (Ref & Shapira, 2017). This difficulty associated with 
choosing the appropriate reference group for social comparison may have led to the mixed and 
inconsistent results in prior studies (Boyle & Shapira, 2012, Ref & Shapira, 2017). To avoid this 
dilemma some scholars have resorted to the use of a weighted model based on a weighted 
combination of the historical and social performance (see Tyler & Caner, 2016; Bromiley et al, 
2014). Others turn to both the historical performance of firms and that of competitors (see Iyer & 
Miller 2008; Chrisman and Patel, 2012). Yet in recent times, scholars find the historical 
performance measure a more preferable approach of predicting a firm’s behaviour, as firms are 
more responsive to their own historical performance gaps (see Choi, Lee & Bae, 2019; Ref & 
Shapira, 2017; Moliterno & Wiersema, 2007). We estimate our aspiration variable using the self 
or historical technology performance. 
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We estimated the patent stock as follows: Patent Stockit= (1-δ)*Patent Stockit-1+ Patentst. We 
used a 15% rate of depreciation (δ) per annum given that patents depreciate due to technological 
obsolescence or being invented around by competitors (Bessen, 2008).22 In the second step we then 
applied the following formula to calculate the technology performance aspiration gaps: Technology 
aspiration level = (patent stockt – average patent stocktt-3) / average patent stockt-3. We subtracted 
the 3-year average of patent stock from the patent stock in yeart. The difference is normalized by 
the 3-year average of the patent stock. The positive values are taken as the technology performance 
above aspiration levels. The negative values are taken as the technology performance below 
aspiration levels. In the third step, for easy interpretation the technology performance below 
aspiration levels are multiplied by (-1) so that all values are positive (See appendix 2 for details).  
This measure is not impacted by differences in the absolute number of patents. Furthermore, 
in order for a firm to fall below aspiration levels or become negative, the firm needs to deviate 
downwards by a large amount from a consistently high performance and stay below the previous 
performance for a longer period. 
4.3.1.4 Control variables  
We follow prior studies in our choice of control variables to account for firm level and industry 
characteristics. Larger firms are more likely to have the capacity to make acquisitions (Ellis et al, 
2011). We use the natural log of total assets as a measure for firm size. The natural log is used to 
handle the skew distribution of the variable. 
                                                          
22 Prior literature suggest the knowledge depreciation rate to be 15% (see Griliches & Mairesse, 1984; Hall, 1990; 
Czarnitzki & Toole, 2011, Zobel, Bashmeier & Chesbrough, 2016 for details). This is what informed the choice of the 
15% rate of depreciation of the patent stock. 
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Debt/assets is the ratio of total debt to total assets, which reflects the percentage of firm’s assets 
that is financed by debt. A firm is highly leveraged if it has a high debt/asset ratio. It also shows 
the associated risk involved in the firm’s operations (Shim & Okamuro, 2011). We anticipate that 
this will have a negative relationship with acquisitions. We also used patent R&D ratio to control 
for technology related activities of firms. We used patent citations to control for the relative novelty 
of firms technologies. The average of ROA controls for overall firm efficiency. ROA is the ratio 
of net income to total assets (Chrisman & Patel, 2012). This is expected to have a positive effect 
on acquisition. The R&D assets ratio as a proxy for firms risk and readiness to undertake long run 
investments. It is calculated as the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets. We expect it to have a 
positive effect on acquisitions. Industry and time dummies are introduced to control for any 
industry time related variance. Finally, we also control for acquisition experience of acquiring 
firms. 
4.4 Results and Analysis 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics is presented in table 1 which shows that an average of 0.09 acquisitions 
in our sample. Furthermore, on average 0.05 acquisitions occur in the upswing while 0.03 
acquisitions occur in the peak of a merger wave. 
The technology above aspiration levels variable shows a mean of 8.22 while the technology 
below aspiration level shows a mean of 0.02. This indicates more of the firms in our sample have 
technology performance above aspiration levels. With a mean of 7.93, the size of the firms in our 
sample are relatively large. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables     
Acquisition dummy 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Upswing acquisition 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Peak acquisitions 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Downswing acquisitions 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 
4 digit SIC industry classification     
Related acquisition 4 digit 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Upswing related acquisitions 4 digit 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 
Peak related acquisitions 4 digit 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 
Downswing related acquisitions 4 digit 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 
Unrelated acquisition 4 digit 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Upswing unrelated acquisitions 4 digit 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Peak unrelated acquisitions 4 digit 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
Downswing unrelated acquisitions 4 digit 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 
2 digit SIC industry classification     
Related acquisition 2 digit 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Upswing related acquisitions 2 digit 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Peak related acquisitions 2 digit 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Downswing related acquisitions 2 digit 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 
Unrelated acquisition 2 digit 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Upswing unrelated acquisitions 2 digit 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Peak unrelated acquisitions 2 digit 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Downswing unrelated acquisitions 2 digit 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 
Control variables     
M&A experience 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Firm size 7.93 1.49 1.36 13.08 
R&D/assets 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.49 
Patent/R&D 1.63 2.38 0.00 38.03 
Patent citations 11.43 11.90 0.00 205.60 
ROA 0.07 0.09 -0.76 0.50 
Debt/assets 0.16 0.13 0.00 0.69 
Patent stock 467.23 1137.09 0.01 18704.75 
Explanatory variables     
Technology below aspiration 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.16 
Technology above aspiration 8.22 34.38 0.00 705.16 
 
We also present correlations in table 2 (in the appendix 1). The variables with high correlations 
are for the various dependent variables. So they have not been used together in the same model. 
Therefore the issue of multicollinearity does not arise.  
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4.4.2 Empirical Analysis 
In order to test our hypotheses, we employed pooled logit estimators. Table 3 presents results 
of pooled logit fixed-effect regression models predicting the likelihood of acquisitions. The 
variable downswing, which describes the declining phase of a merger wave is used as benchmark 
of comparison, hence it is not included in the models. This is to avoid any incidence of 
multicollinearity. Furthermore, the variable patent stock is not included in the models as it is used 
to control for technology intensive firms. 
As shown by model 2 of table 3 (ß = 0.58, p < .05), we find support for hypothesis 1 which 
suggests that an increase in the distance of technology above aspiration levels is positively 
associated with related acquisitions. The marginal effects show that an increase in the distance of 
technology above aspiration level is 1.01 % positively associated with related acquisitions. 
Hypothesis 2 suggests that increases in the distance of technology performance below aspiration 
levels are associated with unrelated acquisitions. Model 6 of table 3 (ß = 4.75, p < .05) confirms 
hypothesis 2. Model 6 of Table 3 as stated also confirms hypothesis 3 which suggests that 
technology performance below aspiration levels is associated with unrelated acquisitions which 
could also signal the start of a merger wave. This indicates that an increase in technology 
performance below aspiration level is 25.75 % positively associated with unrelated acquisitions 
during the upswing of a merger wave. The results also confirm hypothesis 4 which predicts that 
increases in the distance of technology performance above aspiration levels are positively 
associated with related acquisitions during the peak of a merger wave (Model 8 of table 3: ß = 0.74, 
p < .05). This shows a 0.70 % positive association with related acquisitions if the distance of 
technology performance above aspiration level increases. 
4.4.3 Robustness Tests 
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The results presented in table 3 constitute a more fine-grained measure of relatedness. 
However, for post M&A integration to culminate into valuable resources synergies, the target 
resources should ideally not be very similar to that of the acquirer. There is the need for some level 
of differentiation in order for recombination of the sources to be beneficial. In view of this we used 
the two digit SIC code as measure of relatedness. This measure ensures that the target and acquirer 
are different and yet similar enough for resource assimilations to be beneficial. The results as 
presented in table 4 are consistent with the prior results in table 3. 
  
115 
 
 
TABLE 3: Pooled Logit Regression Models for the Probability of Acquisitions (4 digit SIC industry classification) 
  
Acquisition 
dummy 
Related 
acquisitions 
Unrelated 
acquisitions 
Upswing 
acquisitions   
Upswing 
related 
acquisitions 
Upswing 
unrelated 
acquisitions 
Peak 
acquisitions   
Peak 
related 
acquisitions 
Peak 
unrelated 
acquisitions 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Acquisition experience 0.94*** 0.57*** 0.90*** 0.87*** 0.44 0.92*** 0.98*** 0.62** 0.79*** 
 (0.12) (0.21) (0.12) (0.18) (0.36) (0.17) (0.19) (0.30) (0.20) 
Firm size 0.36*** 0.32*** 0.49*** 0.33*** 0.28** 0.49*** 0.46*** 0.36*** 0.59*** 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.13) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) 
R&D/assets 3.87*** 6.91*** 1.68 4.41** 3.96 3.44 4.40** 9.09*** 1.34 
 (1.19) (1.72) (1.36) (1.92) (2.92) (2.14) (1.79) (2.43) (2.06) 
Patent/R&D 0.04 -0.11 0.04* -0.02 -0.35** -0.01 0.09* 0.02 0.11** 
 (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.17) (0.04) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) 
Patent citations 0.00 0.00 0.01** -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
ROA 1.20 1.70 1.72** 2.66** 2.71 3.88*** 0.33 2.22 -0.35 
 (0.74) (1.15) (0.85) (1.26) (2.17) (1.43) (1.12) (1.64) (1.28) 
Debt/assets -1.43** -1.27 -1.79*** -1.16 -2.23 -1.30 -1.85** 0.04 -2.69*** 
 (0.56) (1.02) (0.60) (0.93) (1.88) (0.96) (0.88) (1.38) (0.97) 
Technology below aspiration 0.90 0.61 1.13 3.26 -0.97 4.75** -0.24 -0.04 -0.56 
 (1.43) (2.48) (1.53) (2.09) (4.35) (2.12) (2.22) (3.46) (2.48) 
Technology above aspiration 0.46** 0.58** 0.41** 0.39 0.28 0.43 0.51* 0.74** 0.42 
 (0.18) (0.26) (0.20) (0.28) (0.40) (0.29) (0.28) (0.37) (0.31) 
_cons -6.89*** -9.09*** -8.27*** -7.05*** -8.63*** -8.38*** -6.91*** -21.45 -7.77*** 
 (0.66) (1.45) (0.70) (0.84) (1.79) (0.86) (0.90) (530.53) (0.96) 
Observations 4735.00 3715.00 4616.00 2389.00 1612.00 2380.00 1424.00 1349.00 1309.00 
Log Likelihood -1290.05 -473.24 -1229.24 -578.99 -170.89 -596.19 -480.04 -219.18 -422.29 
Note: Coefficients are reported and standard errors are reported in parentheses 
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
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TABLE 4: Pooled Logit Regression Models for the Probability of Acquisitions (2 digit SIC industry classification) 
  
Related 
acquisitions 
Unrelated 
acquisitions 
Upswing 
related 
acquisitions 
Upswing 
unrelated 
acquisitions 
Peak related 
acquisitions 
Peak 
unrelated 
acquisitions 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Acquisition experience 0.69*** 0.94*** 0.50* 1.01*** 0.72*** 0.79*** 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.25) (0.21) (0.23) (0.24) 
Firm size 0.28*** 0.55*** 0.21** 0.57*** 0.34*** 0.65*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
R&D/assets 4.56*** 1.55 3.83 2.30 5.13** 2.40 
 (1.41) (1.69) (2.39) (2.78) (2.03) (2.47) 
Patent/R&D 0.02 0.04 -0.09 0.01 0.06 0.11* 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Patent citations -0.00 0.01** -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ROA 1.65* 1.14 3.94** 2.21 0.37 0.24 
 (0.94) (1.01) (1.75) (1.71) (1.33) (1.55) 
Debt/assets -1.03 -2.15*** -0.16 -2.46** -0.94 -2.75** 
 (0.73) (0.74) (1.23) (1.20) (1.05) (1.20) 
Technology below aspiration 0.23 2.62 0.42 6.94*** 1.04 -0.01 
 (1.87) (1.84) (2.95) (2.57) (2.66) (3.05) 
Technology above aspiration 0.48** 0.46* 0.22 0.67* 0.63** 0.29 
 (0.22) (0.24) (0.34) (0.35) (0.31) (0.40) 
_cons -6.00*** -10.20*** -6.71*** -9.70*** -6.29*** -9.82*** 
 (0.83) (0.89) (1.16) (1.07) (1.09) (1.22) 
Observations 4566.00 4517.00 2228.00 2380.00 1424.00 1281.00 
Log Likelihood -829.01 -904.97 -330.80 -438.19 -350.81 -310.21 
Note: Coefficients are reported and standard errors are reported parentheses.     
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01    
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4.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
4.5.1 Discussion 
Acquisitions represent one of several routes of resource redeployment (Capron, Dussauge, & 
Mitchell, 1998) as well as a vehicle for sourcing technology (Lungeanu et al, 2016). Our study 
examines under what conditions of technology performance firms make acquisitions. Prior 
research has reflected largely on how relative financial performance trigger acquisitions depending 
on whether performance meets minimum threshold of expected firm performance or not (Cyert & 
March, 1963). While problemistic search has largely underscored the role of unmet technology 
needs in technology sourcing decisions (Tyler & Caner, 2016), we also acknowledge that 
technology performance at or above the minimum threshold can lead to the pursuit of strategic 
activities that ideally would not receive organizational support in periods of poor technology 
performance (Cyert & March, 1963).  
In this regard our findings are in consonance with prior findings as firms above technology 
aspiration levels engage in related acquisitions in search of future technology projects. Redeploying 
fungible scale free resources in distant domains tend to impinge on the value of those resources 
(See Levinthal & Wu, 2010). Related acquisitions come across as a viable strategy as prior research 
has shown that it is not only a low risk endeavour but also out performs unrelated acquisitions 
(Levinthal & Wu, 2010; Robins and Wiersema, 1995; Rumelt, 1974). However, contrary to the 
notion that firms above technology aspiration levels would prefer related acquisitions, we note that 
these firms also engage in unrelated acquisitions as a way of seeking out diverse and novel 
knowledge or technology resources. This is consistent with the view that problemistic search begins 
with attention to local search and subsequently moves to nonlocal search depending on the distance 
to the unmet aspirations (Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Tyler & Caner, 2016). 
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While firms performing at or above technology aspiration levels can afford to engage in 
familiar or routine search for future innovations, firms performing below technology aspirations 
are often under intense pressure to restore performance to acceptable levels (Greve, 2003). In line 
with BTOF, this increases the risk tolerance of such firms (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) and 
they will pursue a risky differentiation strategy in order to restore performance to the status quo 
(Lieberman & Asaba, 2006). A differentiated strategy such as unrelated acquisitions leads to access 
to diverse and novel R&D projects for future technologies. Also unrelated acquisition or 
acquisitions in general in an environment where acquisitions are absent can lead to the emergence 
of a wave of mergers as other firms begin to imitate such a strategic manoeuvre. Our finding is in 
line with this constellation as firms below aspiration levels choose unrelated acquisitions as a 
means of gaining access to new resources thus triggering the onset of a merger wave. 
Competitive dynamics give rise to bandwagon pressures as firms imitate rivals (Lieberman & 
Asaba, 2006). Leading firms such as those above technology performance aspiration levels imitate 
the actions of laggards such as those below technology aspiration levels. They do this to neutralize 
the strategy of rivals and to further entrench their dominance (Ross & Sharapov, 2015). 
Furthermore, technology leaders join the market for corporate control when it is perceived that they 
could be losing out on potential targets that could enhance their future technology performance 
(Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993), help maintain their competitive advantage as well as market 
dominance (Pacheco & Dean, 2015; Ross & Sharapov, 2015). This phenomenon is captured as an 
imitation of rival action and occurs after the upswing of the wave when merger activities are at 
their zenith. 
Our study makes several contributions to the field of strategy. First, we recognise the need for 
a differentiated competitive strategy as a driver of nonlocal search. The BTOF literature observes 
that firms below performance aspiration levels will seek to explore new solutions outside the firms’ 
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core activities (Cyert & March, 1963). However, drawing upon competitive dynamics, we argue 
that firms below technology aspiration levels do not just seek solutions outside their core domains 
for new and diverse ideas but that this kind of search is motivated by the need to take actions with 
the goal of matching up with competitors and restoring performance to acceptable levels (Ross & 
Sharapov, 2015). 
Second, while technology laggards may undertake significantly novel actions such as 
acquisitions to make up for technology gaps, the timing of such decisions and actions underlie an 
industry wide phenomenon. Considering that firms below technology aspirations levels engage in 
radically different strategic activities such as acquisitions in periods when the market for corporate 
control is not active, could set the stage for subsequent imitating behaviours of competitors thereby 
defining the emergence of a merger wave (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006; Pacheco & Dean, 2015). 
Third, the BTOF asserts that firms above technology aspiration levels would ideally engage in 
local search for solutions that are within the core activities of their business or not seek any form 
of organizational change. However, combining this with insights from competitive dynamics, we 
predict that pursing a local search strategy should not be seen as “business as usual” or lack of 
organizational change. This should be conceived as a deliberate effective strategic response to 
redeploy underutilized resources. We note that firms below technology aspirations have the 
tendency to comprehensively appraise options available to them before making acquisitions as they 
need to succeed at it in order to restore performance to acceptable levels. As these acquisitions are 
been made, the need to maintain the status quo or their lead will cause firms above aspiration levels 
to follow social cues and assume that those acquiring may be seizing better opportunities. Being 
above aspiration levels does not bring any incentive to pursue a radically different strategy, so a 
homogenous strategy becomes apparent. Not only does this bandwagon behaviour which is 
observed during the period of intense acquisition activities, make it possible to neutralize the 
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actions of other players, it also makes it possible for leaders to deploy scale free resources 
efficiently to maintain their competitive advantage 
Our study is not without limitations. The setup of our study is such that we examined how 
technology performance aspirations influence acquisitions in different product markets. This may 
appear as mismatch which may obscure the learning opportunities in technology based 
acquisitions. Future research may consider decoupling this by focusing exclusively on acquisitions 
in different technology classifications in order to make the learning implications clear. 
4.5.2 Conclusion 
Our study combines insights from the BTOF, competitive dynamics and bandwagon pressures 
to examine how technology aspiration gaps influence the acquisition behaviour of firms as well as 
the timing of acquisitions relative to the merger wave. Using a panel dataset of S&P 500 firms we 
find support for our predictions that increases in technology performance above aspiration levels 
are positively associated with local search in the form of related acquisitions especially during the 
peak of the merger wave. Our results also support the prediction that increases in the distance of 
technology below aspiration levels are positively associated with nonlocal search or unrelated 
acquisitions which also signals the start of a merger wave. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
The aim of this paper is to develop a better understanding of the influence of family ownership 
on M&As and the effect of such M&As on innovation. The three chapters of the dissertation 
address this by critically reviewing the relevant literature and in the process identified research 
gaps. In the next step the questions that arise are empirically examined. 
5.1 Overview of Main Findings and Implications 
5.1.1 Firm Acquisitions by Family Firms: A mixed Gamble Approach. 
It is widely accepted that family firms follow different strategic considerations in their M&As 
decisions. The purpose of chapter 2 is to understand how these differences in strategic goals impact 
the decision to engage in M&As. The chapter achieves this by investigating the conditions under 
which family firms are more likely to engage in M&As.  
The BAM for years has been the commonly used theoretical framework to analyze the decision 
of family firms to engage in M&As. The BAM suggests that FF are loss averse with respect to their 
socioemotional wealth and willing to preserve that at the expense of economic performance 
(Gomez-Mejia et al, 2010). Furthermore, it suggests that family firms are only willing to engage 
in M&As if their financial performance is under threat. Under the BAM assumptions family firms 
are expected to engage less in M&A transactions than non-family firms (Shim & Okamuro, 2011, 
Caprio et al., 2011). However, perspectives from the mixed gamble approach departs from the 
BAM and makes it possible to consider situations of potential gains as well as losses to SEW. 
Following this we derive and find empirical support for the predictions that family firms are more 
likely to engage in related acquisitions than non-family firms. This effect is much higher when 
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family firms are performing above their aspiration levels. Also between family firms that are 
financially stressed or below aspiration levels and those above aspiration levels, we find that those 
above aspiration levels are more likely to engage in M&As than those who are financially less 
endowed. 
5.1.2 Firm Post-Acquisition Innovation and Merger Waves: The Influence of Family 
Ownership 
Following Chapter 1 which provides empirical support for the involvement of family firms in 
M&As, the purpose of Chapter 2 is to empirically examine whether family firms become more 
innovative than non-family firms after M&As. This is done against the background that mergers 
occur in waves such that a firm’s position in the wave impacts access to potentially beneficial 
targets for post M&A innovation performance (McNamara et al, 2008).  
Family firms are endowed with distinct resources such as organizational social capital (Acquaah, 
2016), patient financial capital, survivability capital which all support long term innovation 
(Sirmon & Hitt, 2003; Kang, 2000). Due to the sense of care and extensive support offered by 
family firms ( Eisenberger, et al, 2001; Konig et al, 2013), their employees feel a sense of 
reciprocity especially during difficult times and offer support for organizational goals such as 
during post M&A integration (Cennamo et al, 2012; Wayne et al, 1997). 
Drawing on the resource based view, the paper argues that family firms are more able to 
efficiently appropriate target resources and reconfigure them through their internal processes for 
future innovation, thus becoming more innovative than non-family firms after acquisitions. The 
paper finds empirical support for the prediction that acquisitions conducted during the upswing of 
a merger waves are more valuable to family firms and are positively associated with innovation 
than for non-family firms. 
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5.1.3 Distance to Technology Aspiration Levels and the Choice of Acquisition Targets in 
Merger Waves 
Chapter 4 is motivated by the findings in Chapters 2 and 3 which are all about family firms. 
Chapter 4 presents an opportunity to examine if the dynamics about the involvement of family 
firms in M&As apply in a different context where no distinction is made between family and non-
family firms. Thus the purpose of Chapter 3 is to investigate how technology aspiration gaps 
influence the search behaviour of acquiring firms to engage in different types of acquisitions. As 
mergers occur in waves, the timing as well as the type of acquisitions are influenced by external 
competitive and bandwagon pressures depending on whether the acquiring firm is above or below 
technology performance aspiration levels. The empirical results support the prediction that 
increases in the distance of technology performance above aspiration levels are positively 
associated with related acquisitions especially during the peak of a merger wave. Also, increases 
in the distance of technology performance below aspiration levels are positively associated with 
more unrelated acquisitions and acquisitions in general which defines the start of a merger wave. 
5.2 Implications of the study 
This study adds empirical evidence to prior findings about the involvement of family firms in 
M&As. Prior studies argue that family firms are reluctant to engage in M&As due to loss aversion 
and the desire to retain control and preserve SEW (Gomez-Mejia et al, 2018). This thesis highlights 
the role of firm level performance especially in decision making regarding M&As. Thus suggesting 
that family firms are simply not reluctant to engage in M&As but that a firm’s financial 
performance above aspiration levels plays a decisive role in influencing a positive decision towards 
M&A transactions. Additionally this questions the basic assumption of the BAM and suggests the 
mixed gamble approach as a better theoretical framework for understanding the strategic actions 
of large family firms. 
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Furthermore, the study highlights the importance of understanding the motives of firms for 
engaging in M&A transactions (Worek et al, 2018). It has been noted that while financial 
performance is said to be the main motive of M&As (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & 
Davison, 2009; McNamara, Haleblian, & Dykes, 2008), resource redeployment (Uhlenbruck, Hitt, & 
Semadeni, 2006), intellectual property rights, access to new technologies (Kotlar et al, 2013) etc. are other 
documented goals for which firms engage in M&As. It goes to show that only upon a better understanding 
of the motives of M&As will scholars be better placed to adequately measure post M&A performance 
implications of M&As. 
5.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
This study is not free of limitations. There are common limitations that cut across the three 
chapters of the dissertation especially in relation to the operational definition of family firms as 
well as the dataset. 
One limitation that this study shares with many others is lack access to all information that 
was needed. For instance, the analysis is limited to a binary measure of family ownership which 
was obtained from the BusinessWeek Magazine. The difficulty in obtaining continuous measure 
of family ownership has made the practice of using a binary variable common in family firm studies 
(Gomez-Mejia et al, 2014; Gomez-Mejia et al, 2010). While the focus has been on showing the 
differences of the type of firm ownership (family firms versus non-family firms), future studies 
may investigate the levels of ownership and how that influence the acquisition behaviour of family 
firms. Furthermore, the 5% ownership used in the thesis is also a limitation. Higher levels of 
ownership may occasion different acquisition behaviours family firms. There is also concern about 
the possibility of over estimating the number of firms identified as family firms given the small 
ownership stake used.  
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Data on whether the family firms in the sample are multiple generation firms was not also 
available. Future studies may consider unpacking this to see how these dimensions affect the results 
observed in this study.   
Also, the family firms in this study are acquirers. There was no information on the family 
ownership status of target firms. It would be interesting to consider the influence of target family 
firms on the likelihood of acquisitions as well as the innovation outcomes of an acquirer that is also 
a family firm.  
Furthermore, it would be very interesting to have more detailed information about decision 
processes within the firms. Such information is, however, difficult to collect, especially for large 
sample studies. Hence, this dissertation accepts that the study has to be seen as complementary to 
qualitative studies that may have a deeper look into the processes of strategic decision making in 
family firms (e.g. Kumeto, 2015). In a similar vein, the objective of firm acquisitions cannot be 
observed. So the study follows prior literature by assuming that related acquisitions are to some 
extent motivated by the aim of related diversification (e.g. Anderson & Reeb, 2003a). It is 
acknowledged that this is not a perfect measure, but believe that this is the most suitable measure 
available. 
Another potential limitation is that the study focuses on the S&P 500 firms. These firms are 
large and well performing and, hence, have access to resources necessary for engaging in firm 
acquisitions. This implies that the results may not be generalizable to small and medium-sized 
firms. The results may challenge prior findings that suggest that firms in a loss frame are less likely 
to engage in acquisitions as such. These results may be explained by a lack of resources for 
acquisitions for samples of small and medium-sized firms rather than by the position of the firms 
vis-à-vis their aspiration level.  
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Another avenue for future research would be to investigate the importance of irrational 
determinants for the decision to acquire another firm. Since Cyert & March (1963) it is known that 
many firm decisions are irrational (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008; Harford, 2005) and an 
investigation into what extent this applies to family firms and non-family firms in the market for 
corporate control would be of great interest. It is believed that an investigation of irrational motives 
would be an interesting topic for a case study.  
While patent counts are accepted in the innovation literature as a measure of innovation 
(Hagedoorn & Cloodt, 2003), it is also known that many patentable inventions are not patented for 
strategic reasons and may not accurately gauge the knowledge base of firms (Griliches,1990). Thus 
patents are regarded as just a part of a whole of the outcome of a firm’s innovation activities (Jaffe 
et al.1993). To mitigate this future studies may focus on specific industries and explore the 
contingencies within these specific industries that impinge on patenting of inventions.  
With regards to chapter 4, the setup of the study is such that it examines how technology 
performance aspirations influence acquisitions in different product markets. This may appear as 
mismatch which may obscure the learning opportunities in technology based acquisitions. Future 
research may consider decoupling this by focusing exclusively on acquisitions in different 
technology classifications in order to make the learning implications clearer. 
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Appendices 
APPENDIX 1 
TABLE 2: Correlations 
  Variables 1 2 3 4 
1 Acquisition dummy 1.00    
2 Upswing acquisition 0.71 1.00   
3 Peak acquisitions 0.61 -0.04 1.00  
4 Downswing acquisitions 0.26 -0.02 -0.02 1.00 
5 Related acquisition 4 digit 0.51 0.31 0.39 0.11 
6 Upswing related acquisitions 4 digit 0.34 0.48 -0.02 -0.01 
7 Peak related acquisitions 4 digit 0.35 -0.03 0.58 -0.01 
8 Downswing related acquisitions 4 digit 0.13 -0.01 -0.01 0.49 
9 Unrelated acquisition 4 digit 0.76 0.57 0.44 0.18 
10 Upswing unrelated acquisitions 4 digit 0.55 0.78 -0.04 -0.02 
11 Peak unrelated acquisitions 4 digit 0.47 -0.04 0.78 -0.01 
12 Downswing unrelated acquisitions 4 digit 0.19 -0.02 -0.02 0.74 
13 Related acquisition 2 digit 0.72 0.45 0.50 0.22 
14 Upswing related acquisitions 2 digit 0.49 0.69 -0.03 -0.01 
15 Peak related acquisitions 2 digit 0.47 -0.03 0.77 -0.01 
16 Downswing related acquisitions 2 digit 0.21 -0.01 -0.01 0.79 
17 Unrelated acquisition 2 digit 0.61 0.48 0.34 0.11 
18 Upswing unrelated acquisitions 2 digit 0.46 0.65 -0.04 -0.02 
19 Peak unrelated acquisitions 2 digit 0.38 -0.03 0.62 -0.01 
20 Downswing unrelated acquisitions 2 digit 0.12 -0.01 -0.01 0.49 
21 M&A experience 0.46 0.33 0.28 0.12 
22 Firm size 0.13 0.06 0.11 0.04 
23 R&D/assets 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 
24 Patent/R&D -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 
25 Patent citations -0.04 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 
26 ROA 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.04 
27 Debt/assets 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.00 
28 Patent stock 0.14 0.04 0.14 0.07 
29 Technology below aspiration -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
30 Technology above aspiration 0.11 0.05 0.12 0.00 
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TABLE 2: Correlations (continued) 
  Variables 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
5 Related acquisition 4 digit 1.00             
6 Upswing related acquisitions 4 digit 0.67 1.00            
7 Peak related acquisitions 4 digit 0.69 -0.01 1.00           
8 Downswing related acquisitions 4 digit 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00          
9 Unrelated acquisition 4 digit 0.08 0.07 0.06 -0.01 1.00         
10 Upswing unrelated acquisitions 4 digit 0.05 0.10 -0.03 -0.01 0.74 1.00        
11 Peak unrelated acquisitions 4 digit 0.08 -0.02 0.14 -0.01 0.58 -0.04 1.00       
12 Downswing unrelated acquisitions 4 digit -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.26 -0.02 -0.01 1.00      
13 Related acquisition 2 digit 0.71 0.48 0.49 0.18 0.41 0.26 0.29 0.13 1.00     
14 Upswing related acquisitions 2 digit 0.46 0.70 -0.02 -0.01 0.29 0.41 -0.03 -0.01 0.68 1.00    
15 Peak related acquisitions 2 digit 0.51 -0.02 0.75 -0.01 0.25 -0.03 0.46 -0.01 0.65 -0.02 1.00   
16 Downswing related acquisitions 2 digit 0.15 -0.01 -0.01 0.62 0.12 -0.02 -0.01 0.49 0.29 -0.01 -0.01 1.00  
17 Unrelated acquisition 2 digit 0.05 0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.80 0.61 0.46 0.19 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.00 1.00 
18 Upswing unrelated acquisitions 2 digit 0.02 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.61 0.82 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.07 -0.03 -0.01 0.75 
19 Peak unrelated acquisitions 2 digit 0.07 -0.02 0.12 -0.01 0.47 -0.03 0.80 -0.01 0.07 -0.02 0.12 -0.01 0.58 
20 Downswing unrelated acquisitions 2 digit -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.20 -0.01 -0.01 0.78 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.25 
21 M&A experience 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.06 0.38 0.26 0.23 0.11 0.33 0.23 0.22 0.10 0.30 
22 Firm size 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.15 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.14 
23 R&D/assets 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 
24 Patent/R&D -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 
25 Patent citations -0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 
26 ROA 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.01 
27 Debt/assets -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
28 Patent stock 0.05 -0.01 0.08 0.00 0.16 0.07 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.18 
29 Technology below aspiration 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 
30 Technology above aspiration 0.10 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.15 
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TABLE 2: Correlations (continued) 
    18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
18 Upswing unrelated acquisitions 2 digit 1.00             
19 Peak unrelated acquisitions 2 digit -0.03 1.00            
20 Downswing unrelated acquisitions 2 digit -0.01 -0.01 1.00           
21 M&A experience 0.22 0.18 0.08 1.00          
22 Firm size 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.25 1.00         
23 R&D/assets 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.24 1.00        
24 Patent/R&D 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 1.00       
25 Patent citations 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.10 -0.37 0.20 0.02 1.00      
26 ROA 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 0.10 1.00     
27 Debt/assets -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.10 0.25 -0.37 0.07 -0.20 -0.27 1.00    
28 Patent stock 0.08 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.46 0.11 0.17 -0.06 -0.07 -0.01 1.00   
29 Technology below aspiration -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.20 -0.20 -0.07 0.00 0.08 -0.11 1.00  
30 Technology above aspiration 0.10 0.12 0.02 0.08 0.25 0.13 0.11 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.63 -0.1341 1.00 
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APPENDIX 2 
Computation of Technology Above and Below Aspiration Levels 
In the first step, we subtracted the 3-year average of patent stock from the patent stock in yeart. 
The difference is normalized by the 3-year average of the patent stock. The positive values are 
taken as the aspiration above aspiration levels while the negative values are taken as the aspiration 
below aspiration levels. The following formula is used: Technology below aspiration level = 
(patent stockt – average patent stocktt-3) / average patent stockt-3. To arrive at a measure for a 
negative aspiration levels we multiplied the negative aspiration level value by (-1) so that all values 
are positive. The examples in tables A & B indicate that the measure is not impacted by differences 
in the absolute number of patents.  
TABLE A 
Year 
Patent 
count 
Patent 
stock Frame 
6 1 2,24450625 0,23980041 
5 0 1,464125 0,088130555 
4 1 1,7225 0,44646606 
3 0 0,85 0,378378378 
2 1 1 2 
1 0 0 0 
 
TABLE B 
Year 
Patent 
count 
Patent 
stock Frame 
6 100 124,450625 0,23980041 
5 0 146,4125 0,088130555 
4 100 172,25 0,44646606 
3 0 85 0,378378378 
2 100 100 2 
1 0 0 0 
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Furthermore, as shown in table C & D, in order for a firm to fall below aspiration levels or 
become negative, the firm needs to deviate downwards by a large amount from a consistently high 
performance and stay below the previous performance for a longer time period. 
 
TABLE C 
Year 
Patent 
count Patent stock Frame 
6 0 230,233656 -0,157434402 
5 0 270,863125 -0,040372265 
4 100 318,6625 0,256369819 
3 100 257,25 0,423236515 
2 100 185 0,947368421 
1 100 100 0 
 
 
 
TABLE D 
Year Patent count Patent stock Frame 
6 0 124,450625 -0,15743 
5 0 146,4125 0,088131 
4 100 172,25 0,446466 
3 0 85 0,378378 
2 100 100 2 
1 0 0 0 
 
 
